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Tytuł:
Kłopoty z prawdą
Troubles with the truth
Autorzy:
Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015950.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
logika
prawda
epistemology
logic
truth
Opis:
The article consists of two parts. In the first one the author, referring to Alfred Tarski's and Antoni B. Stępień's views and contesting them, presents his own definition of 'truth', changing his former views in this respect. The definition is constituted by the formula:(ε 0) /\x [x is true ≡ \/y∈R (x states y)],which may be read in the following way:a sentence is true if it states a certain real (occurring) state of things. The above definition is consistent with the so called (J)[adacki's] convention that, contrary to the so called (T)[arski's] convention avoids certain difficulties, e.g. possible entailing, through occurrence of an extra-linguistic state of things, existence of a respective true sentence. This definition also does not get entangled either in accepting purely intentional or negative state of things. Using the opportunity to do so the author proclaims himself in favour of the evidential criterion of truth, contradictory criterion of falsehood, and pragmatic criterion of faith. In the second part of the article the author replies to the questions concerning his theses that were put during the discussion 'in the company of Professor Stępień's pupils and his pupils' pupils. Especially he answers the charges and questions brought by Dr. Paweł Garbacz. They mainly focused on the problems of falsehood. The author admits two conceptions of falsehood: a false sentence does not state anything, or, a false sentence states a presented (fictitious) state of things.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 193-201
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem prawdy w dziele sztuki
The problem of truth in the work of art
Autorzy:
Chudy, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015953.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
estetyka
epistemologia
wartość
prawda
aesthetics
epistemology
value
truth
Opis:
The text aims at considering from various points of view the presence of the value of truth in the work of art. The first step is a phenomenological analysis of epistemological, ontological and aesthetic phenomena connected with perception of the work of art. Its conclusion is the statement that truth belongs to the characteristics of both creation (contents, structure) and reception (cognition of various aspects) of the work. The very fact that the aesthetic value of the object claiming to be beautiful can be discussed proves the presence of the object on the rational-veritable plane. The next aspect undertaken in the article is concerned with the epistemological and methodological criticism of the view (represented here by R. Ingarden) that there is a radical difference between the objective domains of science and art. An attempt is made to show that the view is rooted rather in ideologically understood scientism and neo-positivism than in a realistic conception of cognition through art. In a completely realistic attitude the borderline between 'what is rationally cognised' and 'what is beautiful' (the sphere of quasi in Ingarden's meaning) is not an absolute borderline. The domain of the work of art also contains cognitive elements, often existentially and morally essential for man's life. As it appears, a similar position can be found in G. B. Vico's texts that proclaim the unity of poetic and metaphysical perspective in ancient beginnings of anthropological thought about the human world. Nowadays a methodological tendency is observed on the philosophical plane that allows joining the veritable and aesthetic aspects, and hence exploring the objective domain of art in the cognitive aspect. This is expressed today, among others, in the increase of the significance of art in social, cultural and scientific life.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 45-71
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Trzy strategie dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem
Three strategies of debate with scepticism
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015956.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
filozofia współczesna
epistemology
scepticism
contemporary philosophy
Opis:
In debate with scepticism three general strategies may be differentiated: (1) pointing to self-refutation of scepticism; (2) looking for certainty; and (3) modification of the concept of knowledge. The latter strategy has at least three versions: (a) knowledge does not require certainty, (b) knowledge is not broadened by way of deduction, and (c) knowledge does not require the knowledge of knowledge. The first strategy refutes global scepticism, but does not give an example of knowledge and is not efficient in the case of scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist. Also the second strategy is only able to refute the typical thesis of global scepticism (knowledge does not exist). Scepticism based on the hypothesis of the malicious scientist is more efficiently refuted in the third strategy. However, separation of knowledge and certainty is only avoiding the problem of scepticism. It is also doubtful if the principle of broadening knowledge by way of deduction may be refuted. Negation of the principle of transparency of knowledge is the most convincing one. After it is refuted, knowledge is possible in the situation when we do not know if we know and we cannot exclude sceptical hypotheses.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 575-595
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Grimm Wisdom
Mądrość według Grimma
Autorzy:
O’GRADY, Paul
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488204.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-03-26
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
madrość
epistemologia analityczna
Stephen Grimm
wisdom
analytical epistemology
Opis:
Dotychczas problematyka mądrości nie była szerzej rozważana na gruncie epistemologii analitycznej. W ostatnim czasie interesujące ujęcie tematu zaproponował Stephen Grimm, który dowodzi, że mądrość oparta jest na wiedzy oraz że tradycyjny podział na wiedzę teoretyczną i praktyczną jest nie do utrzymania. Dostrzegam pewną niespójność w tychże aspektach jego pracy. Z jednej strony chciałby utrzymywać, że tradycyjne wzorce mądrości (takie jak Jezus, Budda, Konfucjusz) mogą wciąż być określane mianem „mądrych” z punktu widzenia jego teorii. Lecz z drugiej strony, proponowany przezeń warunek bycia mądrym zdaje się zakładać, że tylko cześć tych, którzy głoszą sprzeczne ze sobą poglądy, istotnie jest mądra. Rozważam szereg możliwych rozwiązań tego problemu oraz popieram podejście kontekstualistyczne, które dopuszcza warunek wiedzy oraz pozwala tradycyjne wzorce mądrości określać mianem „mądrych”.
