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Wyszukujesz frazę "Polish penal code" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
Tytuł:
The practice of applying the provision of Article 297 of the Polish Penal Code
Autorzy:
Gutbier, Katarzyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1788439.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-06-24
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
oszustwo kredytowe
polski kodeks karny
wyroki
orzecznictwo
case law
credit fraud
Polish Penal Code
judgements
Opis:
The aim of the publication is to present the results of research on the issue of the application of the provision of Article 297 of Polish Penal Code in practice and an attempt to evaluate them and an attempt to formulate conclusions. The features characterizing the offense under Article 297 § 1 of Polish Penal Code, which reads as follows: who, in order to obtain for himself or someone else, from a bank or organizational unit conducting similar economic activity under the Act or from an authority or institution with public funds - credit, monetary loan, surety, guarantee, letter of credit, subsidy, subsidy, confirmation by the bank of a liability arising from a surety or a guarantee or similar cash payment for  a  specific  business  purpose,  payment  instrument  or  public  contract,  submit  counterfeit, converted, attesting untruth or unreliable document or unreliable written statement regarding circumstances  of  significant  importance  in  order  to  obtain  the  mentioned  financial  support, payment instrument or order, it is punishable by imprisonment up from 3 months to 5 years. Discussed are also the indications of committing an act consisting in abandoning the notification in Article 297 § 2 of Polish Penal Code, worded as follows: who, in breach of a binding obligation, does not notify the relevant entity of the situation that may affect the cessation or limitation of the financial support referred to in § 1 or the public order or the possibility of further use of the electronic payment instrument. Next,  the  methodology  of  the  research  was  described  in  detail.  The  research  was  of  an  files nature  and  concerned  final  judgments  issued  by  courts  of  second  instance.  The  time  period of  researches was from 2012 to 2016. A purposeful selection was also made due to the legal qualification of the deed on the basis of which the conviction was handed down in the first instance, i.e. the offenses under Article 297 of Polish Penal Code. Then the results of the research were presented and an attempt was made to comment on the results obtained. The conclusions from the research indicated, among others, the cases of lack of correct understanding of the provision, confusion of concepts, unnecessary automatic cumulative classification of the deed, narrowing the use of the instruments mentioned in the provision to credits, loans and subsidies, and many more cases.
Celem publikacji jest przedstawienie wyników badań dotyczących problematyki zastosowania przepisu art. 297 k.k. w praktyce oraz podjęcie próby ich oceny i sformułowania wniosków. Opisano znamiona charakteryzujące przestępstwo z art. 297 § 1 k.k., który brzmi następująco: kto, w celu uzyskania dla siebie lub kogo innego, od banku lub jednostki organizacyjnej prowadzącej podobną działalność gospodarczą na podstawie ustawy albo od organu lub instytucji dysponujących środkami publicznymi – kredytu, pożyczki pieniężnej, poręczenia, gwarancji, akredytywy, dotacji, subwencji, potwierdzenia przez bank zobowiązania wynikającego z poręczenia lub z gwarancji lub podobnego świadczenia pieniężnego na określony cel gospodarczy, instrumentu płatniczego lub zamówienia publicznego, przedkłada podrobiony, przerobiony, poświadczający nieprawdę albo nierzetelny dokument albo nierzetelne, pisemne oświadczenie dotyczące okoliczności o istotnym znaczeniu dla uzyskania wymienionego wsparcia fnansowego, instrumentu płatniczego lub zamówienia, podlega karze pozbawienia wolności od 3 miesięcy do lat 5. Omówiono także znamiona popełnienia czynu polegającego na zaniechaniu powiadomienia z art. 297 § 2 k.k., o następującym brzmieniu: kto wbrew ciążącemu obowiązkowi, nie powiadamia właściwego podmiotu o powstaniu sytuacji mogącej mieć wpływ na wstrzymanie albo ograniczenie wysokości udzielonego wsparcia fnansowego, określonego w § 1, lub zamówienia publicznego albo na możliwość dalszego korzystania z instrumentu płatniczego. Następnie została dokładnie opisana metodologia przeprowadzonych badań. Badania miały charakter aktowy i dotyczyły prawomocnych orzeczeń wydanych przez sądy drugiej instancji. Cezurą czasową objęto okres od 2012 do 2016. Dokonano także wyboru celowego ze względu na kwalifkacje prawną czynu na podstawie, którego dokonano skazania w pierwszej instancji, tj. przestępstwa z art. 297 k.k. Następnie przedstawiono wyniki badań oraz podjęto próbę skomentowania otrzymanych rezultatów. Wnioski z badań wskazały, między innymi, na przypadki występowania braku prawidłowego zrozumienia przepisu, mylenie pojęć, niepotrzebnej automatycznej kumulatywnej kwalifkacji czynu, zawężenie stosowania instrumentów wymienionych w przepisie do kredytu, pożyczki oraz dotacji oraz a wiele innych.
