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    Tytuł:
    Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Account of Analogy Applied to Law: the Proportional Model of Analogical Legal Reasoning
    Autorzy:
    Koszowski, Maciej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927495.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016-06-01
    Wydawca:
    Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
    Tematy:
    proportion
    proportional
    proportionality
    analogy
    legal
    Chaïm Perelman
    Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca
    reasoning
    approach
    logic
    apply
    analogically
    account
    law
    Opis:
    In this paper, the author has undertaken an attempt to adjust Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of analogy to the province of law. He thus sketches out a pertinent scheme of legal analogy based upon the similarity of proportions and indulges in a consideration of the merits and demerits of such a proposition. To this aim, as the proportions that are compared in such an account of analogy, the relations between the facts of the cases and their legal outcomes were chosen: one such outcome already known and one tentatively posited. Finally, however, the author’s analyses lead to the conclusion that despite its considerable theoretical attractiveness and some mystical charm, legal analogy consisting of the comparison of two proportions is either quite similar to orthodox approaches to analogical reasoning in law or too obscure for one to employ it credibly in the legal setting. In consequence, until its proponents have elucidated the workings of proportional analogy in more detail, the potential use of such a form of analogy in the province of law does not seem promising and cannot be recommended.
    Źródło:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2016, 2(13); 5-13
    2082-3304
    Pojawia się w:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Model precedensu z analogii
    The Model of Precedent Based upon Analogical Reasoning
    Autorzy:
    Koszowski, Maciej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927465.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-06-01
    Wydawca:
    Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
    Tematy:
    precedens sądowy
    analogia
    faktualny model analogii
    model racjonalny analogii
    judicial precedent
    analogical reasoning
    factual model
    rational model
    Opis:
    Apart from the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions), or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, i.e. the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to generate just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience.
    Źródło:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2014, 2(9); 43-65
    2082-3304
    Pojawia się w:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    O lukach w prawie rzadko spotykanych słów kilka
    A few rare remarks on legal gaps
    Autorzy:
    Koszowski, Maciej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/929284.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
    Tematy:
    intra legem gap
    contra legem gap
    legal gap
    extra legem gap
    luka w prawie
    luka extra legem
    luka intra legem
    luka contra legem
    Opis:
    The article addresses the issue of legal gaps (lacunas). Specifically, the author puts forward the general definition of legal gap which uses the concept of ‘automatically applicable’ legal rule as well as presupposes specific understanding of law – namely, that it is consisted solely of the rules of the mentioned type. Next, basing upon that definition, he defines three kinds of lacunas that are commonly distinguished in Polish and international scholarly literature, i.e. extra, intra and contra legem. As it is demonstrated, the merits of proffered definitions are manifold. First of all, they reduce the dependence of the notion of legal gap on value judgment. Secondly, they fairly well fit into the structure of contemporary legal orders. Thirdly, owing to them, the filling of legal gaps is not pointless. And lastly, the other kinds of lacunas one may encounter in academic literature are not at odds with the proffered theory, at least not by definition. At the end of the article, in the light of the main idea of the author’s conception, the Anglo -Saxon notion of the case of first impression is discussed, taking into account different models of (approaches to) the phenomenon of a binding judicial precedent.
    Źródło:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2013, 1(6); 109-122
    2082-3304
    Pojawia się w:
    Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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