Wisdom has not been widely discussed in analytical epistemology. An interesting recent analysis comes from Stephen Grimm who argues that wisdom requires knowledge and that the traditional dichotomy between theoretical and practical wisdom doesn’t hold. I note a tension between these aspects of his work. He wishes to maintain that traditional exemplars of wisdom (such as Jesus, Buddha, Confucius) may still be termed ‘wise’ by his theory. But his knowledge condition seems to require that only a subset of those who hold conflicting views are really wise. I consider a number of possible responses to this and endorse a non-indexical contextualist approach which will allow the knowledge condition and also allow the traditional exemplars to be termed ‘wise’.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2018, 66, 1; 67-77
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
O cenności racjonalności w wierze religijnej
On how Precious Rationality is in Religious Cognition
Autorzy:
Pepliński, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015839.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
racjonalność
przekonania religijne
epistemology
rationality
religious belief
Opis:
The issue of rationality of religious beliefs belongs to the main problems of 20th century philosophy of religion. When posing this problem the term `rationality' is often used in a way that is not precise, and sometimes it seems to be ambiguous. In order to avoid this error I define rationality of acceptance regulatively as a property consisting in being in accordance with defined epistemic rules of the ethics of beliefs. The main rule that is taken into consideration here is the following requirement: `Each theorem p accepted by person S should be justifiable by her in a degree proportional to the degree of assertion with which he accepts p'. Acceptances having the property of so defined rationality belong to a broader class of reasonable acts, where rationality is understood as a property consisting in being a reliable use of human cognitive abilities. I claim that although the religious faith of a `common' Christian is not rational in this sense, as mysteries of faith are not justifiable by natural reason, it has a reasonable character and is precious from the epistemic point of view. I defend the proposition that the fact of not being rational in this particular sense does not involve irrationality that consists in breaking the rule that orders a change in the way of accepting a certain theorem p so as to adjust the degree of assertion to the justification one has, the borderline case being one of rejecting the theorem for which one does not have any epistemically valid justification. The proposition that one of these rules is obligatory for the believer with respect to his acceptance of the propositions of faith cannot be justified without stating that Christianity is false. This latter proposition cannot be proved philosophically.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 1; 219-244
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poznanie i byt. Z epistemologii Wilfrida Sellarsa
Knowledge and being in the epistemology of Wilfrid Sellars
Autorzy:
Szubka, Tadeusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015962.pdf
Data publikacji:
2002
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
poznanie
tomizm
W. Sellars
epistemology
cognition
Thomism
Opis:
Wilfrid Sellars very often expounds his philosophical views in an historical context. In his paper „Being and Being Known” Sellars gives a succinct account of his epistemology while at the same time discussing the Thomistic conception of sensory and intellectual knowledge. His aim in that paper is to provide a plausible interpretation of the doctrine that both the senses and the intellect are informed by the nature of external objects, and thus our cognitive acts are isomorphic with their objects. Sellars claims that there are two dimensions to that isomorphism, and that those separate dimensions are conflated by the Thomists, as well as by other philosophers. That is to