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Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
Tytuł:
New technologies or new human rights: the right to a government by humans and the right to one’s own thoughts?
Autorzy:
Ryszard, Piotrowski,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902813.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-01-17
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
new technologies
human rights
artificial intelligence
democracy
right to privacy
the right to a government by humans
the right to one’s own thoughts
nowe technologie
prawa człowieka
sztuczna inteligencja
prawo do prywatności
prawo do rządu sprawowanego przez ludzi
prawo do własnych myśli
Opis:
The rapid development of information and communication technology has made it imperative that new human rights be spelled out, to cope with an array of expected threats associated with this process. With artificial intelligence being increasingly put to practical uses, the prospect arises of Man’s becoming more and more AI-dependant in multiple walks of life. This necessitates that a constitutional and international dimension be imparted to a right that stipulates that key state-level decisions impacting human condition, life and freedom must be made by humans, not automated systems or other AI contraptions. But if artificial intelligence were to make decisions, then it should be properly equipped with value-based criteria. The culture of abdication of privacy protection may breed consent to the creation and practical use of technologies capable to penetrate an individual consciousness without his or her consent. Evidence based on such thought interference must be barred from court proceedings. Everyone’s right to intellectual identity and integrity, the right to one’s thoughts being free from technological interference, is as essential for the survival of the democratic system as the right to privacy – and it may well prove equally endangered.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2018, 76; 283-296
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances, and the Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Rethinking the Polish Experience
Autorzy:
Ryszard, Piotrowski,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902983.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-05-04
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
separation of powers
checks and balances
rule of law
democracy
the Constitution
human rights
values
sovereign
privacy
new technologies
podział władzy
kontrola i równowaga
praworządność
demokracja
Konstytucja
prawa człowieka
wartości
suwerenność
prywatność
nowe technologie
Opis:
The principle of checks and balances counts among the most fundamental constitutional values, as it is connected with the recognition and guaranteeing of human rights – in other words is the very essence of the Constitution, an act that limits the majority rule to allow for the rights and freedoms of the individual. Also of key importance is the connection of this precept with the essence of the democratic system, understood as one where the majority rule is constrained by human rights. The principle of checks and balances could function in full only in correspondence with culture of respect for human rights. The status of the sovereign needs legitimacy, which derives from the sovereign’s subordination to the Constitution. Being sovereign means being unsubordinated to anybody. It is thus fair to conclude that the attribute of sovereignty actually belongs to the values that have been shaped by culture and linked to the timeless moral rules and principles corresponding to humanity’s eternal dilemmas – the values that create the constitutional culture, i.e. a community’s set of values. The sovereign does not exercise the supreme authority over values, and the values are embodied in the Constitution, which is inseparably linked with the people and their sovereignty. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland reflects the precepts of liberal democracy, or such kind of democracy where the sources of human rights do not stem from the will of the majority. The model of governance adopted in the Constitution could be described as consensual democracy. Constitutional practice has taken a course where the system of consensual democracy – as laid down in the Constitution of Poland, with the power of the majority being constrained by rights of the minority – is turning into a system of a majority democracy, based not on a dialogue between the majority and the opposition, but on the power of a parliamentary majority who disregards the systemic role of the opposition.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2019, 79; 78-91
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Remarks on the Dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland
Autorzy:
Ryszard, Piotrowski,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902515.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Constitution
democratic state ruled by law
Constitutional Tribunal
Opis:
Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2016, 68; 279-292
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Uwagi o prawnym znaczeniu konstytucyjnego zakazu nadmiernego zadłużania państwa
Autorzy:
Piotrowski, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1632213.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-06-23
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Constitution
national public debt
public finance
budget deficit
freedom of economic activity
parliament
Konstytucja
państwowy dług publiczny
finanse publiczne
deficyt budżetowy
swoboda działalności gospodarczej
parlament
Opis:
According to Article 216.5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland it shall be permissible neither to contract loans nor provide guarantees and financial sureties which would engender a national public debt exceeding three-fifths of the value of the annual gross domestic product. The method of calculating the value of the annual gross domestic product and national public debt shall be specified by statute. However, this provision co-establishing the principle of balance budget as constitutional value is not an absolute paradigm. It is limited by other constitutional values and principles, including the principle of common good, and should not be abused against the principle of diligence and efficiency in the work of state bodies.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2020, 86; 227-240
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A Republic of distrust, fear and division. Rethinking contemporary Polish Experience
Autorzy:
Piotrowski, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/47397975.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-12
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
distrust
power
constitution
democracy
state
human rights
new technologies
judicial power
opposition
nieufność
władza
konstytucja
demokracja
prawa człowieka
nowe technologie
władza sądownicza
opozycja
Opis:
The system of governance in contemporary Poland is founded mainly on a negative narrative of distrust. That narrative brought to power the country’s present scaremongering rulers. They continue feeding the public with frightening stories of an influx of refugees, threats of war and terrorist attacks, evils of globalisation and a loss of cultural identity to foreign ways of life. A balance between distrust of rulers and trust in them is part of democracy’s constitutional identity. Those currently in power sow distrust in liberal democracy and its values – they violate the constitution, stir up distrust of elites, and make attempts at bringing the judiciary to heelwhile staging judges bashing propaganda campaigns. Distrust of European law and European institutions is part and parcel of this process. The negative narrative weakens and threatens to disenfranchise civil society, blurring the line between law and lawlessness. It also weakens those in power.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2021, 88; 312-324
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wojna i pokój w Konstytucji RP
Autorzy:
Piotrowski, Ryszard
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/48562326.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-11-13
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Constitution
war
peace
human rights
democracy
Opis:
Art. 116 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides that a state of war and the conclusion of peace are declared by the Sejm acting in the name of the Republic of Poland. These two notions, having no constitutional definition, come under the rubric of established notions, i.e. concepts whose meaning derives from doctrinal findings and provisions of law, as well as from constitutional principles and values. The Sejm’s power to declare a state of war and, consequently, declare the conclusion of peace is part of Polish system-of-governance traditions. The parliament’s power to declare war actually characterizes most of the democratic systems, even if it could be argued that waiving this prerogative in practice characterizes it as well, reflecting the preponderance of the executive power in the domain of foreign policy. The wording of Art. 116 rules out an invasive war, also in the form of a war of prevention or a preventive self-defence. The Sejm may adopt the relevant resolution only in case of armed aggression against the territory of the Republic of Poland, or if international treaties impose an obligation of common defence against aggression, i.e. as a consequence of an act of aggression. Being of key importance for the constitutional regulation of war and peace, this constraint is commensurate with international law, which the Republic of Poland is required to respect pursuant to Art. 9 of the Constitution, and is also commensurate with the Preamble to the Constitution. In a democracy, acts of war – as an important government prerogative – may only be conducted pursuant to the relevant constitutional provisions which define the conditions that must be met for such acts to be legitimate. The conduct of a war, after all, does not warrant the suspension of the Constitution. A democratic state ruled by law must not conduct a war otherwise than on the basis, and within the constraints, of law – if it is to retain its constitutional identity. For the use of armed forces abroad to be commensurate with the Constitution, such use must not represent an act of aggression, nor can it represent any acts violating the principles of the United Nations Charter. If past experience is to be a guide, democratic constitutions are not capable of preventing anti-democratic changes in the system of governance, nor are they capable of preventing wars. War represents a failure of the Constitution, by destroying its foundation, the belief in inalienable and inherent dignity of the person.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2022, 91; 300-319
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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