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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
The process of microRNAs discovery
Autorzy:
Kawalec, Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690756.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
breakthrough research
let-7
lin-4
particularism
processualism
scientific discovery
research routine
microRNAs
noncoding RNA
Opis:
The widespread particularist account of the onset of molecular biology that identifies it with the discovery of the DNA structure in 1953 has been recently contested. The paper contributes to this debate by focusing on a more recent discovery of small noncoding RNAs (microRNAs). First, it outlines a particularist account of the microRNAs discovery and the origins of the particularist predilection of the modern scientometric studies of science dynamics. Next, it discusses its limitations and proposes an alternative, modified processualist account of the discovery. In the final part, the paper applies this approach to unravel network dynamics of the research on the first two microRNAs that were discovered, namely lin-4 and let-7.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2020, 68; 219-242
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Explanation, representation and information
Autorzy:
Karadimas, Panagiotis
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763413.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
representation
optimization process
ontic conception of explanation
epistemic conception of explanation
Opis:
The ontic conception of explanation is predicated on the proposition that “explanation is a relation between real objects in the world” and hence, according to this approach, scientific explanation cannot take place absent such a premise. Despite the fact that critics have emphasized several drawbacks of the ontic conception, as for example its inability to address the so-called “abstract explanations”, the debate is not settled and the ontic view can claim to capture cases of explanation that are non-abstract, such as causal relations between events. However, by eliminating the distinction between abstract and non-abstract explanations, it follows that ontic and epistemic proposals can no longer contend to capture different cases of explanation and either all are captured by the ontic view or all are captured by the epistemic view. On closer inspection, it turns out that the ontic view deals with events that fall outside the scientists’ scope of observation and that it does not accommodate common instances of explanation such as explanations from false propositions and hence it cannot establish itself as the dominant philosophical stance with respect to explanation. On the contrary, the epistemic conception does account for almost all episodes of explanation and can be described as a relation between representations, whereby the explanans transmit information to the explanandum and that this information can come, dependent on context, in the form of any of the available theories of explanation (law-like, unificatory, causal and non-causal). The range of application of the ontic view thus is severely restricted to trivial cases of explanation that come through direct observation of the events involved in an explanation and explanation is to be mostly conceived epistemically.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 21-55
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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