say, there is isomorphism in the real or the natural order, and there is isomorphism in the intentional or the logical order. Sellars insists that in sensory cognition isomorphism holds merely in the real order. By contrast, intellectual knowledge is based upon the isomorphism of the intentional order. However, that isomorphism obtains in virtue of specific relations holding in the real order. Thus those two orders are intimately connected. Unfortunately, Sellars does not fully elaborate the nature of the connections between those two orders. I argue that in light of his commitment to ontological naturalism, Sellars should claim that ultimately there is only one isomorphism, namely the isomorphism in the real order. I suggest that his insistence that there are no genuine semantical relations holding between the elements of the intentional and the real supports such an interpretation.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2002, 50, 1; 439-457
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Założenia i konsekwencje epistemologiczne eksplikacji formalnej pojęcia uzasadniania w szkole fińskiej
Assumptions and epistemological consequences of the formal explication of the concept of justification in the Finnish School
Autorzy:
Kawalec, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016136.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
wiedza
indukcja
uzasadnienie
Carnap
epistemology
knowledge
induction
justification
Opis:
The common view on the program of the formal explication of the concept of confirmation, undertaken primarily by Carnap and the members of the Finnish School, is that it is irrelevant to epistemological debates on justification. In order to oppose this view I draw upon the features of Carnap’s early epistemological project expressed in Der logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). The key issue concerns the role of logic in epistemology, which in Carnap's own terms deviates from the one ascribed to it in the traditional program of logical empiricism, i.e. for Carnap logical structure is a precondition of objective epistemic relations between sentences. This view is inherited by the Finnish School, and the differences between theirs and Carnap's systems of inductive logic concern the type of theory of knowledge rather than theory of justification which in both cases is essentially identical.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 109-126
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Descartes (and Spinoza) on Intellectual Experience and Skepticism
Kartezjusz (i Spinoza) w kwestii intelektualnego doświadczenia i sceptycyzmu
Autorzy:
Carriero, John
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791056.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-06-30
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
niepowątpiewalność
świadomość
sceptycyzm
intuicja
epistemology
indubitability
consciousness
skepticism
intuition
Opis:
Epistemologia Kartezjusza jest zakorzeniona w jego głębokim zainteresowaniu i uznaniu dla tego, co można by nazwać intelektualnym doświadczeniem, lub dokładniej przejrzystym intelektualnym doświadczeniem (przejrzyste intelektualne doświadczenie jest moim terminem oznaczającym to, co Kartezjusz określał ujęciem jasnym i wyraźnym). To zainteresowanie intelektualnym doświadczeniem, jak mi się wydaje, podzielali inni racjonaliści, Spinoza i Leibniz. W części pierwszej artykułu staram się ulokować fenomen przejrzystego intelektualnego doświadczenia w ramach doktryny Kartezjusza i Spinozy. Usiłuję pokazać, że jeśli nie uwzględnimy w sposób właściwy charakteru tego doświadczenia, to ryzykujemy utratą wglądu w centralne motywy leżące u podstaw ich teorii poznania. W drugiej części artykułu rozważam intelektualne doświadczenia w kontekście sceptycznego wątpienia, w szczególności radyklanego wątpienia. Chociaż często przyjmuje się, że Kartezjusz i Spinoza zajmują opozycyjne stanowiska, gdy chodzi o kwestię radykalnego wątpienia, to ja sądzę, że ich stanowisko były bardziej do siebie podobne w tej sprawie niż się zwykle przyjmuje.
