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Tytuł:
Przeobrażenia idei sprawiedliwości społecznej. Część II: Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako sprawiedliwość wyrównawcza
Metamorphoses of the Idea of Social Justice. Part II: Social Justice as a Commutative Justice
Autorzy:
STOIŃSKI, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488289.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-03-26
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
etyka
filozofia polityki
sprawiedliwość społeczna
sprawiedliwość ogólna
sprawiedliwość rozdzielcza
ethics
philosophy of politics
social justice
legal justice
distributive justice
Opis:
W latach 40 XIX wieku Luigi Taparelli i Antonio Rosmini wprowadzili do publicznego obiegu termin „sprawiedliwość społeczna”. Od tamtego czasu znaczenie tego pojęcia znacznie się poszerzyło. Literatura przedmiotu notuje liczne identyfikacje tego konceptu. W tej części wskazane zostały utożsamienia sprawiedliwości społecznej ze sprawiedliwością wyrównawczą (w odmianach: karzącej, naprawczej i wymiennej). Niektóre z tego rodzaju identyfikacji zakładają istnienie podmiotów kolektywnych. Występują one jako czasowe bądź przestrzenne grupy społeczne i kohorty.
In the 1840’s, due to Luigi Taparelli and Antonio Rosmini, the term of “social justice” emerged. Since that time, its meaning has developed in many ways. In the literature of the subject, one can find numerous identifications of the term “social justice”. The article focuses on the identity of this term with justice framed as: a commutative justice (in its varieties: retributive, restorative and justice of exchange). Some of these concepts assume the existence of some kind of social persons. The author, in inevitably approximate analyses, tries to show specificity of particular types of meanings assigned to the notion of “social justice”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2018, 66, 1; 99-114
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Procedural Justice in the Courtroom: The Factor Structure and Psychometric Properties of the Revised Procedural Justice Scale
Autorzy:
Prusiński, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1731381.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-09-10
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
procedural justice
the judiciary
district courts
civil cases
Procedural Justice Scale
Opis:
In Polish psychology there has been no systematic research so far on the experience of contact with courts and on the evaluation of this experience using the theory of procedural justice. Polish psychologists do not have Polish instruments measuring procedural justice at their disposal. The Procedural Justice Scale is a measure operationalizing the dimensions of procedural justice according to Tyler’s model: respect, neutrality, voice, understanding, and influence. The aim of the present article is to present the work on the revised version of the Procedural Justice Scale, measuring procedural justice operationalized exclusively in psychological terms, and to present the psychometric properties of this scale. In particular, the author tested the reliability of the instrument and verified its validity based on confirmatory factor analysis, scale intercorrelations, and intergroup differences. The results confirmed the five-factor structure of procedural justice. They also confirmed the criterion validity of the measure, reflected in correlations with validation instruments.
Źródło:
Roczniki Psychologiczne; 2020, 23, 1; 83-105
1507-7888
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Psychologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Przeobrażenia idei sprawiedliwości społecznej. Część I: Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako sprawiedliwość ogólna i rozdzielcza
Metamorphoses of the Idea of Social Justice. Part I: Social Justice as a Legal and Distributive Justice
Autorzy:
STOIŃSKI, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488508.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-03-26
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
etyka
filozofia polityki
sprawiedliwość społeczna
sprawiedliwość ogólna
sprawiedliwość rozdzielcza
ethics
philosophy of politics
social justice
legal justice
distributive justice
Opis:
W latach 40. XIX wieku Luigi Taparelli i Antonio Rosmini wprowadzili do publicznego obiegu termin „sprawiedliwość społeczna”. Od tamtego czasu znaczenie tego pojęcia znacznie się poszerzyło. Literatura przedmiotu notuje liczne identyfikacje tego konceptu. Niniejszy tekst koncentruje się na wskazaniu kilku jego ujęć. Autor, w siłą rzeczy skrótowo zaprezentowanych analizach, stara się pokazać specyfikę poszczególnych rodzajów znaczeń nadawanych „sprawiedliwości społecznej”. Sprawiedliwość społeczna będąca przedmiotem analizy w tym artykule utożsamiana jest ze sprawiedliwością ogólną (prawną) i rozdzielczą.
In the 1840’s, due to Luigi Taparelli and Antonio Rosmini, the term of “social justice” emerged. Since that time, its meaning has developed in many ways. In the literature of the subject, one can find numerous identifications of “social justice”. This paper brings up some applications of the notion. The author, in inevitably approximate analyses, tries to show the specificity of particular types of meanings assigned to the notion of “social justice”. The article focuses on the identity of this term with justice framed as a legal and distributive justice.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2018, 66, 1; 79-97
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Przeobrażenia idei sprawiedliwości społecznej. Część III: Sprawiedliwość społeczna jako idea solidarności i równości
Metamorphoses of the Idea of Social Justice. Part III: Social Justice as an Idea of Solidarity and Equalit
Autorzy:
STOIŃSKI, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/488499.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-03-26
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
etyka
filozofia polityki
sprawiedliwość społeczna
sprawiedliwość ogólna
sprawiedliwość rozdzielcza
ethics
philosophy of politics
social justice
legal justice
distributive justice
Opis:
W latach 40 XIX wieku Luigi Taparelli i Antonio Rosmini wprowadzili do publicznego obiegu termin „sprawiedliwość społeczna”. Od tamtego czasu znaczenie tego pojęcia znacznie się poszerzyło. Literatura przedmiotu notuje liczne identyfikacje tego konceptu. W tej części wskazane zostały utożsamienia sprawiedliwości społecznej ze sprawiedliwością wyrównawczą (w odmianach: karzącej, naprawczej i wymiennej). Niektóre z tego rodzaju identyfikacji zakładają istnienie podmiotów kolektywnych. Występują one jako czasowe bądź przestrzenne grupy społeczne i kohorty.
In the 1840’s, due to Luigi Taparelli and Antonio Rosmini, the term of “social justice” emerged. Since that time, its meaning has developed in many ways. In the literature of the subject, one can find numerous identifications of the term “social justice”. The article focuses on the identity of this term with justice framed as: a commutative justice (in its varieties: retributive, restorative and justice of exchange). Some of these concepts assume the existence of some kind of social persons. The author, in inevitably approximate analyses, tries to show specificity of particular types of meanings assigned to the notion of “social justice”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2018, 66, 1; 115-132
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Mercy as the Basis for Solving the Social Dispute About Justice
Autorzy:
Sienkiewicz, Edward
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2039162.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
mercy
justice
social dispute
anthropological and personalist criterion
Opis:
The social dispute over justice that is in a great crisis, must not be limited to social and economical criteria only. This is proved by the elementary experience, since attempts to overcome injustice only on this level are not effective. The anthropological and personalist criterion is necessary here. Only this criterion allows one to integrally define a man – also in his relations with others – as a person. Also justice has a personalist character, and because of this it is not a value that is only added to a man. As such, it is also an objective value that has an obligatory character, which is difficult to justify, and the more so to make it come true, without the Christian Revelation. The event of Jesus Christ, with the preparation given in the Old Testament, shows man’s sin as the fundamental source of injustice. This is why in an encounter with injustice only God’s mercy is effective, as the only factor – through Jesus’ paschal mystery – that overcomes sin. It is not tantamount to giving up justice, but to practicing it – as in Jesus’ understanding surrendering to the criteria of justice is a necessary condition of mercy, so that the sin can be judged and overcome, and the man can be saved.
