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    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    Normatywna moc prawdy
    The Normative Authority of the Truth
    Autorzy:
    Szostek, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1917610.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-03-16
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    The basic thesis in the article says that the truth has a normative authority. In his considerations the author first of all tries to follow St.Thomas Aquinas’ thought. St.Thomas stressed more strongly than other thinkers the various meanings of the binding power of the truth, although the idea of „the ethics of being faithful to the truth” (mainly discussed in § 3) is contained in contained rather in St.Thomas’ system implicitly and not expressed explicitly. Taking into consideration Cardinal K. Wojtyła’s work is very helpful in making it explicit. The author shows the sense of the basic theses on three planes. First (§1) he analyses St. Thomas’ definition of truthfulness and discusses its rank and range, as opposed to various kinds of lies, and especially he looks for motives that made both St. Augustine and St. Thomas evaluate every kind of lie very negatively. Next (§ 2) he analyses a deeper meaning of „the truth as a virtue”, that is closer to the modern postulate of an authentic life. This, however, in St. Thomas’ work, finds its ultimate foundation in God, which reveals a deeper sense of righteousness as an expression of being faithful to the truth. The last part of the considerations (§ 3) is devoted to an explanation of the question: in what sense and why does any cognitive act by which one learns the truth carry a moral charge with it – a charge so strong that departure from the truth, even most banal, inevitably harms the subject itself that is a rational being.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1999, 47, 2; 283-298
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Filozoficzne implikacje obiektywizmu w etyce
    Some Philosophical Implications of Objectivism in Ethics
    Autorzy:
    Szostek, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106839.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1990
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    The paper defends a thesis that objectivism is a condition of sensibleness of pursuing normative ethics. On the basis of biblical and literary examples the author analyzes the experience of getting to know one's own fault. He points that an essential element of such an experience is perception of the value of a person who suffered injustice. This discovery, being different from other (so-called scientific) discoveries, retains the character of a discovery. That is to say, the character of the perception of values which hitherto have not been perceived by the subject clearly enough, neither have been created by that subject. Such a character of the discovery of values justifies ethical objectivism and explains its sense. An objectivistic standpoint in ethics brings about, among others, three implications: 1. an adequate to the experience of a value conception of man as its carrier (its axiologic superiority over non-rational beings); 2. epistemological realism (including an ability to get to know values), and 3. contingency of a human being. Finally, the author points at the "incongruity" between the anthropological and ethical considerations which tend to a more profound cognition of man himself, and modern technical mentality, with which mentality the modern shape of culture is too much imbued.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1990, 37-38, 2; 7-20
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dobro wspólne jako kluczowa kategoria polityczna. Przyczynek do zagadnienia: moralność a polityka
    The Common good as the Key Political Category a Contribution to the Issue: Morality and Politics
    Autorzy:
    Szostek, Andrzej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1860751.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1997
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    The article is a modified version of the paper delivered at the Congress of Polish Philosophy in September 1995. The first part proves that politics, in its long-term approach, may not dispense with the category of the common good. Therefore the postulate of demoralization of politics deviates from the demands of democracy, whose aim should be to strive for the common good. The second part of the paper proves that the recognition of the common good as the key category of politics entails the following philosophical consequences: the common good has a universal, that is anti-particular, character; it has a rational profile, that is it is based on the truth; finally, such a good demands that there should be a possibility for all members of a political community to participate in it. The common good implies that man be treated as subject, therefore the Christian tradition harmonizes with the demands of the ethos of politics.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Nauk Społecznych; 1997, 25, 1; 101-110
    0137-4176
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Nauk Społecznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

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