Descartes’s epistemology is rooted in his profound interest in and respect for what might be called intellectual experience, especially lucid intellectual experience. (Lucid intellectual experience is my term for what Descartes calls perceiving clearly and distinctly.) This interest, it seems to me, was shared by Descartes’s rationalist successors Spinoza and Leibniz. In the first part of this paper, I locate the phenomenon of lucid intellectual experience, focusing on Descartes and Spinoza. I try to show if we do not give enough attention to the character of such experience, we risk losing touch with a central motivation behind their respective epistemologies. In the second part of the paper, I consider intellectual experience in the context of skeptical doubt, particularly radical doubt. Although Descartes and Spinoza are often taken to be opposed here, I think they share more than is commonly appreciated.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2020, 68, 2; 21-42
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Alvina I. Goldmana teoria wiedzy i uzasadnienia
Alvin I. Goldman’s theory of knowledge and justification
Autorzy:
Ziemińska, Renata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016134.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
wiedza
uzasadnianie
naturalizm
reliabilizm
epistemology
knowledge
justification
naturalism
reliabilism
Opis:
A. Goldman proposes a softened version of the naturalistic epistemology connected with cognitive sciences. His theory of knowledge and justification belongs to the trend of extemalism and reliabilism. With reference to the Gettier problem Goldman (1967) suggests adding the condition of causal relation between belief and the fact concerned with the belief to the standard definition of knowledge. In (1976) he replaces the casual definition with the causalreliabilistic one: a true belief is knowledge if it is produced by reliable processes, that is by processes that generate true beliefs in the actual world and would generate them in relevant counter-factual situations (the concepts of relevant alternatives and knowledge as the ability to discriminate are involved here). In his recent works written on the basis of data from cognitive psychology Goldman goes beyond the Gettier problem: if knowledge is a prototype concept analysing it by means of necessary and sufficient conditions loses sense. Contrary to numerous externalists Goldman includes the traditional concept of justification in externalist epistemology. Justification of belief is a function of global reliability of the process that generated it, as reliability is in at least 50% the tendency of the process to generate true beliefs. Goldman's reliabilism struggles against (1) the problem of generality (how broad the definition of the types of processes that are supposed to be reliable may be); (2) the problem of the demon's world (the malicious demon's victims have the same foundations for their beliefs as we have, but still their beliefs are unjustified in the light of reliabilism as they are generated by unreliable processes); (3) the problem of clairvoyance (a reliable clairvoyant meets all the conditions of the reliabilistic theory of justification, and yet his beliefs are irrational): (4} the problem of the range of reliability (which possible worlds are relevant for justification). Responding to these problems Goldman first (1988) differentiates strong and weak justifications and then, changing his position to one of virtue reliabilism, he replaces reliability with what is considered reliable (1992b). By this very fact he agrees to the internalists' thesis saying that reliability is important for justification if it is accessible for the subject. However, Goldman means the collective subject (the community's opinions) and this is the basis for his externalism. He does not agree to subjectivism of the individual subject and he does not change the basic idea that epistemology should be close
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 77-107
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Concept of Conversion in the Light of Some Concepts of Faith
Pojęcie nawrócenia w odniesieniu do niektórych pojęć wiary
Autorzy:
Lechniak, Marek
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31232796.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
conversion
epistemology or religion
faith
Robert Audi
nawrócenie
epistemologia religii
wiara
Opis:
The paper is devoted to an analysis of the concept of conversion in relation to the various concepts of faith distinguished by Robert Audi. The first part presents William James’ analysis of the concept of conversion, the biblical roots of the concept of conversion as epistrephō and metanoeō and analyses of conversion in the social sciences. The second part of the paper analyses the various notions of faith proposed in the works of Robert Audi. Finally, in the third part, I analyse how conversion can be understood in relation to the main of the concepts of faith identified by Audi; I also relate the concept of faith to the concept of scientific revolution characterised in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of the development of science.