Źródło:
Biuletyn Kryminologiczny; 2018, 25; 197-222
2084-5375
Pojawia się w:
Biuletyn Kryminologiczny
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Przestępstwa uprowadzenia lub zatrzymania małoletniego lub osoby nieporadnej (art. 188 K.K.)
Abductons or Detention of Minor or a Helpless Person (Art. 188 of the Polish Penal Code)
Autorzy:
Kołakowska-Przełomiec, Helena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/699146.pdf
Data publikacji:
1984
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
przestępstwa
uprowadzenie
zatrzymanie
małoletni
osoba nieporadna
kodeks karny
Polska
abductions
detention of minor
helpless person
Polska
penal code
Opis:
The present article contains a detailed description and results of analysis of cases of abduction and detention sentenced in Poland in 1979. The total of these cases was 9.       Abduction or detention, specified in Art. 188 of the Polish Penal Code, belongs to the group of offences against the family.      Art. 188 of the Penal Code provides, that "whoever contrary to the will of the person appointed to take care or to supervise, abducts or detains a minor or a person who is helpless by reason of this mental or physical condition, shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for from 6 months to 5 years”.        Theoretical studies and commentaries to the Penal Code stress the fact that the subject of legal protection in Art. 188 of the Penal Code is the institution of care and supervision. Art. 188 is turned against lawless one-sided alterations in the relation, directly determined or adjudicated by court, of care or supervision of a person specified in this Article. It is also indicated that this Article aims at protecting the child from the lawlessness of this quarrelling parents or other persons. It is also characteristic that the commentaries stress the fact that the motives from which the perpetrator acted are unessential as regards the existence of an offence specified in Art. 188.      A small number of persons sentenced for abduction or detention does not mean that offences of this kind are of little social significance. The real extent of this phenomenon is much greater than indicated by the small number of sentenced persons. As the common knowledge shows, the cases of lawless taking away of the children by quarrelling parents or relatives are frequent. Thus it could have been expected that the cases of abduction or detention which had been investigated by court as offences might be particularly drastic of nature. Yet the analysis of all cases failed to confirm this supposition. Among the 9 cases, there were 4 cases of "abdcution" and 5 cases of "detention'' of minors. None of the cases concerned a helpless person. In as few as 2 cases the minors were strangers unrelated to the perpetrator. In four cases, the minors were sons of the perpetrators, in one  case the minor was the perpetrator's  daughter, in one case – granddaughter;  also in one case, the minor was the perpetrator’s cousion. Among the perpetrators of „abduction" or  „detention” there were six men and three women.       The analysis of all criminal cases specified in Art. 188 reveals two sides of this type of offence: a) the aspect of family, care, and education, b) the criminal aspect.  However, these two sides are not closely connected with one another.       The cases of "abduction and detention" as represented in the paper reveal the background on which it comes to various forms of behaviour of parents towards children and towards each other. In the majority of cases,  an intervention of guardianship authorities in the life of parents and children has already taken place and various provisions have been made. However, they failed to eliminate the existing conflicts, what is more,  they increased them. The further execution of these decisions lacks additional supervision which would ensure a free contact with the child for the parent with whom the child does, not reside permanently, and, on the other hand, which would limit the lawlessness of mothers who do not allow the fathers to contact the children they care for. Therefore, in the examined cases we  deal with "abduction'' or "detention'' of a child by his father who is faced with difficulties on the mother's  part when he wants to see his child. The analysed cases are not drastic in character as regards  the conduct of perpetrators and the circumstances of their offence. On the other hand,  they are generally most drastic as regards legal proceedings  in such cases  and sentences. The examined fathers, mother, grandmother, and cousin are treated as offenders: persecuted, charged, tried, and sentenced for acts which, even if they disturbed the institution of care, could be treated as family and care cases. Generally it seems that the criminal character of the analysed cases is independent and separate, so to say, from the entire aspect of family, care, and education of these cases. It may be assumed that this situation is to a certain degree conditioned by the dogmatic and formalistic approach in the proceedings and sentencing in these  cases, which is  based on the formulation found in commentaries, that the perpetrator’s  motives are unrelevant to the existence of the offence, and that the subject of legal protection in Art. 188 is the institution of care and supervision, not the interest of the abducted person.       In the final part of the present paper it is stressed that while protecting the institution of care, one should still take into consideration first of all the interest of the child for whom this institution is to function. It is also in the child's interest that his parents and close relations do not become criminals because of him. The cases of „abduction and detention of a minor” should be examined as cases of family and care, penal law proceedings instituted only in cases of actual abduction of a minor, first of all that committed by strangers.
