Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "guilt" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7
Tytuł:
Наратив вини в „Кассандрі” Лесі Українки
Guilt Narrative in Lesya Ukrainka’s “Cassandra”
Autorzy:
Varetska, Sofia
Macenka, Svitlana
Melnyk, Diana
Tarasyuk, Yaryna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2157676.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-07-28
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
Lesya Ukrainka
Cassandra
myth
guilt
linguistic manifestation of guilt
mythological guilt
social aspect of guilt
philosophical and existential dimension of guilt
Opis:
The article is dedicated to the guilt narrative in Lesya Ukrainka’s “Cassandra” (1907). The purpose of the research is to trace how this narrative gets actualized and how it functions on different textual levels and from different optic standpoints: linguistic, mythological, social, and philosophical. The core principle of analysis is a holistic approach that makes a versatile, multi-level and multi-vector interpretation of the text possible, so, this is attracting it within a wider European cultural and philosophical context and changing the horizons for its interpretation. It is pointed out that guilt narrative is a through one, and it gets specific cultural contexts, intertextual connections, sense models and linguistic embodiments at each of the researched levels. Hence, it may be said that different aspects of this narrative are relatively autonomous and can be viewed as absolutely different and self-sufficient linguistic and semantic fields. The linguistic level of guilt brings you into the problem field of the spoken and unspeakable, a cognitive dissonance between the said/unsaid and perceived. The mythological aspect of guilt introduces the context of ancient (hence, all Western European) literature, shows the procedural nature of the mythological and literary image of Cassandra. The social aspect of guilt makes indubitable the antinomy of individual and social, victim and self-sacrifice, the problem of Other and Otherness, as the reverse side of self-identification. The philosophical dimension of guilt is disclosed in the background of re-interpreted myth phenomenon, anthropological dimension of mythological and literary connections. It is emphasized that the researched aspects complement and deepen each other at the same time. It is directing the through narrative of guilt from classical ancient literary interpretations of the myth about Cassandra towards the modern European re-interpretation of the very concept of the myth, from the ancient myth history to the universal human code. And Lesya Ukrainka’s “Cassandra” is not just exemplifying an attempt of making a literary search, the researcher’s and writer’s interest in the ancient materials, and also constitutes a way of personal myth manifestation and the search of Ukrainian national identity via the European context.
Źródło:
Studia Polsko-Ukraińskie; 2022, 9; 125-140
2353-5644
2451-2958
Pojawia się w:
Studia Polsko-Ukraińskie
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Impact of Human Dignity on the Principles of Criminal Liability. The Example of Guilt
Autorzy:
Krzysztof, Szczucki,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902957.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
criminal law
constitutional law
human dignity
guilt
culpability
criminal liability
Opis:
Human dignity is a well-known concept among Western countries since after World War II, when states, in an effort to create a new platform of cooperation with a view to guaranteeing peace, were looking for an axiological foundation of the new order. The findings described in the article may serve to underpin the following notions, which have to be the object of further research on relations between the human dignity principle and rules of criminal liability, guilt in particular. First, the “guilt standard” is obligatory, whenever a state intends to punish a person. Second, punishment can be meted out only to an offender with an ability to bear responsibility. In other words, only a person whose characteristic derived from the principle of dignity is fully actualized can be punished. Third, punishing should be preceded by an analysis of the degree of guilt. The more eager the perpetrator was to act against the legal system and against the values protected by it, the severer punishment should be meted out. Finally, law should provide for exclusion of culpability when the human dignity principle demands one to act in a manner that is outwardly criminal, but was committed due to a motivation that ought to be excused in the light of the dignity principle.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2016, 67; 11-31
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Guilt as a premise of administrative liability of a penal character
Autorzy:
Błachnio-Parzych, Anna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/48899539.pdf
Data publikacji:
2024-03-09
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
principle of guilt
nullum crimen sine culpa
administrative-criminal liability
presumption of innocence
Opis:
Liability for offences subject to administrative monetary sanctions formally belongs to administrative law, where the prevailing position is that guilt does not constitute a prerequisite for this liability. However, the punitive nature of some sanctions at the same time places this kind of liability under broadly understood criminal law (penal law). Their penal nature raises doubt as to the legitimacy of the aforementioned position concerning guilt. The aim of this article is to answer the question whether guilt should constitute a premise for administrative liability of a penal nature. First, analysis of the standards in the matter developed in the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the European Union will be presented. Next, selected provisions of administrative law in force will be examined to answer the question whether they are compatible with the aforementioned standards.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2023, 100; 28-43
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Responsibility – an Anthropological Outline
Autorzy:
Stanisław, Jędrczak,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902637.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-03-08
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
proleptic view on personhood
responsibility
pseudo-Diodorian modality
freedom of will
consensus
guilt
proleptyczna koncepcja osoby
odpowiedzialność
modalność pseudo-Diodorowa
wina
Opis:
In the article, I try to present an outline of the theory of responsibility. Its double root – based on the logical distinction between criterion and testimony – is derived from Abelard’s anthropology of action and the theory of personhood developed by Timothy Chappell. Initially, I discuss the metaphysical difficulties related to the problem of freedom (especially linked with determinism). Afterwards, following Abelard, I try to indicate an anthropological justification of punishment based on guilt. The last part of the paper is devoted to the attempt to enter the free will into a broader view of Chappell’s theory. The aim of the work is to prepare the ground for future studies on the proleptic notion of personhood and its further application within the philosophy of law.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2019, 82; 131-148
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
„Wszyscy oskarżeni są piękni...”. Antynomie doświadczenia prawa w prozie Franza Kafki
Autorzy:
Paweł, Dybel,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/897114.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
positive law
father
disenchantment
guilt
trauma
acephalic law
prawo pozytywne
ojciec
rozczarowanie
wina
prawo acefaliczne
Opis:
This article is an attempt to demonstrate the specificity of a relation of a human subject to the institution of law in the form in which it was presented in Franz Kafka’s prose, linking it closely with the writer’s approach to the figure of the father. I indicate that in both cases this relation is based on the feeling of guilt, with no “redemption” possible. However, the difference is that in the first case this is the feeling of guilt towards an anonymous institution of the positive law as such, whereas in the second case guilt as guilt towards the father is of personal nature. In the first case, the problem of “the accused” lies in the fact that the accusation and judgment whether someone is guilty or not has no clearly defined point of reference. It is not guilt towards “someone” – e.g. towards God, the father, the sovereign etc. – but towards law itself. This is law which is the prosecutor and decides on guilt. This, in turn, means that one is guilty before no one. The positive law is the acephalous law, this is the headless law. Therefore, any attempt to prove own innocence towards it is doomed to failure.