Źródło:
Roczniki Teologiczne; 2016, 63, 2 English Version; 85-100
2353-7272
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Otfrieda Höffego krytyka Rawlsa teorii sprawiedliwości
Otfried Höffe’s Criticism of Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Autorzy:
Lis, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1856471.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
teoria sprawiedliwości
sprawiedliwość jako bezstronność
sytuacja pierwotna (stan natury)
zasady sprawiedliwości
umowa społeczna
utylitaryzm
theory of justice
justice as impartiality
primary situation (state of the nature)
rules of justice
social contract
utilitarianism
Opis:
In 1971 J. Rawls published A Theory of Justice. It became the subject of numerous analyses that can be reduced – with respect to reactions to it – to two positions: rejection and radicalization. The rejection reaction consists in the proposition that justice, understood by Rawls as impartiality, cannot be put into practice in real life. On the other hand, radicalization may be reduced to a multidirectional development of methodological suggestions in this theory. O. Höffe, who made this analysis, should be numbered among the radicals. He mainly discovered that Rawls was not able to defend the idea of justice as impartiality. For this reason he himself makes an attempt to formulate a new theory of justice for which practical philosophy is the philosophical base, and the theory of social contract and a semantic analysis of the idea of justice are premises for construing it.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 2005, 33, 1; 61-84
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem sprawiedliwości międzynarodowej
International Justice
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1876952.pdf
Data publikacji:
1976
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
In party I of the article the author attempts to present the relationship between justice and other values; Part II deals with the subjects of universal community; Part III discusses planes and forms of dispensing social justice. Nowadays international justice is mentioned besides traditional forms of justice, i. e. substitutional, distributional, social and legal. It seems to result from the birth of international community. All kinds of justice possess a common feature. Termed the principle of justice, it encourages granting what is lawfully due to other subjects as well as legalizing the right to achieve individual aims. Justice may be understood as moral competence, moral principle, social order founded upon the principle, and action which follows from respecting the law and duties. The author is essentially interested in justice as action. Being the realization of natural law, justice is moral action by means of which what is rightfully suum, cuique reddendi his is given to the other. It is also an activity through which man attains his own aims to which he is entitled. Justice is related to other values, such as truth, liberty and good (common). Just action must be founded upon the true knowledge of man, his dignity, equality, rights, duties, aims and tasks. It also implies liberty since any enforced action is not truly human and as such it can serve to realize neither action nor laws of both the individual and the community. Justice is also connected with good (common) which constitutes its subject, these are personal good i. e. integrated development, and instrumental one, i. e economic and cultural goods. In Part II the author attempts to present the subjects of laws and duties in the international community. He analyses theological, philosophical and sociological aspects of the problem, and lays down moral and legal norms that should be in face in the community. If we consider the philosophical and theological aspect, then it is possible to discuss the existence of universal (international) community; the sociological aspect implies merely the framework of such a community, while its full realization is still the postulate of the common good. The attitude of many authors, including the Code of International Morality which treats particular states as subjects of this community, cannot be maintained according to the notins of natural law. Already F de Vittoria proved that individuals and states constitute the subjects of this community, and at present the same opinion is expressed by many sociologists interested in international relations. It is worth adding that also international organizations and nations (ethnic minorities) are its subjects. The same subjects are the subjects of rights and duties in the universal (international) community. One should look for the foundations of legal force of the norms valid in the universal community in the value of an individual. The same natural law which determines the norms of conduct between particular citizens should also rule the relationships within the universal community. Natural rights of every national (state) community and other social groups result from the very nature of man and the demands of social life. As there exist mutual rights and duties of particular countries, their mutual relations should be founded upon the principle of justice. The author accepts J. Messner’s definition of international justice. He stresses the existence of two interrelated elements, suum cuique, and economic and cultural cooperation as in important factor of accomplishing the cuum. International justice is realized by means of varied cooperation rather, than sharing the their goods by the developed countries. The latter form can lead merely to the short- -lived satisfaction of the consumer’s needs. Although such equality is of a passive nature, it is necessary now. The teachings of bona superfluora formulated by Fathers of the Church, are extended by Populorum progressio from the individual plane to the international relations. Christian ethics always has stressed the universal appropriation of economic and cultural goods and the universal natural law entitling to their use. The idea of universal appropriation of mundane goods is of absolute and timeless value, independent of historical or social determinants and there is no need to verify it. Teachings of the Church concering the economic goods (ownership) and cultural are considered from the viewpoint of universal international community. The author stresses that scientific and technological as well as economic and cultural cooperation constitute the proper form of dispensing international justice. It is cooperation rather than aid since poverty and illiteracy cannot be abolished without the participation and effort of the developing countries themselves. They have to change their social and economic structures as well as the mentality of social groups. Cooperation but not aid demands changes in the structure of world economy. This is not only a moral postulate but also one resulting from the interests of both developed and developing