      The present article contains a detailed description and results of analysis of cases of abduction and detention sentenced in Poland in 1979. The total of these cases was 9.       Abduction or detention, specified in Art. 188 of the Polish Penal Code, belongs to the group of offences against the family.      Art. 188 of the Penal Code provides, that "whoever contrary to the will of the person appointed to take care or to supervise, abducts or detains a minor or a person who is helpless by reason of this mental or physical condition, shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for from 6 months to 5 years”.        Theoretical studies and commentaries to the Penal Code stress the fact that the subject of legal protection in Art. 188 of the Penal Code is the institution of care and supervision. Art. 188 is turned against lawless one-sided alterations in the relation, directly determined or adjudicated by court, of care or supervision of a person specified in this Article. It is also indicated that this Article aims at protecting the child from the lawlessness of this quarrelling parents or other persons. It is also characteristic that the commentaries stress the fact that the motives from which the perpetrator acted are unessential as regards the existence of an offence specified in Art. 188.      A small number of persons sentenced for abduction or detention does not mean that offences of this kind are of little social significance. The real extent of this phenomenon is much greater than indicated by the small number of sentenced persons. As the common knowledge shows, the cases of lawless taking away of the children by quarrelling parents or relatives are frequent. Thus it could have been expected that the cases of abduction or detention which had been investigated by court as offences might be particularly drastic of nature. Yet the analysis of all cases failed to confirm this supposition. Among the 9 cases, there were 4 cases of "abdcution" and 5 cases of "detention'' of minors. None of the cases concerned a helpless person. In as few as 2 cases the minors were strangers unrelated to the perpetrator. In four cases, the minors were sons of the perpetrators, in one  case the minor was the perpetrator's  daughter, in one case – granddaughter;  also in one case, the minor was the perpetrator’s cousion. Among the perpetrators of „abduction" or  „detention” there were six men and three women.       The analysis of all criminal cases specified in Art. 188 reveals two sides of this type of offence: a) the aspect of family, care, and education, b) the criminal aspect.  However, these two sides are not closely connected with one another.       The cases of "abduction and detention" as represented in the paper reveal the background on which it comes to various forms of behaviour of parents towards children and towards each other. In the majority of cases,  an intervention of guardianship authorities in the life of parents and children has already taken place and various provisions have been made. However, they failed to eliminate the existing conflicts, what is more,  they increased them. The further execution of these decisions lacks additional supervision which would ensure a free contact with the child for the parent with whom the child does, not reside permanently, and, on the other hand, which would limit the lawlessness of mothers who do not allow the fathers to contact the children they care for. Therefore, in the examined cases we  deal with "abduction'' or "detention'' of a child by his father who is faced with difficulties on the mother's  part when he wants to see his child. The analysed cases are not drastic in character as regards  the conduct of perpetrators and the circumstances of their offence. On the other hand,  they are generally most drastic as regards legal proceedings  in such cases  and sentences. The examined fathers, mother, grandmother, and cousin are treated as offenders: persecuted, charged, tried, and sentenced for acts which, even if they disturbed the institution of care, could be treated as family and care cases. Generally it seems that the criminal character of the analysed cases is independent and separate, so to say, from the entire aspect of family, care, and education of these cases. It may be assumed that this situation is to a certain degree conditioned by the dogmatic and formalistic approach in the proceedings and sentencing in these  cases, which is  based on the formulation found in commentaries, that the perpetrator’s  motives are unrelevant to the existence of the offence, and that the subject of legal protection in Art. 188 is the institution of care and supervision, not the interest of the abducted person.       In the final part of the present paper it is stressed that while protecting the institution of care, one should still take into consideration first of all the interest of the child for whom this institution is to function. It is also in the child's interest that his parents and close relations do not become criminals because of him. The cases of „abduction and detention of a minor” should be examined as cases of family and care, penal law proceedings instituted only in cases of actual abduction of a minor, first of all that committed by strangers.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1984, XI; 227-244
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Z rozważań o karach i środkach karnych o charakterze majątkowym (w świetle przepisów kodeksu karnego z 1997 r.)
