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Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 16
Tytuł:
The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries
Autorzy:
Peña, Abel
Wright, Cory
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763410.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation
nature of explanation
norms of explanation
Opis:
There are at least two deep and related debates about explanation: about its nature and about its norms. The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Problems in Science/Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (ZFN) is to survey whether or not a consensus is at hand in these debates and to help settle what it can. The overarching foci are twofold: (i) the nature of scientific explanation, with special attention to the debate between ontic and epistemic conception of explanation, and (ii) the norms of scientific explanation, with special attention to so-called ‘ontic’ (or better, ‘alethic’) norms like truth and referential success and epistemic norms like intelligibility and idealized understanding. It called for advocates of various conceptions to articulate the current state of these debates. Researchers and scholars from around the globe—including Poland, Canada, Korea, The Netherlands, the United States, Greece, Austria, and Belgium—contributed. The special issue also attempts to provide an opening for new work on the norms of explanation, such as truth or model-based accuracy, information compression, abstraction, and generalization.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 5-17
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Dimensions of explanation
Autorzy:
Hochstein, Eric
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763416.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
evaluative dimension
communicative concept of explanation
representational concept of explanation
ontic conception of explanation
mechanistic explanation
Opis:
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 57-98
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Explanation, representation and information
Autorzy:
Karadimas, Panagiotis
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763413.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
representation
optimization process
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation
Opis:
The ontic conception of explanation is predicated on the proposition that “explanation is a relation between real objects in the world” and hence, according to this approach, scientific explanation cannot take place absent such a premise. Despite the fact that critics have emphasized several drawbacks of the ontic conception, as for example its inability to address the so-called “abstract explanations”, the debate is not settled and the ontic view can claim to capture cases of explanation that are non-abstract, such as causal relations between events. However, by eliminating the distinction between abstract and non-abstract explanations, it follows that ontic and epistemic proposals can no longer contend to capture different cases of explanation and either all are captured by the ontic view or all are captured by the epistemic view. On closer inspection, it turns out that the ontic view deals with events that fall outside the scientists’ scope of observation and that it does not accommodate common instances of explanation such as explanations from false propositions and hence it cannot establish itself as the dominant philosophical stance with respect to explanation. On the contrary, the epistemic conception does account for almost all episodes of explanation and can be described as a relation between representations, whereby the explanans transmit information to the explanandum and that this information can come, dependent on context, in the form of any of the available theories of explanation (law-like, unificatory, causal and non-causal). The range of application of the ontic view thus is severely restricted to trivial cases of explanation that come through direct observation of the events involved in an explanation and explanation is to be mostly conceived epistemically.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 21-55
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
Autorzy:
Povich, Mark
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763422.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
philosophy of science
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical explanation
ontic conception
conventionalism
Opis:
Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 171-223
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Przyczynek do krytyki statystyczno-relewantnego modelu wyjaśniania naukowego
The case for critique of statistical relevance model of scientific explanation
Autorzy:
Gorazda, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691122.pdf
Data publikacji:
2009
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
Salmon Wesley
scientific explanation
statistical relevance model
Opis:
The statistical relevance model of scientific explanation was proposed by Wesley Salmon in 1971 as an interesting alternative to already existed models introduced by Hempel and supported by many other philosophers of science. The most important difference between the nomological models and statistical relevance model is that the latter tries not to use the very dubious term of 'law of nature'. The first part of the paper consists of the overview of the Salmon's model and of the main arguments which were raised by various authors against it. In the main part of the text all of those arguments which were meant to undermine the model are presented on an example taken from the economic practice. It is very popular among the economists and especially among valuation experts the so called 'statistical analysis of the market'. The main objective of the analysis is to discover all of the factors which influence the market value of the particular product, in other words to explain the market value of the product. The example was taken from the social science (economics) for purpose as one of the thesis in the paper is that, the SR model can work quite well in physics or chemistry, but it is dubious whether we can really deploy it in sciences which try to describe and explain the various phenomena of human activity and behavior. The final conclusions are: The practical deployment of the model in social sciences are problematic, as it is too idealistic and therefore it doesn't work properly. Against its initial presumption the model doesn't avoid the problem of laws of nature. Although the law of nature is not a required element of the explanans, it comes back at the stage of proposing the initial candidates for the relevant variables. The hypothesis on, which variables can be and which cannot be relevant to the explained phenomenon are constructed mostly according to the intuitively understood causal relationship founded on laws of nature. The important postulate of homogenous partition is in practice unachievable what causes that the explanation is bound with the enormous risk of a mistake. The risk is quantifiable and can be estimated, but the estimation is depended upon experience and intuition of a researcher.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2009, 45; 124-139
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
How science tracks understanding
Autorzy:
Malfatti, Federica Isabella
