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Wyszukujesz frazę "philosophy of knowledge" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
On Mainstreaming Philosophy of Science in Psychology Through “Psychological Theoretics
Autorzy:
Oppong, Seth
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2118303.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-03-31
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
psychological theoretics
reproducibility crisis
theoretical psychology
philosophical psychology
philosophy of knowledge
Opis:
The principal goal of psychological science is not application but theory. This is because a good theory yields accurate predictions and control, two preconditions for applications. Thus, good psychological science is one that produces good theories. Against the background of reproducibility crisis and the apparent non-existence of an integrated subfield of psychology addressing those issues, I submit psychological theoretics (or psycho-theoretics) as a potential solution. The scope of psychological theoretics is outlined and distinguished from other closely related subfields. It was argued that psychological theoretics has the potential to make a unique contribution to the advancement of good psychological science. It is also worth noting that even if the global community of psychologists might not be ready for psychological theoretics as a new subfield, the reforms proposed under its rubrics would still remain relevant today and in the future. Indeed, the question of whether it is completely new will surely be the subject of scientific debate.
Źródło:
Roczniki Psychologiczne; 2022, 25, 1; 27-45
1507-7888
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Psychologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O luksusie filozofowania
Autorzy:
Bugajak, Grzegorz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013455.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
filozofia naukowa
filozofia przyrody
obraz świata
wiedza czysta
scientific philosophy
philosophy of nature
worldview
pure knowledge
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2006, 54, 1; 342-345
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tomizm analityczny
Analytical Thomism
Autorzy:
Japola, Justyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015833.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
tomizm
filozofia analityczna
tomistyczna teoria poznania
Thomism
analytical philosophy
Thomistic theory of knowledge
Opis:
The term „analytical Thomism” was coined by John Haldane of the University of St. Andrews (Scotland). Haldane characterizes analytical Thomism as „a broad philosophical approach that brings into mutual relationship the styles and preoccupations of recent English-speaking philosophy and the concepts and concerns shared by Aquinas and his followers.” In addition to Haldane, the most prominent philosophers, whose philosophical training and general philosophical perspective are rooted in English-speaking analytical philosophy but who are very much interested in the thought of Thomas Aquinas include: Peter Geach, Elisabeth Anscombe, Anthony Kenny, Norman Kretzmann, Brian Davies, Scott MacDonald, Eleonore Stump, and Christopher Martin. In the first part of the paper I consider the question whether it is possible to be both a Thomist and an analytic philosopher. I set forth reasons why the alliance between the two views does not seem to be possible and I try to make clear that such impressions are often based on misconceptions. In fact, I try to show in the paper that the alliance between Thomism and analytic philosophy may prove beneficial for both sides. The goal of the second part of the paper is to present some specific problems characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy and to show how they are approached from a Thomistic perspective. First of all, I present Robert Pasnau's analysis of Aquinas' position on the nature of human thinking. I also argue that Aquinas' account of our knowledge of our own mental states can be an attractive alternative to currently still popular models of self-knowledge as a type of perception. On the latter accounts, introspection, which is a very special type of causal mechanism, reliably produces corresponding second-level beliefs or judgments about our first-level mental states. In this special type of observation no intermediate and fallible organ of perception is involved, and this is what guarantees the truth of second-level statements. The principal problem facing such inner sense accounts of self-knowledge is that they do not provide us with a satisfactory explanation of why a causal mechanism should always produce true statements in the case of knowledge of mental states where similar mechanisms sometimes fail in the case of external perception. It is exactly at this point, as we shall see, that Aquinas' reflective model of self-knowledge turns out to be attractive.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 1; 321-347
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Komu i po co potrzebna jest dziś filozofia przyrody?
Autorzy:
Piątek, Zdzisława
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013883.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
filozofia przyrody
nauki kognitywne
wiedza niedyskursywna
natura umysłów
philosophy of nature
cognitive sciences
non-discursive knowledge
nature of minds
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2005, 53, 2; 434-437
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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