Remarks on Penalties and Penal Measures of Pecuniary Nature (In the Light of the Provisions of 1997 Penal Code)
Autorzy:
Sienkiewicz, Zofia
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698746.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
kara
środki karne o charakterze majątkowym
kodeks karny z 1997 r.
polityka karna
penalty
penal measures of pecuniary nature
penal policy
Polish Penal Code of 1997
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 2008, XXIX-XXX; 629-641
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Judgement of the Supreme Court, dated 17 February 2016 (Ref. no. WA 16/15)
Autorzy:
Kleczkowska, Agata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/706774.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-09-01
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
blind bayonets
international criminal law
Penal Code
Polish Supreme Court
unlawful order
Opis:
In its Judgement of 17 February 2016, the Polish Supreme Court adjudicated the case of Polish soldiers accused of crimes committed in the village of Nangar Khel in Afghanistan in 2007. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that Polish soldiers were guilty of, inter alia, breach of Article 318 of the Polish Penal Code, which stipulates that a soldier commits a crime even when executing an order if he is aware of this crime. However, the part of the judgement devoted to the problem of unlawful orders is very limited and almost completely lacks references to international law. The Supreme Court could have referred to a number of international legal acts, starting from the beginning of 20th century and up to the more recent regulations, including those in the Rome Statute. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not use international case law. As a result, the argumentation of the Supreme Court should be assessed as limited and unconvincing.
Źródło:
Polish Yearbook of International Law; 2016, 36; 267-276
0554-498X
Pojawia się w:
Polish Yearbook of International Law
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Granice nieletniości w polskim prawie karnym
The Statutory Age-Limits of Juvenile Delinquenta in Polish Penal Law
Autorzy:
Rdzanek-Piwowar, Grażyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698533.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
nieletni przestępcy
nieletni
polskie prawo karne
kodeks karny
juvenile delinquents
juveniles
polish penal law
penal code
Opis:
The entering into force on 13 May l983 of the Act on the treatment of juveniles of 26 October 1982 ended the period of over fifty years of validity of provisions of the penal code of 1932 (Chapter XI) and code of criminal procedure of 1928 (Chapter II of Book XI) which regulated the principles of responsibility of juvenile perpetrators of “acts prohibited under penalty”. Authors of the pre-war legislation, at the first stage of its preparation in particular, intended to make it specific and educational in nature through omission in the treatment of juveniles of the elements of responsibility and punishment. The finally adopted solution was a compromise: responsibility of juveniles have been related to age, discernment, and type of measures applied. With respect to undiscerning juvenile perpetrators of acts prohibited under penalty under the age of 13, and also to those aged 13–17, only educational  measures could be applied (admonition; supervision by the parents, former guardians, or a probation officer; placement in an educational institution) Juveniles aged 13–17 who discerned the meaning of their act were to be placed in a correction al institution; educational measures were to be applied in their cases if the circumstances, the juvenile’s personality or his living conditions made such placement inexpedient. Thus the legislation concerning juveniles remained part of the system of penal law in spite of the special features it started to acquire. That was also the direction, after the war in particular, of interpretation of the legal provisions. As a result, the measures applied to juveniles were given an explicitly educational character. This was done through the relation of those imeasures  to the perpetrator’s personality and not to the act, and through abolition of the institution of discernment. Since discernment. Since mid–1950s, the juvenile courts followed instructions which  changed the legal status of a juvenile. The age limit of penal responsibility of juveniles was set initially at ten and then at 13 years; younger children were not to be brought before the courts unless the case concerned guardianship. Many changes in the post-war provisions were also introduced by means of statutes. They concerned organization and functioning of the system of treatment of juveniles  (strengthening of the role of judge, introduction of the so-called family courts, increased number of probation officers). This way, a socially desirable continuation of the legal tradition was secured by means of reforms which were evolutionary and dictated by the current needs, and without liquidation of the existing structures, tested in the practice of many decades. The new statute adopted many of those changes more or less directly. Setting the upper age limit of juveniles, the post-war penal code of 1969 preserved the principle according to which criminal responsibility is conditioned upon the offender’s age of at least 17 (Art. 9). At the same time, though, Art. 9 made it possible to apply to offenders aged 17 the measures normally designed for juveniles, and to sentence juveniles aged 16 guilty of the most serious crimes to the ordinary but extraordinarily mitigated penalties. The final shape of the Act on the treatment of juveniles of 26 October 1982 was influenced both by the intent to preserve the developed and tested solutions, and by the discussion that preceded its introduction when optional conceptions of the treatment of juveniles were submitted. The following stages of the thirty-two years’ period of legislative works can be distinguished: – the years 1950–1956; long works on a new penal code were in progress and attempts were made at aggravating the responsibility of juveniles through the introduction of penalties (according to a draft of 1950, penalties were to be imposed on juveniles starting from the age of 12); – the years 1956–1960; in 1956, it was decided to work on a separate statute on juvenil and not within the preparation of a new penal code; a special team of the Codification Commission failed to agree upon a draft of the statute; – the years 1961–65;  no legislative works were formally in progres but two different conceptions were discussed: of inclusion of prevention in the act (which would thus apply to the socially maladjusted juveniles as well) and of introduction of social courts; – the years 1966–1971; attempts were made at partly realizing those conceptions in a succession of draft statutes; – the years 1972–76; the works were conducted by the Ministry of Education which tried to include the problems of prevention of juvenile delinquency and treatment of juveniles in a broader statute called the young generation code; – the years 1977–82 when the works on a statute were again taken over by the Ministry of Justice and a succession of versions of the draft were prepared. The Act of 26 October 1982 on the treatment of juveniles changed the scope of the notion of “juvenile”. According to the statutory definition, juveniles are: 1) persons with respect to whom provisions of  the act apply in the sphere of prevention and control of demoralization; the upper age limit in this category is 18 years, and the lower limit is not specified; 2) persons with respect to whom provisions of the statute apply in the sphere of proceedings in cases of punishable acts; such proceedings can be instituted towards persons who have been aged over 13 but under 17 while committing a punishable act; 3) persons with respect to whom provisions of the statute apply in connection with the carrying out of educational or corrective measures; the upper age limit of this category is 21 years. Tlerefore, the statute goes beyond the sphere traditionally reserved for penal law. The aim at making the statute educational in nature is manifested above all by the principle that the commission by a juvenile of a punishable act is not the only condition of the institution of proceedings in the case of that juvenile. The statute sanctions the need for intervention in the early stage of social maladjustment not only in cases where that maladjustment manifests itself in a punishable act. If a juvenile does commit an act of this  kind, his offence is not examined in the categories of guilt and responsibility. This is manifested by the abolition of the criteria of discernment, by the term “punishable act” used to designate an  offence committed by a juvenile, and by the absence of the term “responsibility of juveniles” in the name and provisions of the statute discussed. The statute bases on the assumption of education; its basic notion is demoralization. In its first meaning in which it has been used by the legislator, “demoralization'” is treated as a prerequisite of initiation of proceedings. Were the educational assumptions adopted to the full, commission of a punishable act could and should be treated as one of the symptoms of demoralization, not different in any way from the other symptoms. Assumed in the statute, however, is a special treatment of the juveniles with respecr to whom provisions of the statute apply in the sphere of prevention of demoralization, and in the sphere of control of demoralization. With respect to the latter, provisions of  the statute on  proceedings in cases of punishable acts apply, and with respect to the former – provisions on civil proceedings. The differentiation introduced by the statute (which is not consistent for that matter) results from a specific compromise: a combination of the ideas of prevention and  education with the approach typical of penal law where the legal response is conditioned upon the gravity of the act.  A conflict of the tendencies which clash nowadays all over the world – to preserve the model of treatment of juveniles within the institutions of penal law on the one hand, and to give the statute an educational character on the other  hand – can be noticed in other provisions of the statute discussed as well. In the classical system, the age limits of juveniles were clear and had just as clearly defined functions – they marked out the age of the so-called conditional criminal responsibility, provided discernment could be ascertained. Today, the upper limit of the age of juveniles is usually also the limit of full criminal responsibility, although many legislations provide for an exceptional possibility of imposition of penalties upon the oldest juveniles who commit a crime or a serious offence. The problem of the lower limit is more entangled , the modern legislations adopting several age limits here which results usually from the need to determine different scopes of intervention of the legal provisions in the sphere of juvenile law. Therefore, what still remains an important issue  is for the juvenile law to define an age limit below which provisions of penal law never apply, not even as auxiliaries.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1993, XIX; 191-231
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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