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31804110.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
Truth
scientific realism
understanding
Explanation
scientific knowledge
Opis:
This review article discusses the book Understanding How Science Explains the World by Kevin McCain, published by Cambridge University Press (2022). With an impressive combination of clarity and depth, McCain provides the reader with a firm grasp of how science works, of what science aims to achieve, and of what makes science a successful epistemic enterprise. The review article reconstructs the book’s overall dialectic and identifies one potential point of tension which concerns the role of truth or accuracy in scientific knowledge.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 317-320
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Daniel Dennett’s New Mind: Darwin, Turing but no Bach
Autorzy:
Krzanowski, Roman
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690878.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
mind
philosophy of mind
cognitive science
scientific explanation
Opis:
Book review: Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The evolution of mind, Penguin Random House, UK 2017, pp. 467.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2018, 64; 209-213
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The ontic-epistemic debates of explanation revisited: The three-dimensional approach
Autorzy:
Gim, Jinyeong
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763418.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
mechanistic explanation
scientific representation
explanatory norms
Wesley Salmon
Opis:
After Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical stance on explanation in the 1980s, the ontic-epistemic debate of scientific explanations appeared to be resolved in the philosophy of science. However, since the twenty-first century, this debate has been rekindled among philosophers who focus on mechanistic explanations. Nevertheless, its issues have evolved, necessitating scrutiny of the new trends in this debate and a comparison with the original controversy between Carl Hempel and Salmon. The primary objective of this paper is to elucidate three categorical dimensions in the ontic-epistemic debates, spanning from the original to the recent controversies. Subsequently, it will explore why the conception of explanation is linked to representations, what conditions are necessary for linguistic expressions to be explanatory, and what roles norms play in explanation. Consequently, contrary to the common stereotype, it will be argued that mechanistic explanations are more likely to be epistemic rather than ontic.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 99-169
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część I
Limits of scientific explanation (I)
Autorzy:
Gorazda, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690994.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
naturalism
unity of science
philosophy of economics
complexity
Opis:
The purpose of the paper is to challenge one of the most important assumptions of the neo-positivists, namely the unity of science. The idea that all of the sciences, both natural and social, should have the same structure and should deploy similar methods is, after Grobler, called naturalism. I try to argue for anti-naturalism. An interesting example seems to be economics. It does not, however, demonstrate the success, similar to that achieved by natural sciences. Certain naturalistic explanations for this lack of success are reviewed and criticized in the paper. Firstly, complexity: at the beginning of this naturalistic argument, one encounters the problem of definition. Up to nine different notions of complexity are proposed and only a few of them are practically quantitative. Secondly, mathematics: in the natural sciences we explore mathematical theories in order to capture the regularities in the investigated phenomena and to include them in the corresponding equations. However, even if we do not have a perfectly corresponding mathematical model, regularities themselves can be observed. Wherever we do not have a good theory expressed in terms of exact mathematical equations, we should at least be able to judge the existence or non-existence of certain regularities on the basis of linear (statistical) or non-linear methods. Those methods, some of them extremely sophisticated, are being extensively applied in economics and in econometrics (the so called quantitative methods). The results are disappointing. The anti-naturalistic argumentation of Grobler is dealt with separately. Grobler names three anti-naturalistic arguments: complexity (as mentioned above), the free will of humans (which the author did not find interesting enough) and, finally, the reasoning which is called, ”inherent two-way interdependence”. Grobler maintains that we are able to work out a meta-theory which shall include both predictions and the possible impact of those predictions on the theory’s object. This proposal is rejected in the paper.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2012, 51; 41-75
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
What are the limits of mathematical explanation? Interview with Charles McCarty by Piotr Urbańczyk
Autorzy:
McCarty, David Charles
Urbańczyk, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691211.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
mathematics
logic
mathematical explanation
limits of explanation
mathematical proof
proof-core
intuitionism
constructivsim
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems
intuitionistics mathematics
classical mathematics
Axiom of Choice
Opis:
An interview with Charles McCarty by Piotr Urbańczyk concerning  mathematical explanation.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2016, 60; 119-137
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?
Autorzy:
Oleksowicz, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763439.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
new mechanical philosophy
mechanistic explanation
ontic
epistemic
explanatory norms
explanatory constraints
Opis:
In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 259-291
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rozumienie dowodu matematycznego a zagadnienie wyjaśnienia w matematyce
The Notion of Mathematical Proof and the Problem of Explanation in Mathematics
Autorzy:
Wójtowicz, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690770.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical proof
explanation in mathematics
explanatory proofs
mathematical intuition
Opis:
In the article, I present two possible points of view concerning mathematical proofs: (a) the formal view (according to which the formalized versions of mathematical proofs reveal their “essence”); (b) the semantic view (according to which mathematical proofs are sequences of intellectual acts, and a form of intuitive “grasp” is crucial). The problem of formalizability of mathematical proofs is discussed, as well as the problem of explanation in mathematics – in particular the problem of explanatory versus non-explanatory character of mathematical proofs. I argue, that this problem can be analyzed in a fruitful way only from the semantic point of view.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2015, 58; 89-114
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Modelling interactive computing systems: Do we have a good theory of what computers are?
Autorzy:
Martin, Alice
Magnaudet, Mathieu
Conversy, Stéphane
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31804107.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
philosophy of computing
models of computation
interactive computing
computing mechanism
computational mechanistic explanation
Opis:
Computers are increasingly interactive. They are no more transformational systems producing a final output after a finite execution. Instead, they continuously react in time to external events that modify the course of computing execution. While philosophers have been interested in conceptualizing computers for a long time, they seem to have paid little attention to the specificities of interactive computing. We propose to tackle this issue by surveying the literature in theoretical computer science, where one can find explicit proposals for a model of interactive computing. In that field, the formal modelling of interactive computing systems has been brought down to whether the new interaction models are reducible to Turing Machines. There are three areas where interaction models are framed. The comparison between TMs and interactive system models is at stake in all of them. These areas are namely some works on concurrency by Milner, on Reactive Turing Machines, and on interaction as a new computing paradigm. For each of the three identified models, we present its motivation, sum up its account for interaction and its legacy, and point out issues regarding the understanding of computers. The survey shows difficulties for epistemologists. The reason is that these analyses focus on the formal equivalence between interactive models of computation and classic ones. Such a project is different from addressing how a computing machine can be interactive: in other words, which mechanisms allow it.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2022, 73; 77-119
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część II
Limits of scientific explanation (II)
Autorzy:
Gorazda, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690548.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
philosophy of science
scientific explanation
model theory
philosophy of mind
F. A. von Hayek
Opis:
The second part of the text is intended to deal with the anti-naturalistic argument of F.A. Hayek. To present it comprehensively, however, his theory of mind has to be outlined first. According to Hayek, the way in which we perceive the world is entirely grounded in the biological construction of our neural order and thus, from this perspective, he seems to be a naturalist. He excludes any non-natural properties of our cognition like e.g. transcendental free will. However, a closer look at the functioning of our biological apparatus of perception divulges certain inherent and internal restrictions. First of all, we notice that the neural order (biological construction of neurons) is in fact a very complex apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses. Impulses may come from reality which is outer to the neural order as well as from the inside. The apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses is not stable, but permanently dynamic. An unstoppable attack of sensations and relevant responses of the system creates new classification rules (neural connections) and demolishes those which have been inactive for a longer time. A system of those rules, existing in a particular time unit, forms a model of reality which imperfectly corresponds to the existing, transcendent reality. The final argument for anti-naturalism which is elucidated in the text is Hayek’s idea of what is explanation and where lie its limits. This idea can be reduced to the following quotation: “…any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity that is possessed by an object which it classifies.” In other words: if our cognitive system is an “apparatus of classification”, and if an explanation means modeling, and if a complete explanation requires the explanation of the apparatus itself, then a complete explanation is not possible at all, as the apparatus, which has a certain level of complexity, cannot upgrade this level in order to explain itself. Hayek’s reasoning is generally approved yet it is emphasized, however, that it rests on very strong assumptions which are identified and named at the end of the text.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 53-106
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zagadnienie hipotez i teorii naukowych w rozważaniach filozoficznych Mariana Smoluchowskiego
The issue of hypotheses and scientific theories in the philosophical thoughts of Marian Smoluchowski
Autorzy:
Dziekan, Małgorzata
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691112.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
science
hypothesis
scientific theory
scientific explanation
analogy
models of physical phenomena
Marian Smoluchowski
Ludwig Boltzmann
Opis:
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate and reconstruct the philosophical thoughts in Marian Smoluchowski’s papers (in his publications and in unknown manuscripts as well). He was an outstanding Polish physicist, who lived at the turn of the XIX and XX century. Smoluchowski was particularly interested in theoretical physics. His achievements in this discipline, some even very significant, have caused him to be perceived mainly as a physicist. His work in the theory of fluctuations and kinetic theory of gases, especially in the theory of Brownian motions, is well known to physicists. My attention in this paper is focused on the metascientific problems which dominated his philosophical reflections. His analysis in the fields on philosophy of science (the concept of hypothesis, theory) ought to be perceived in light of physics. Philosophical reflections were at the margins of science which he practiced – physics was always the background to his deliberations. An important limit to our deliberations was set by concentrating on issues typical of the philosophy of science. In Smoluchowski’s case, however, it is difficult to say that his branch of philosophy is characterized by systematic reflection. It is difficult to classify his reflection in the framework of any given philosophical trend.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2017, 62; 7-71
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Wyświetlanie 1-15 z 16

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