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Tytuł:: Woluntaryzm w ujeciu Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza i Samuela Clarkea
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke on voluntarism
Autorzy:: Bubula, Daniel
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691233.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2011
Wydawca:: Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:: voluntarism
determinism
indeterminism
principle of sufficient reason
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Samuel Clark
Opis:: The article concerns the metaphysical problem of divine will as it is discussed in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Its essence can be expressed in the following question: in which way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of freedom in action and deciding? Leibniz is convinced that there is no contradiction between these two theses. Clarke is strongly opposed to that view. He is the protagonist of indeterminism. The article is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the divine will in relation to the principle of the sufficient reason. The second part points to some difficulties related to Leibniz's view on determinism.
Źródło:: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2011, 48; 77-94
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Tytuł:: Czy konceptualizm jest wystarczającą podstawą dla odrzucenia niekonstruktywnych dowodów istnienia w matematyce?
Is Conceptualism a Sufficient Reason for the Rejection of Non-Constructive Existence Proofs in Mathematics?
Autorzy:: Chlastawa, Daniel
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690974.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2012
Wydawca:: Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:: mathematical constructivism
non-constructive proofs
existence proofs
conceptualism
Opis:: Non-constructive existence proofs (which prove the existence of mathematical objects of a certain kind without giving any particular examples of such objects) are rejected by constructivists, who hold a conceptualist view that mathematical objects exist only if they are constructed. In the paper it is argued that this conceptualist argument against non-constructive proofs is fallacious, because those proofs establish the existence of objects belonging to certain kinds rather than the existence of those objects per se. Moreover, to engage in proving existence theorems in a given mathematical theory one has to define all of the objects of this theory at the very beginning, which can be interpreted as establishing the existence of these objects before any theorem about them is proven. It is also argued that the constructivist may escape these objections by adopting the actualistic view, according to which a mathematical sentence is true if and only if it is established as true, but this view is very implausible, as it seems unable to explain the strictness and objectiveness of mathematics and the fact that it differs so fundamentally from, for example, fictional discourse.
Źródło:: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2012, 51; 116-130
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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