Źródło:
Przegląd Humanistyczny; 2016, 60(4 (455)); 9-22
0033-2194
Pojawia się w:
Przegląd Humanistyczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Die Bedeutung von „Können” bei Fahrlässigkeit und Schuld
Autorzy:
Schmoller, Kurt
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/48899332.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023-01-23
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
negligence
guilt
free will
determinism
meaning of “(s)he could have”
purpose of punishment
Opis:
In connection with criminal negligence, the focus is regularly on whether the perpetrator “could have” recognized and avoided the situation he brought about, whether (s)he “could have” acted more carefully or complied with the requirements of due diligence. When examining guilt, it is also important (in the case of intentional as well as negligent offenses) whether the perpetrator “could have” recognized the wrongfulness of his/her act and “could have” acted according to this insight. If the “(s)he could have” perspective is rejected, the offender remains unpunished. On the other hand, there is a controversy regarding the extent humans can freely choose their perceptions and behaviour at all or whether these are ultimately determined by external and internal circumstances. The article explores the question of how a “(s)he could have” requirement can be conceived in law and especially in criminal law in a way that remains unaffected by the unsolved debate between “free will” and “determinism”. The author proposes that in the phrase “(s)he could have” the word “can” should not be understood in the (indeterministic) sense of alternative perceptions or behaviour, but simply as the existence of specific psycho-physical properties which, according to empirical knowledge, are necessary for compliance with a norm, just as it can be said, for example, that someone “can” speak French or that he “can” play the piano. It is also compatible with the function of “punishment” in modern (secular) criminal law to understand the “(s)he could have” requirement of punishability as a mere statement about existing, empirically ascertainable psychophysical properties of a person (and in this way to decouple it from the problem of determinism).
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2022, 93; 209-225
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Artykuł 28 § 1 k.k. po nowelizacji z dnia 20 lutego 2015 r. Uwagi na temat konieczności oddzielania strony podmiotowej czynu zabronionego od winy
Autorzy:
Zbigniew, Jędrzejewski,
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902838.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Tematy:
prohibited act
mens rea
intentional character of an offence
unintentional character of an offence
guilt
act committed while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act
Opis:
The object of analysis is the amended art. 28 § 1 of the Penal Code, which stipulates that „whoever commits an act while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act, shall not commit a crime”. The new regulation of 28 § 1 of the Penal Code is the next attempt to statutorily define the concept of an offence based on the methodology of a strict separation of the object of evaluation from the evaluation itself, that is, primarily a radical separation of mens rea of a prohibited act from guilt. Therefore, the authors of the change have consistently attempted to eliminate all normative attributes from the scope of „recklessness” and „negligence”. This is a result of the view that assumes a pure descriptive character of the set of criminal offence features (Ger. „Tatbestand”) including subjective features (offences of intentional and unintentional character). In this context, acts committed while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of a prohibited act exclude guilt, however the fulfilment of the features of criminal acts of unintentional character is limited to the fulfilment of objective features (a consequence of the concept of the unintentional character of an offence as a plain negation of intent). The negative wording of art. 1 § 3 of the Penal Code, the objective and general interpretation of the term found in art. 9 § 2 „could have foreseen” (a transfer of the so-called objective foreseeability to the category of objective attribution) and the concept of committing an act while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of a prohibited act excluding guilt lead, in the area of unintentional character of an offence, to the presumption of guilt on the basis of the fulfilling only the objective features of a criminal act. The author of the article demonstrates the inaccuracy of this argument for a strictly descriptive character of the features of a prohibited act, and in particular the features of intent (intentional character of an offence). The object of intent (a feature of a criminal offence) has a evaluative character (evaluation), therefore determining intent can generally constitute a premise for accepting guilt (intended), unless the circumstance of excluding guilt exceptionally occurs. In the case of an unintentional character of an act, such a relation does not occur, and the guarantee functions (the rule of positive establishment of the perpetrator’s guilt) thus require subjective (specific and individual evaluation) interpretation of the premise „could have foreseen” found in art. 9 § 2 of the Penal Code.
Źródło:
Studia Iuridica; 2016, 65; 25-40
0137-4346
Pojawia się w:
Studia Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies