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    Tytuł:
    Intelekt bierny a intelekt możnościowy w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    Passive intellect and potential intellect according to St. Thomas Aquinas
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452457.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt bierny
    intelekt możnościowy
    perypatetycka tradycja epistemologiczna
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    passive intellect
    potential intellect
    peripatetic epistemological tradition
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    The article is an attempt to respond the following questions: is there a difference between operations of potential and passive intellect? Could one call the potential intellect passive intellect? Are there any questions, statements or opinions in the history of philosophy which separate potential from passive intellect? The passivity of potential intellect is not a problem here, because its nature and its act is to be in the state of potency towards ist object. The subject of analysis tends to define teechnical terms "intellectus passivus" and to reach philosophical implications resulting from it.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2012, 1; 65-84
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Realna różnica między intelektem czynnym i możnościowym w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    The Real Distinction Between Agent and Potential Intellect in Approach Thomas Aquinas
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452459.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Thomas Aquinas
    potential intellect
    agent intellect
    real distinction
    object oh intellectual cognition
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy
    intelekt czynny
    różnica realna
    przedmiot poznania intelektualnego
    Opis:
    The aim of article was to prove the existence of the real difference between active intellect and potential intellect, based on the epistemological thought of Thomas Aquinas. Although many authors suggested such a character distinction, yet no one does not try to justifying it. In this article are comments on intellects in Aristotle account, very short history – following the Aquinas - of distinguishing and separating intellects. Presented is the same understanding of the real difference between existence and essence of beings created and in this light given difference between intellects, because Aquinas, actually never spoke about it in this way. A basic element of the article is to distinguish intellects on the basis of a formal rules of their objects and distinguish them on the basis of acts, which allows to build a proper argumentation. It has been shown that between what is recognized in the potential intellect is a disproportion, which may be removed by the allocation of truly different between potential and active intellect. Between intellects there is a real difference only in the case of the human intellect, since both in God and in the angelic beings, this differentiation is not needed. The real difference between intellects is based on the difference between the act and potency or being in act and being in potency, however, are not they act and potency relative to each other, but to the cognized object. Moreover, the active intellect as being in the act, is not determined nor determining the object of cognition potential intellect, it is not the object recognized by him. Finally, if the way of cognition depends on the mode of existence, the intellectual knowledge infinity of human remains in potency, by what must be in man two intellects.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2015, 4; 63-95
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Poznanie Adama i wiedza Chrystusa a intelekt możnościowy i czynny. Ujęcie Tomasza z Akwinu
    The Cognition of Adam and Knowldege of Christ in the Context of Potential and Agent Intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078915.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy i czynny
    wiedza Chrystusa
    wiedza Adama
    Thomas Aquinas
    potential intellect
    agent intellect
    knowledge of Christ
    knowledge of Adam
    Opis:
    Thomas Aquinas anthropology is related to the description of human nature, which was established at the beginning, before original sin, as well as taking into account all its effects, and the nature that was united with God. The distinction of two intellects adopted by Aristotle - a potential and active intellect - for Aquinas was helpful in showing the unique character of the knowledge that Adam and Christ had. Adam as the one who was appointed as teacher of people, had perfect knowledge and did not have a potential intellect that would be an unwritten tablet. His potential intellect had the habits of knowledge, by which he had a perfect knowledge of everything that can be embraced in any field of cognition by the power of the first principles of knowledge. The perfection of Christ's knowledge was incomparably greater than knowledge of Adam and every other human being – it was result of unification with the Word, but not the mixing of two natures. Christ had knowledge which have blessed (saved), infused knowledge (resulting from union with the Word) and had experiential knowledge appropriate to age and time. Christ developed in knowledge and wisdom because he grew in human experience.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 123-138
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Prawda o intelekcie. Mieczysława Gogacza rozumienie intelektu możnościowego i czynnego
    Truth about intellect. Understanding of possible and agent intellect in the thought of Mieczysław Gogacz
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452563.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt możnościowy
    intelekt czynny
    dusza i ciało
    jednostkowienie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    Mieczysław Gogacz
    possible intellect
    agent intellect
    soul and body
    individuation
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is presentation the problems of possible intellect and agent intellect in philosophy Mieczyslaw Gogacz, founder of consequent version of thomism (Warsaw School of Thomism). His understanding of the intellect was dictated by the successive publications. Difference between intellects, was first shown in the context of fundamental metaphysical positions - realism and idealism. According to M. Gogacz realistic proposition is depends on the distinction between two intellects, and idealistic related with the acceptance of a single intellect with passive and active function, and identification of the faculties of the soul with itself. M. Gogacz presented the metaphysical description of the nature of the intellect, emphasizing its being, as well as the very essence. He underlined that the possible intellect should be defined as the possibility of the soul, which is it imperfection (intellect is principle of individuation of the soul), located in the soul, but not identical with its essence. Agent intellect in his opinion should be defined as an accident of the possible intellect. Distinction between possible intellect and agent intellect allowed to remark the difference between knowing confused and clearly, and to build the theory of “speech of the heart”, which describes the most important way of knowing a principle of being – act of being.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2016, 5; 75-89
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    La vérité, fondement de l’éthique
    Prawda podstawą etyki
    Autorzy:
    Gogacz, Mieczysław
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078847.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    etyka
    prawda
    dobro
    intelekt
    wola
    éthique
    vérité
    bonté
    intellect
    volonté
    Opis:
    Tezą artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że dobro wyznacza etykę, a do dobra doprowadza prawda. Transcendentalna własność prawdy, oddziałując na człowieka, wywołuje dwie relacje: 8) wiarę, gdy przejawiająca istnienie prawda w jakimś bycie oddziała na własność prawdy przejawiającej nasze istnienie oraz H) poznanie, gdy przejawiająca istnienie prawda w jakimś bycie oddziała na nas i wywoła w naszym intelekcie możnościowym doznanie jedności quidditas. Pobudzona przez intelekt wola aktywizuje człowieka, który swymi relacjami istnieniowymi nawiązuje kontakt z oddziałującym na nas bytem. Korzystając z własności otwarcia się na nas bytu i reagując tą samą własnością transcendentalną, człowiek odnosi się do oddziałującego bytu z ufnością, czyli z wiarą, że ten oddziałujący na nas byt jest dobrem, spełniającym nadzieję uzyskania wspomagającego i chroniącego nas powiązania. To podstawowe zachowanie woli, wyznaczone ukazaniem jej przez intelekt bytu jako prawdy, polega na odnoszeniu się do każdego bytu w jego prawdzie jako do dobra dla nas, nazywane jest sumieniem. Sumienie skłania nas, byśmy kierowali się do dobra, a tym samym unikali zła. Pierwszym więc skutkiem powrotu człowieka przez relacje istnieniowe do oddziałującego na nas bytu, powrotu w poziomie jeszcze nieuświadomionych sobie, lecz realnych naszych relacji z bytem w jego własności prawdy, jest doznanie bytu jako dobra. A dobro wyznacza chroniące byt działania, którymi zajmuje się etyka. Etyka swymi pryncypiami pozwala trafnie wybrać działania, gdy chcemy, aby trwały relacje istnieniowe. Aby wybierać, trzeba posłużyć się intelektem. Z tego względu mądrość staje się pierwszym pryncypium wyboru działań, rozważanych w etyce. Kolejnym pryncypium jest kontemplacja. Obydwa te pryncypia wyznacza wcześniejsza więź intelektu z wolą na poziomie mowy serca, stanowiąca sumienie.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 23-29
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Miejsce woli w zagadnieniu ludzkiego działania w ujęciu św. Tomasza z Akwinu
    A place of will in the problem of human’s action in Thomas Aquinas view
    Autorzy:
    Zapisek, Dorota
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452407.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intellect
    will
    feelings
    liberum arbitrium
    free action
    intelekt
    wola
    uczucia
    wolne działanie
    Opis:
    When we talk about human`s action in view of Thomas Aquinas, in the first place is a concept of „intelectualism”. The most of well known continuators of Aquinas thought underline that the key of understanding problem of free action first of all is knowing the action of intellect, because intellect is highest of human`s potencies. In fact in Aquinas opinion intellect is the most perfect potency of human being. However the problem of action of will seems to be the starting point in explanation of humans` free action. In the views of polish thomistic philosophers for example J. Woroniecki, M.A. Krąpiec, S. Swieżawski, this question is presenting and explaining by schema of process of making free decision (liberum arbitrium). Nevertheless when we study the Aquinas texts, we can make the conclusion that the most important in explanation of what is human`s free action are principles of this action that is intellect and will. For Aquinas essentials are principles of cooperation of intellect and will, range of interaction these potencies and field of autonomy both potencies.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2012, 1; 109-121
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Głupota, ignorancja i acedia a poznanie intelektualne i działanie moralne
    Stupidity, ignorance, acedia and their meaning for the intellectual cognition and moral action
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057885.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt
    moralność
    głupota
    ignorancja
    acedia
    Aquinas
    intellect
    morality
    stupidity
    ignorance
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is to answer the question how the deficiencies and indisposition of intellectual cognition can influence the moral actions of a person. Three vices have been analyzed: stupidity, ignorance and acedia. The natural desire to know (Aristotle) is expressed in the transition from potency to act; consists in a natural inclination to perfect knowledge, realizing the perfection of human nature; it is fulfilled in the happiness that comes from passing from theoretical to practical knowledge, because knowledge cannot be something vain (vanus). In this context, it is clear that acedia blocks the transition of the potential intellect to any cognitive act. Ignorance explains why man does not acquire knowledge that could be used in moral acts, and therefore he does not realize his nature because of it. Ignorance is probably the best proof of the intellectual weakness of man's nature, its peculiar imperfection (internal resistance of the intellect). As for the practical order and the fulfillment of happiness in human action, it is best seen in contrast to the wisdom of stupidity. Lack of judgment in final matters (theoretical and practical) blocks the natural human disire for happiness.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 127-146
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy poznanie jest wyższe niż miłość? Uzasadnienie wyższości intelektu nad wolą w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu
    Is cognition better than love? Justification of intellect’s superiority over will in Thomas Aquinas’ account
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452475.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt
    wola
    miłość
    poznanie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intellect
    will
    love
    cognition
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    Thomas Aquinas in his works sympathizes with the priority and thus superiority of intellect over will definitely. Presenting various ways of arguing he intends to point out the perfection of intellect, which becomes perfect in its act of cognition, it assures the proper action of will. Because of its object – truth about reality – as well as final and formal causation intellect moves will which aims to good. Only in the situation of such an object of intellect, which somehow exceeds human cognition potencies, will could acquire superiority over cognition. Thus a man only in an act of love of God is able to love by will that, which he cannot cognize. In other cases, particularly in case of natural cognition of sensual reality, in which man grasps an essence, cognition always goes before volition. Stressing superiority of intellect over will is not a matter of introducing into the consideration of their mutual relations additional topic. It is crucial problem, which allows proper understanding issue of freedom in Aquinas’ account.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2014, 3; 75-97
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Antropologiczne podstawy etyki
    Anthropological foundations of ethics
    Autorzy:
    Andrzejuk, Artur
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078909.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    etyka
    osoba ludzka
    intelekt
    wola
    sumienie
    ethics
    human person
    Thomas Aquinas
    intellect
    will
    conscience
    Opis:
    The belief in the uniqueness of man was shared by many philosophers who have represented different ways of thinking. Plato recognized man as a soul imprisoned in the body. The world of gods and ideas was the homeland of the soul, whereas soul was only a pilgrim in earthly world. Using empirical cognition in accordance with a methodology Aristotle claimed that man is a rational animal. This rationality was so special to Aristotle that he regarded it as divine. Thomas Aquinas inherits the Aristotelian tradition, enriched by the views of Cicero, Augustine and Arab philosophers. Ethics is most often described as "moral philosophy", which seems to indicate that it is about the science of morality, which is an integral part of philosophy. As such, it deals with principles (principles). In the case of ethics these are the principles of choosing the moral good. In this way Aquinas defines the subject of ethics. It is different from the subjects of other philosophical disciplines. In Aquinas's approach, ethics is autonomous in terms of subject, but methodologically it depends on metaphysics and anthropology. Also, the starting points of ethical reflection lies in first philosophy (metaphysics) and human philosophy (philosophical anthropology). According to the anthropological foundations of ethics, these are, according to Thomas, some consequences of human nature as a personal being. At the same time, it is worth noting that the topic of a person and personal relationships goes beyond human philosophy, because God is also a person who establishes personal relationships with other persons. As part of human philosophy, we examine the consequences of being a person that relate to human existence. They have a significant impact on human morality. These are: individuality, rationality, freedom and the already mentioned personal relationships. The consequences of this personal structure in man is having intellect and will, which results in intellectual cognition and free decision making. The very "mechanism" of behavior, which is always individual, is explained by Aquinas by the means of his concept of conscience, which in his ethics is the subjective principle of morality.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 157-172
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Koncepcja intelektu a rozumienie wiary. Zestawienie poglądów Tomasza z Akwinu, Immanuela Kanta i Augusta Comte’a
    The conception of the intellect and the understanding of faith.A juxtaposition of the views of Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and Auguste Comte
    Autorzy:
    Sieńkowski, Marcin
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078911.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt
    wiara
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    Immanuel Kant
    August Comte
    intellect
    faith
    Thomas Aquinas
    Auguste Comte
    Opis:
    Faith is a complex activity, which consists of the action of the intellect and the will. The understanding of these two authorities affects the understanding of faith. Therefore, it can be concluded that a specific conception of faith is associated with a specific conception of the intellect. The reason justifying this conclusion is the ability of the intellect to demonstrate the existence of God. The conception of the intellect showing that God exists creates the pos-sibility of receiving revelation, or the supernatural faith that is the recognition of what God has revealed. This type of intellect is characteristic of the realistic philosophy represented by Thomas Aquinas. Kantʼs conception of intellect is related to the very study of phenomena. In the order of theoretical knowledge, it is not possible to show that God exists because He is not a phenomenon. This possibility exists in a practical order, where God is the idea of reason. Therefore, the recognition of the existence of God is made thanks to the rational faith present only on the ground of morality. In turn, Comteʼs understanding of the intellect associated with the knowledge of facts and permanent relationships between them in the form of laws precludes the possibility of stating that God exists. The positivist understanding of the intel-lect is in no way connected with searching for the existence of God. This kind of intellect does not include Godʼs reach because it is limited to the examination of facts and laws. The only faith accepted by him is the natural faith that constitutes trust in the person who conveys the heritage of positivism.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 139-156
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Ogół czy konkret przedmiotem ludzkiego poznania? Rozważania na podstawie q. 2 a. 6. "Quaestiones disputatae De veritate – De scientia Dei"
    Is the Generality or the Concrete Thing the Object of Human Knowledge? Reflections based on Article 6 of the Question 2 of "Quaestiones disputatae De Veritate – De scientia Dei"
    Autorzy:
    Sulenta, Paulina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452701.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    ogół
    konkret
    intelekt
    ludzkie poznanie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    generality
    concrete thing
    intellect
    human knowledge
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    Presented article is an attempt to answer the question: what, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, is the object of human knowledge – the generality or the concrete thing? In the introduction the author remarks that the purpose of her reflections is not to make an ultimate subjective rational justification for the possibility or impossibility of knowing what is individual, but her reflections form a reconstruction of St. Thomas Aquinas’ position contained in article 6 in the second question of Quaestiones disputatae De veritate – De scientia Dei. It is mainly a question here of showing in Aquinas’ analyses a factor that would allow us to resolve whether the human intellect is capable of knowing what is individual. In the first part of the article, the author presents a fundamental difficulty that led St. Thomas to study the problem. The difficulty arose from the Aristotelian theory of the faculties and of abstraction. The theory allowed him to explain how the passage occurs from the sensory apprehension of the concrete thing to the intellect’s reading of the concrete thing’s general, necessary, and constant content, but the theory did not explain how one can recognize the concrete thing as such in which the general nature is realized. Next, the author concentrates on an analysis of the corpus of article 6 of the second question of Quaestiones disputatae De veritate – De scientia Dei. St. Thomas says there that the impressed intellectual-cognitive form (species intelligibilis impressa) that determines the intellect to know a thing does not contain individualizing material conditions, and thereby the intellect through itself (per se) knowls only generalities, but does not know concrete things. Thomas notes, however, that per accidens the human intellect can know what is individual. Therefore also in the third part of the article the author considers how, according to Aquinas, the concrete thing can be apprehended by the intellect. St. Thomas in this passage looks to the operation of conversio ad phantasmata in which the intellect indirectly knows the concrete content of a thing as the reason for a general concept. However, the author remarks that this is not the only possibility that man has for knowing what is individual. This is because Thomas in his analyses emphasizes that ultimately it is not the intellect but the entire man who is the subject of knowledge. For the operation of a turn to mental images to be possible, it is necessary that a faculty should exist that makes it possible to recognize earlier the concrete thing as that in which the general nature is realized. According to Aquinas, this faculty is the particular reason (ratio particularis, vis cogitativa).
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 113-135
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.
    Aquinas’s impediment argument for the immateriality of the intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452485.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy
    niematerialność intelektu
    poznanie intelektualne
    dusza i ciało
    Thomas Aquinas
    possible intellect
    immateriality
    intellectual cognition
    soul and body
    Opis:
    Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 77-98
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Poznanie intelektualne duszy ludzkiej oddzielonej od ciała (anima separata) a intelekt czynny i możnościowy
    Intellectual Cognition of the Human Soul Separated From the Body (anima separata) and Active and Possible Intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/5940131.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    poznanie duszy po śmierci
    nieśmiertelność
    intelekt czynny i możnościowy
    „światło chwały”
    knowledge of the soul after death
    immortality
    intellect active and possible
    „light of glory”
    Opis:
    The purpose of this paper is to attempt the answer to the question of how the soul comes to know, not as a form of the body, but as a subsistent form, independent in its existence from the body, but dependent on its own created act of being (ipsum esse). We will be interested in the question of how the separated soul comes to know: Whether the two intellectual powers that are naturally in the soul - the possible intellect and the active intellect - will realize their acts, and therefore whether the soul will come to know at all, and whether it will come to know individual reality? There will be a theological theme in the paper, that is, a theme determined by the issue of the completion of the human structure in the body (the resurrection of the body) and the related beatific vision, which is the achievement of the end of human intellectual activities. It seems that the question of anima separata is not a purely speculative problem, since it contains the answer to the question of understanding human nature, an answer that is most relevant to philosophy in its practical field. For Aquinas, the existence of a separated soul, suspended, as it were, between existence in an animated body and existence in a glorified body, is “hypothetical”, and the humanity of such an entity is incomplete. However, given that Thomas is essentially considering real and not possible entities, the topic of the existence and workings of the separated soul should not be within the field of his subject matter. It seems, however, that Thomas was interested in confronting such a theme, which would reveal the uniqueness of human nature also in this aspect.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2022, 11; 89-109
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
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