Artykuł poświęcony jest analizie pojęcia nawrócenia w odniesieniu do różnych pojęć wiary wyróżnionych przez Roberta Audiego. W pierwszej części zaprezentowane są Williama Jamesa analiza pojęcia nawrócenia, biblijne korzenie pojęcia nawrócenia jako epistrephō metanoeō oraz analizy nawrócenia na gruncie nauk społecznych. Druga część artykułu zawiera analizę różnych pojęć wiary zaproponowanych w pracach Audiego. W końcu w trzeciej części analizuję, jak można rozumieć nawrócenie w odniesieniu do głównych z pojęć wiary wskazanych przez Audiego; odnoszę również pojęcie wiary do pojęcia rewolucji naukowej scharakteryzowanego w koncepcji rozwoju nauki autorstwa Thomasa Kuhna.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2023, 71, 2; 209-238
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Związek metafizyki i epistemologii w myśli W. S. Sołowjowa
The Connection between Metaphysics and Epistemology in V. S. Soloviov’s Thought
Autorzy:
Obolevitch, Teresa
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013438.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Sołowjow
metafizyka
epistemologia
wszechjedność
Absolut
Soloviov
metaphysics
epistemology
all-unity
Absolute
Opis:
In the article the assumptions are analyzed of V. S. Soloviov’s (1853-1900) metaphysics presented in his Criticism of Abstract Principles. When forming a metaphysics Soloviov considers and subjects to criticism two theories: Hegel’s extreme (in the Russian philosopher’s term – “abstract”) idealism, and the positivists’ radical empiricism. Soloviov perceives resolution of the difficulties seen in these theories in the conception of the so-called all-unity. According to this conception every being has its ontic foundation in the Absolute, which makes possible an inner connection between all things on the metaphysical and, respectively, epistemological level. In the present study it was found that Soloviov’s metaphysics is based on the following assumptions: (1) the thesis about the possibility of cognizing ‘a thing in itself’; (2) determining a close connection that occurs between the ontological and epistemological order; (3) the conviction that analysis of epistemological conception leads to the ontological ‘truth about the thing’. Acceptance of these propositions is connected with the Russian philosopher’s religious beliefs concerning the existence of an ultimate foundation of reality, and his detailed critical-‑historical analyses are completely subjected to the aspiration to create a theist metaphysics on the basis of this Absolute principle, that is of God.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2006, 54, 1; 107-124
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
On the Epistemology of Chance
O epistemologii przypadku
Autorzy:
Gębura, Błażej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1791052.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-10-01
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
przypadek
epistemologia
sceptycyzm
uzasadnienie
wiedza
metafilozofia
chance
epistemology
skepticism
justification
knowledge
metaphilosophy
Opis:
Teizm probabilistyczny Dariusza Łukasiewicza to teizm, który nobilituje pojęcie przypadku i wyjaśnia rolę, jaką ono odgrywa w kontekście opatrzności Bożej. Epistemolog może jednak zainteresować się kwestią o wiele bardziej podstawową i zapytać, czy nasze przekonania dotyczące przypadku można określić mianem wiedzy? Artykuł podzielony jest na trzy części. W pierwszej omawiam wybrane sposoby uzasadniania wiedzy o przypadku: uzasadnienie zdroworozsądkowe, pragmatyczne, empiryczne i aprioryczne, i konkluduję, że posiadamy wiedzę tychiczną w odniesieniu do przypadku nieintencjonalnego (C2), epistemicznego (C3), probabilistycznego (C5) i kauzalnego (C6). W części drugiej podejmuję problem sceptycyzmu w kwestii przypadku i sugeruję, że znaczącą rolę w dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem tychicznym odgrywają standardy racjonalności. W części trzeciej odnoszę się do dyskutowanego przez Łukasiewicza pojęcia przypadku kompozytywnego i twierdzę, że: (i) nie dysponujemy wiedzą na temat tak rozumianego przypadku; oraz, że (ii) nie należy tego faktu traktować jako racji na rzecz sceptycyzmu tychicznego.
Probabilistic theism according to Dariusz Łukaszewicz is a theism which ennobles the concept of chance and explains the role which chance plays in the context of Divine Providence. An epistemologist can, however, be interested in a much more basic issue and ask whether our beliefs concerning chance can be called knowledge. This article is divided into three parts. In the first one I discuss selected ways of justifying knowledge of chance, namely common sense justification, pragmatic justification, empirical justification, and a priori justification, as well as concluding that we possess tychical knowledge in reference to non-intentional chance (C2), epistemic chance (C3), probabilistic chance (C5), and causal chance (C6). In the second part I undertake the problem of skepticism in the problem of chance and I suggest that a significant role in the discussion with tychical skepticism is played by the standards of rationality. In the third section I refer to the concept of composite chance discussed by Łukasiewicz, and I claim that (i) we do not possess knowledge of composite chance as understood by Łukasiewicz, and that (ii) this fact should not be treated as a reason in favor of tychical skepticism.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2020, 68, 3; 221-232
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadka naturalizmu
The Puzzle of Naturalism
Autorzy:
Judycki, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2015793.pdf
Data publikacji:
2003
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
