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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Droga do rewolucji
    Way to Revolution
    Autorzy:
    Szakolczai, Attila
    Matulewska, Aleksandra
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/477245.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2007
    Wydawca:
    Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
    Opis:
    The main reason for the revolution which broke out in 1956 was the communist party itself. Until 1953 it opposed almost all the Hungarian society, the living standards of which was being lowered gradually since 1948. Income of most of the labourers was scarcely enough to cover the every day needs. Levelling the differences within the society was made only in the lowest class. Life conditions of most of the nation were worse. Living standards were lowered most for intellectuals (apart from those working for the communist authorities). In the country the conditions were even worse. Socialistic reforms of the agriculture, compulsory collectivisation led to lowering incomes of this social group. The regime could survive only because of the common terror and smashing the society, particularly by ÁVH (State Security Services) activities, which controlled the society with the developing net of agents. The change was made in the middle of 1953 when Mátyás Rákosi was dismissed, and Imre Nagy gained the power. His government led to serious changes in the inner policy. The most important steps were cleaning the atmosphere which had been soaked with terror. Nagy closed internment camps, stopped resettlements, and many of prisoners were liberated. He desisted from some investments in the heavy industry, which allowed for transferring the money to other branches of industry. Reducing condingents of compulsory supplies of farm produce led to improvement in food deliveries. The aim and the main task of Rákosi and ÁVH was stopping or slowdown or at least keeping control over the process of revision and rehabilitation. The process of division of the party began, which was the reason of disintegration of this monolitic structure into two parts. In the beginning of 1955 Rákosi with the help of Moscow could get rid of Nagy. In spring 1955 he was dismissed from the post of the prime minister. From the beginning of 1955 Rákosi tried to restore the previous order, and it was necessary to re-unite the party. Hungarian party authorities condemned the policy led from 1953. The investigation in the case of Rajk death and the reveal of the role that Rákosi played in it led to his dismissal in July 1956. Moscow chose the worst possible successor, that is Ernő Gerő. He was trying to stabilise the situation in the country and to close the past with no purges. He announced democratisation of the socialist system, but he did not do much to achieve it. Rehabilitation activities were such a big challenge for ÁVH, that it had less time to fi ght the enemy. In the name of restoring the law order they had to resign from surveiling political leaders. Thus there was a danger that it would loose its political power. The revision of Rajk case started a hail of events. The party leaders on the state level were not able to face the real problems, they were not even able to start the process of seeking for resolution. The activities taken were wrong and too slow. The party started to fall. At the local party level more and more members started to accept reforms.
    Źródło:
    Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość; 2007, 1(11); 15-31
    1427-7476
    Pojawia się w:
    Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Refleksje na temat losu Żydów w okupowanej Polsce 1939–1945
    Refl ections on the Fate of the Jews in Occupied Poland, 1939–1945
    Autorzy:
    Silberklang, David
    Matulewska, Aleksandra
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/477964.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2008
    Wydawca:
    Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
    Opis:
    The article examines the fate of the Jews in Poland in the Soviet and German occupation zones. Nazi and Soviet policies affected all Jews, both as Jews and as part of the general population. But particularly under the Nazis, the Jews suffered a special fate, as refl ected in the different, if connected, timetables of World War II and the Holocaust. By the end of 1942 most Polish Jews were already dead; by the time the Allies arrived or the Poles were ready for their national uprising, almost no Jews remained. The salient features of Soviet treatment of the Jews were suspicion and dissolution – suspicion of all political and religious activity; suspicion and dissolution of all private enterprise; dissolution of Jewish educational and communal frameworks. Still, most Polish Jews generally preferred the Soviets – the lesser of two evils – to the Nazis. The salient features of Nazi treatment of the Jews were totality and relentlessness, from the early wanton violence, forced labor, mass expulsions, death marches, and mass murder, to the later more systematic policies. The Jews became increasingly isolated and faced