countries. Individual national interests and universal interests are identical as nowadays common good of a particular state cannot be separated from the good of the whole family of men. Development and welfare of one nation at the same time both follow from and prompt welfare and development of other nations. Peace constitutes the common interest of all peoples of the world. The author thinks that to a certain extent the duty of developed countries to help the developing ones may follow the principle of restitution. It is a historical fact that the rich countries have achieved their present economic level by means of, among other things, colonial exploitation. International justice should be realized through: — respect of dignity of the human being, preservation of the rights of man as well as rights of nations and countries to existence and development;— cooperation in the field of science, technology, economy and culture;— proper and just, fixed prices of agricultural raw materials and products;— participation of the developing countries in the decisions concerning economic problems of the international community.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1976, 4; 19-40
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Koncepcja ekosprawiedliwości w encyklice Laudato Si
The Concept of Eco-Justice in the Encyclical Laudato Si
Autorzy:
Sadowski, Ryszard F.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2038436.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
ekosprawiedliwość
sprawiedliwość środowiskowa
encyklika Laudato Si'
sprawiedliwość międzypokoleniowa
chrześcijaństwo
religia i ekologia
ecojustice
environmental justice
encyclical Laudatos Si'
intergenerational justice
Christianity
religion and ecology
Opis:
Artykuł ten ukazuje ujęcie sprawiedliwości zaprezentowane przez papieża Franciszka w encyklice Laudato Si'. Zwraca uwagę na ciągłość nauczania kolejnych papieży w kontekście łączenia kwestii społecznej i kwestii środowiskowej, rozszerzenia zakresu przedmiotowego koncepcji sprawiedliwości na całe stworzenie oraz ukazanie międzypokoleniowego wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Opracowanie to ukazuje ponadto chrześcijańskie inspiracje koncepcji ekosprawiedliwości oraz zgodność ujęcia sprawiedliwości przedstawionego w encyklice ze współczesną myślą ekofilozoficzną. Wydaje się, że najlepszym określeniem tej koncepcji jest „integralna ekosprawiedliwość”.
This article presents the account of justice presented by Pope Francis in his encyclical Laudato Si'. It also shows the continuity of teaching successive popes in the context of linking social issues and environmental issues; extending the scope of the concept of justice for all creation; and presenting intergenerational character of justice. The study also shows Christian inspiration of eco-justice and compliance of justice approach presented in the encyclical to contemporary ecophilosophical works. It seems that the best term for the papal concept of justice is „integral eco-justice”.
Źródło:
Roczniki Teologiczne; 2016, 63, 3; 151-166
2353-7272
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Antyczna idea sprawiedliwości
The Ancient Idea of Justice
Autorzy:
Kowalczyk, Stanisław
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1860457.pdf
Data publikacji:
1998
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
The idea of justice was mainly the subject matter of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's works (The Republic, The Laws, The Gorgias) allows us to distinguish twofold elements in his conception of justice: ethical and socio-political. The former elements bear the objective-universal character. They are as follows: 1) justice as giving everybody what they rightly deserve, 2) the distinction between commutative justice (based on a mathematical equality), and distributive justice (based on a mere proportional equality). Now the socio-political elements of the Platonic conception of justice are connected with the approval of an authoritarian model of the state. Aristotle, while discussing the idea of justice mainly in the fifth book of his Nicomachean Ethics, distinguished two kinds of justice: general and particular. General justice, being man's internal righteousness, contains other moral virtues. Particular justice denotes a respect for the principles of equality in social relations. Following Plato, Aristotle distinguished commutative justice and distributive justice; the former is realized, for instance, in the act of purchase-sale, the latter in the relationships between the state and its citizens. The Roman thinkers applied the Greek idea of justice to the sphere of law. It was, above all, Ulpianos who did it. He defined justice as a permanent will to give everybody what they deserve.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1998, 26, 1; 171-179
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Sprawiedliwość a celowość w prawie
Justice and Porposefulness in Law
Autorzy:
Potrzeszcz, Jadwiga
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1871446.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-11-13
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
In the article an attempt is undertaken at defining mutual relations of justice and purposefulness, as the values that form the idea of law. The conception of the idea of law was worked out mainly by the German philosophy of law, and especially by G. Radbruch and A. Kaufmann. In the idea of law G. Radbruch distinguished three elements: justice, purposefulness and reliability of law. Justice is a formal principle whose essence is equality. It just defines the form of law, requiring that the equal should be treated equally and the unequal differently in an adequate way. To complement this principle purposefulness is necessary, which is a material principle defining the contents of law. However, since it is connected with relativism and controversies may originate of the political-worldview nature concerning the contents of law, also the principle of reliability of law is necessary that can put an end to these controversies and bring about legal peace, securing the binding force for the positive law. Between these three elements of the idea of law, according to Radbuch, there is a relation of mutual exclusion. A. Kaufmann developed the theory of the idea of law. His point of departure was the fact that as equality is the essence of justice, then equality itself is not the whole of justice. There are other tendencies beside it, namely, purposefulness and security of law. He identified the idea of law with a broadly understood justice that may be considered in three aspects: in the aspect of justice as equality, in the aspect of justice as purposefulness and in the aspect of justice as a factor giving security of law.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych; 2004, 14, 1; 29-43
1507-7896
2544-5227
