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Tytuł:
Model precedensu z analogii
The Model of Precedent Based upon Analogical Reasoning
Autorzy:
Koszowski, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927465.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-06-01
Wydawca:
Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
Tematy:
precedens sądowy
analogia
faktualny model analogii
model racjonalny analogii
judicial precedent
analogical reasoning
factual model
rational model
Opis:
Apart from the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions), or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, i.e. the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to generate just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience.
Źródło:
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2014, 2(9); 43-65
2082-3304
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Account of Analogy Applied to Law: the Proportional Model of Analogical Legal Reasoning
Autorzy:
Koszowski, Maciej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/927495.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016-06-01
Wydawca:
Stowarzyszenie Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej – Sekcja Polska IVR
Tematy:
proportion
proportional
proportionality
analogy
legal
Chaïm Perelman
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca
reasoning
approach
logic
apply
analogically
account
law
Opis:
In this paper, the author has undertaken an attempt to adjust Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of analogy to the province of law. He thus sketches out a pertinent scheme of legal analogy based upon the similarity of proportions and indulges in a consideration of the merits and demerits of such a proposition. To this aim, as the proportions that are compared in such an account of analogy, the relations between the facts of the cases and their legal outcomes were chosen: one such outcome already known and one tentatively posited. Finally, however, the author’s analyses lead to the conclusion that despite its considerable theoretical attractiveness and some mystical charm, legal analogy consisting of the comparison of two proportions is either quite similar to orthodox approaches to analogical reasoning in law or too obscure for one to employ it credibly in the legal setting. In consequence, until its proponents have elucidated the workings of proportional analogy in more detail, the potential use of such a form of analogy in the province of law does not seem promising and cannot be recommended.
Źródło:
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej; 2016, 2(13); 5-13
2082-3304
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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