naturalizm
epistemologia
filozofia umysłu
teizm
naturalism
epistemology
philosophy of the mind
theism
Opis:
Naturalism is a philosophical doctrine assuming that all that exists is natural, that is, that there are no spiritual realities, no purely spiritual substances, no supernatural beings, transcendent in relation to the world. In epistemology it is said that no correct and convincing arguments can be formulated for existence of this kind of objects. The general thesis of naturalism is concerned with a discussion on theism and atheism, a discussion on the ontological status of the human mind, a discussion coming from the area of philosophy of biology, from the area of ethics and axiology, and even a discussion of the issue of how the objects of formal sciences exist. Naturalism is rather a conclusion from accumulation of arguments from various branches of knowledge than a self-dependent philosophical conviction. In the course of the considerations the following issues will be dealt with: historical background of naturalism, ontological and methodological naturalism, naturalism in axiology, epistemology, in social sciences and philosophy of the mind, relations between naturalism and physicalism, materialism, emergentism and functionalism. Opponents of naturalism usually try to show that within one or another branch of knowledge naturalism cannot be maintained, and on this basis they assume that naturalism as awhole is false. In the present considerations a different method of anti-naturalist argumentation has been used, namely, a fictitious thesis has been accepted, that as result of future development of scientific knowledge naturalism in all the branches will be considered as a convincing point of view and will be generally accepted. The phrase „puzzle of naturalism” used in the title is supposed to suggest that even in such a situation the general thesis of naturalism will not result from acceptance of particular naturalisms in all branches of knowledge. In other words, conceivable complete explanative successes achieved in particular branches of knowledge will not give the right to draw a general naturalistic conclusion. Hence the thesis of auniversal naturalism will remain puzzling.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2003, 51, 3; 19-39
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Obiektywność percepcji zmysłowej
The objectivity of sense perception
Autorzy:
Smith, Barry
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016133.pdf
Data publikacji:
2001
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
epistemologia
percepcja
obiektywność
środowisko
nisza ekologiczna
epistemology
perception
objectivity
environment
ecological niche
Opis:
There is an old problem in philosophy: the problem of how we pass from the mental theater of our representations to the external realm of concrete physical objects - from the "inner” to the "outer” . This problem arises against the background of representationalist theories of the relation between mind and its objects, theories that have taken different forms since Descartes, Kant, Helmholtz or Brentano. Representationalist theories of perception are marked by the following three features: 1. The perceiving subject is idealized. It is conceived as lying outside any context or environment and in abstraction from any goal-directed behavior. 2. Perception is seen as beginning with raw or bare sensations; then, by a process of inference or deliberation, there arise beliefs about external, physical objects. 3. Physical objects are assumed to be out there in the world, but to be inaccessible to direct experience. Our knowledge of them is indirect; it is the product of hypothesis and inference. This representationalist theory lives on in the computational theories of the mind and in doctrines of "methodological solipsism” embraced by much contemporary cognitive science. But the theory rests on a mistake. By making perception dependent on sensation, and by making sensations the direct objects of experience, it has matters exactly upside down. The paper draws on the ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson and Roger Barker in order to provide the metaphysical principles of a more adequate theory.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2001, 49, 1; 63-75
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Poezja i filozofia. O zasługach Profesora Władysława Stróżewskiego dla badań nad Norwidem
Poetry and philosophy. On professor Władysław Stróżewski’s contribution to Norwid studies
Autorzy:
Niewczas, Łukasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31233730.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
Władysław Stróżewski
Cyprian Norwid
filozofia
poezja
prawda
epistemologia
aksjologia
filosophy
poetry
epistemology
axiology
Opis:
Artykuł poświęcony jest norwidologicznym dokonaniom wybitnego filozofa Władysława Stróżewskiego. Autor artykułu zwraca uwagę na specyfikę filozoficznego podejścia do poetyckich utworów Norwida. Podkreśla elementy zbliżające myśl Stróżewskiego do twórczości Norwida na polu epistemologii i aksjologii, z których najważniejszym wydaje się wspólne obydwu rozumienie prawdy oraz dążenia do niej jako podstawowego imperatywu ludzkiego działania.
The article is devoted to Norwid studies of the outstanding philosopher Władysław Stróżewski. The author draws attention to the specificity of philosophical approach to Norwid`s poetic works. He emphasizes the elements that bring Stróżawski’s work closer to Norwid’s work in the field of epistemology and axiology.
Źródło:
Studia Norwidiana; 2023, 41; 303-307
0860-0562
Pojawia się w:
Studia Norwidiana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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