Temat: Liar paradox - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: The Liar, Contextualism, and the Stalnakerian View of Context
Autorzy:: Rudnicki, Jakub
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/973299.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2019
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:: contextualism
Stalnaker
liar paradox
context
semantics
Glanzberg
Opis:: My aim in this paper is to amend the Stalnakerian view of context in such a way that it can allow for an adequate treatment of a contextualist position regarding the Liar Paradox. I discuss Glanzberg’s contextualism and the reason why his position cannot be encompassed by the Stalnakerian view, as it is normally construed. Finally, I introduce the phenomenon I call “semantic dissonance”, followed by a mechanism accommodating the Stalnakerian view to the demands of Glanzberg’s contextualism.
Źródło:: Studia Semiotyczne; 2019, 33, 1
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:: Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective
Autorzy:: Gomułka, Jakub
Wawrzyniak, Jan
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/561372.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2017
Wydawca:: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne
Tematy:: compositionality principle
context principle
intelligibility
liar paradox
nonsense
Wittgenstein
Opis:: Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.
Źródło:: Studia Semiotyczne; 2017, 31, 2; 179-199
0137-6608
Pojawia się w:: Studia Semiotyczne
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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