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Możliwości czy dobra pierwotne? Dyskusja Amartyi Sena z Johnem Rawlsem na temat właściwej przestrzeni sprawiedliwości
Capabilities or Primary Goods? The Discussion between Amartya Sen and John Rawls about the Proper Space of Justice
Autorzy:
Kwarciński, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013439.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
przestrzeń sprawiedliwości
teoria sprawiedliwości
możliwości
dobra pierwotne
wolność
space of justice
theory of justice
capabilities
primary goods
freedom
Opis:
The article is an analysis of the discussion between Amartya Sen and John Rawls concerning the dispute about the proper space of justice. According to Rawls, the author of the theory of justice as impartiality, primary goods are the basis for defining the proper space of justice (he understands the space of justice as the space of primary goods). On the other hand, in Sen’s opinion, the basis is constituted by human capabilities (the space of justice  as the space of human capabilities). The basic aim of the article is to analyze the charges made by Sen against the theory of justice as impartiality based on the category of primary goods. After having taken into consideration the difference in the perspectives accepted by the two authors with respect to the problem of justice (Sen is oriented to securing the fate of the poor, whereas Rawls, focusing on obtaining an impartial choice of principles of justice, is concerned about nobody having a privileged position), the approach proposed by Sen was assessed as the more convincing one. This approach allows considering all the information concerning a broadly understood human existence (health, income, climatic, social, political conditions, etc.) when defining just social relations.
Źródło:
Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2006, 54, 1; 81-106
0035-7685
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Filozoficzne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Sprawiedliwość społeczna w skardze konstytucyjnej
Social Justice in the Constitutional Complaint
Autorzy:
Potrzeszcz, Jadwiga
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1871555.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-11-13
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
One of the means of protecting the individual's liberties and rights is – in accordance with Art.79.1 of the Constitution of the Polish Republic of April 2, 1997 – the institution of common constitutional complaint. The complaint may be laid by anyone whose constitutional liberties or rights have been violated. The detailed regulations for laying a constitutional complaint are defined by the Constitutional Tribunal Act of August 1, 1997. Along with the growing popularity of the constitutional complaint the frequency is growing of referring in the complaint to infringement of the rules following from Art. 2 and 32 of the Constitution – the rules of social justice and equality. The Constitutional Tribunal has been facing the necessity to decide if from the rules expressed in Art. 2 and 32 of the Constitution follow subjective rights of an individual, or if they are just systemic rules whose character is objective. The article presents the views of the Constitutional Tribunal on admissibility of referring to infringement of the rules of social justice and equality in a constitutional complaint as well as on the contents of those rules.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych; 2003, 13, 1; 17-30
1507-7896
2544-5227
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wolność czy sprawiedliwość − fałszywa alternatywa
Freedom or Justice: A False Alternative
Autorzy:
Mazurek, Franciszek Janusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1861022.pdf
Data publikacji:
1996
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Opis:
In the introduction the author refers to the documents of the CSCE. In these documents we read that the dignity of the human person is the highest value, and economic activity should respect and support it. The dignity of the human person underlies the norm of morality which says, persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam; it is also the basis of all human rights as well as of social freedom and justice. It is methodologically incorrect to state that there is contradiction between freedom and justice. The error here consists in the fact that the contradiction in individual interests or social groups is concealed behind those values, and two different, exclusive (liberal and Marxist) conceptions of freedom and justice are being compared. A social freedom takes place when all human rights are recognized and respected, whereas we deal with justice when these rights are efficiently and equally protected. These values constitute each other, therefore the alternative: freedom or justice is false. One cannot speak about freedom in the sphere of economy, if the partners do not exercise equal rights. The so-called free contracts are neither free nor just, if they are enforced by the partner who is economically more powerful. Contracts must be based on equal rights and the principle of natural law (ius cogens), pact sunt servanda. Various kinds of justice notwithstanding (commutative, distributive and social), justice is one. F.A. von Hayek wrote that "the expression social justice do not belong to the category of error, but to the category of nonsense, similarly as the expression morality of the stone". We may agree with the opinion of the Noble prize winner, however under one condition, namely that we fail to notice the difference between the behaviour of man and stone. The author is decidedly in favor of the priority of labour before the real capital, and views this priority in its ontic, genetic, functional and ethical aspect. That priority is bound with the so-called human capital. The capital being man himself, his health, talents, education, professional qualifications and developed morality. Human capital has been given priority before the capital of things. Human capital is largely made up of labour and is expressed through labour. In the province of economy the highest rank should be given to creative and full of initiative work. Work is a personal, moral, cultural, social, religious and economic value, and for this reason man is entitled to this value, that is to work and to work with initiative. He is also entitled with the right to education, formation and health care. Such rights are social rights. It is critical for the economic development of the country to recognize and realize those rights, and it is also an expression of justice. The right to initiative is closely bound with the right to possess private property. It is important for the economic development of the country to respect the right to participation, for it promotes initiative "from below". Political and economic democracy takes shape when freedom and social rights are being put into practice.
Źródło:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1996, 24, 1; 63-94
0137-4176
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Miłosierdzie jako podstawa rozwiązywania społecznego sporu o sprawiedliwość
Mercy as the Basis for Solving the Social Dispute about Justice
Autorzy:
Sienkiewicz, Edward
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2040205.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
Tematy:
miłosierdzie
sprawiedliwość
spór społeczny
kryterium antropologiczne i personalistyczne
mercy
justice
social dispute
anthropological and personalist criterion
Opis:
Społecznego sporu o sprawiedliwość, która znajduje się w wielkim kryzysie, nie wolno ograniczyć tylko do kryteriów społecznych i ekonomicznych. Dowodem na to jest elementarne doświadczenie, ponieważ próby pokonania niesprawiedliwości na tym tylko poziomie nie przynoszą większych efektów. Potrzebne jest kryterium antropologiczne i personalistyczne. Dopiero ono pozwala integralnie ująć człowieka, także w jego relacjach do drugich – jako osobę. Osobowy charakter posiada także sprawiedliwość, która przez to nie jest wartością do człowieka dodaną. Jako taka jest też wartością obiektywną, posiadającą charakter zobowiązujący, co trudne jest do uzasadnienia, a tym bardziej do urzeczywistnienia bez chrześcijańskiego Objawienia. Wydarzenie Jezusa Chrystusa, ze starotestamentowym jego przygotowaniem, ukazuje grzech człowieka jako podstawowe źródło niesprawiedliwości. Dlatego też w spotkaniu z nią skuteczne jest tylko Boże miłosierdzie, jako jedyne – przez misterium paschalne Jezusa – pokonujące grzech. Nie oznacza ono rezygnacji ze sprawiedliwości, ale jej wypełnienie, ponieważ w rozumieniu Jezusa koniecznym warunkiem miłosierdzia jest poddanie się najpierw kryteriom sprawiedliwości, aby mógł być osądzony i pokonany grzech a uratowany człowiek.
The social dispute over justice that is in a great crisis, must not be limited to social and economical criteria only. This is proved by the elementary experience, since attempts to overcome injustice only on this level are not effective. The anthropological and personalist criterion is necessary here. Only this criterion allows one to integrally define a man – also in his relations with others – as a person. Also justice has a personalist character, and because of this it is not a value that is only added to a man. As such, it is also an objective value that has an obligatory character, which is difficult to justify, and the more so to make it come true, without the Christian Revelation. The event of Jesus Christ, with the preparation given in the Old Testament, shows man's sin as the fundamental source of injustice. This is why in an encounter with injustice only God's mercy is effective, as the only factor – through Jesus' paschal mystery – that overcomes sin. It is not tantamount to giving up justice, but to practicing it – as in Jesus' understanding surrendering to the criteria of justice is a necessary condition of mercy, so that the sin can be judged and overcome, and the man can be saved.
Źródło:
Roczniki Teologiczne; 2016, 63, 2; 115-132
2353-7272
Pojawia się w:
Roczniki Teologiczne
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 80

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