their persecutors alone. Between October 1939 and spring 1941, tens of thousands of Jews were expelled from western Poland to the Generalgouvernement. The Nazi sought not only to Germanize these territories, but also to drive all the Jews out of German territory. The Jews were outside Nazi population policies, meant in the long run to disappear. Economically, Jews were completely impoverished, which in turn affected their health profi le. Starvation and disease became rampant in the large ghettos, resulting in mass death well before the “Final Solution” began. When the Nazis embarked on the murder of the Jews, devoting the full force and resources of a powerful, ideologically motivated, modern state to this national project, this was a seek-and-destroy mission that meant to leave no Jew alive. Here, too, the Jews were largely alone. The salient features in the Jews’ responses to the Nazis were helplessness and a sense of living in a hostile environment. They struggled to understand Nazi racial antisemitism. Seeing that following Nazi rules could spell death, the Jews needed to learn to become outlaws in order to hope to survive. Jews generally did not understand the Nazi intentions for them, and even if some did, this realization came only after most of the Jews in a community were already dead. Being a Jew in Poland during the Holocaust meant being constantly hunted, harassed, isolated, and threatened with death, not only from the Germans, but also from neighbors or others from among the local population, even if some local people were willing to lend them a helping hand.
    Źródło:
    Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość; 2008, 1(12); 113-126
    1427-7476
    Pojawia się w:
    Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rumunia wobec Praskiej Wiosny
    Romania and the Prague Spring
    Autorzy:
    Palii, Vasile
    Retegan, Mihai
    Matulewska, Aleksandra
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/478055.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2007
    Wydawca:
    Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu
    Opis:
    The April declaration of 1964 established a practical and theoretical basis for international relationships of Romania. Without it the period between 1965 and 1968 and Romania attitude towards intervention in Czechoslovakia cannot be understood. The isolated Romanian efforts within the Soviet block could be even more distinguished in 1967 by two attitudes which put this country in the centre of international attention. The fi rst case was a refusal to carry out Moscow guidelines to break diplomatic relationships with Israel because of the Six-Day 1967 Arab-Israeli War; the second was recognition of German Federal Republic and visit of its vicechancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Brandt in Romania, when Moscow satelite states recognised only German Democratic Republic. After these events Romanian diplomatic relationships with the free world entered a new stage. Between 1964 and 1968 the communist regime in Bucharest prepared a set of main rules of the foreign affairs policy. In the activities undertaken in that period one could notice all the elements which were revealed later in August 1968: rejection of the centre of authority in the communistic movement; the right of decision taking for every party; Warsaw Pact should not be domain of the Soviet Union only; its members should have more power within the organisation; Moscow guidelines concerning foreing affairs policies for members of the Warsaw Pact should be optional, and taking such decisions should be judged by national interest. Ceauşescu wanted independence combined with the Stalin model of socialism. Dubcek wanted socialism different from the Soviet one, staying under Moscow influence. For the USSR the Czechoslovakian model was far more dangerous: it was an alternative for a Soviet model. That is why in August 1968 ZSRR invaded Czechoslovakia and not Romania. Brezhnev and his comrads wanted to eliminate a team of reformers from Prague and to threaten Ceauşescu concentrating troops at the Romanian border. Ceauşescu declaration of 21st August 1968 is a benchmark of the peak of his popularity and the culmination point of independence activities of “national communism”. Definitely there were other moments of “riot” in Romania, but none of them had such wide repercussions of condemnation as intervention in Czechoslovakia. Lack of reaction of the Soviet Union shows that “the Soviet Union was not too worried about this kind of insubordination of its vassals, because the core, that is the though control of the society by the party and the Soviet model of developing country was not questioned. In the contrary to China in the middle of the sixties and Cambodia ten years later, these regimes were not dangerous according to Moscow, because they did not create a new model of communism which they would like to defend”.
    Źródło:
    Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość; 2007, 1(11); 61-73
    1427-7476
    Pojawia się w:
    Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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