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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    Some Problems With Judging Rationality
    Autorzy:
    Swistak, Piotr
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/494300.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-06-15
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Game Theory
    rationality
    behavioral game theory
    ultimatum game
    Opis:
    The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make.
    Źródło:
    Decyzje; 2015, 23; 5-22
    1733-0092
    2391-761X
    Pojawia się w:
    Decyzje
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Some Thoughts on Michael Chwe’s „Jane Austen, Applied Game Theorist”
    Autorzy:
    Kamiński, Marek M.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1198600.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Jane Austen
    game theory
    decision theory
    mating
    Opis:
    The article examines the decision-making components of Jane Austen’s six major novels as reconstructed in Michael Chwe’s book and his argument that Austen was a precursor of game theory. In her novels, Austen describes an abundance of strategic situations in the mating process within the British higher classes. Social constraints made mating within this world a tough game due to harsh punishments for failure, especially for women, and severe limitation on signaling interest or sympathy. Austen cleverly investigates this environment and reconstructs many aspects of strategic behavior that have their counterparts in formal concepts of game and decision theory. While she hasn’t made contributions to theory per se, she deserves being named a precursor of applied strategic thinking and an expert on a particular strategically sophisticated social environment.
    Źródło:
    Decyzje; 2018, 30; 63-74
    1733-0092
    2391-761X
    Pojawia się w:
    Decyzje
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A Bayesian Blessing: A Biblical Decision Explained by Game Theory
    Autorzy:
    Dodell, Leah
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1198590.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    Game Theory
    Economics
    Bayesian Games
    Strategic Communication
    Deception
    Old Testament
    Opis:
    This paper revisits one of the most debated tales from the Old Testament, Jacob’s deception of his father Isaac, and models it in the framework of a Bayesian game. Solving for the equilibrium that occurs in the Torah reveals what conditions must hold for biblical characters to be willing to make the decisions that they make. The paper also examines how the protagonists’ decisions would have changed if they had held different values. The analysis sheds light on which interpretations of the biblical story hold the most weight when its characters maintain consistent beliefs and act upon them in a sequentially rational manner.
    Źródło:
    Decyzje; 2018, 30; 53-61
    1733-0092
    2391-761X
    Pojawia się w:
    Decyzje
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Analysis of Ineffectiveness Arising in “Investor-government” Relations
    Autorzy:
    Sokolovskyi, Dmytro B.
    Sokolovska, Olena V.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/417302.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-09-15
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    investors
    Pareto-optimality
    modeling
    Game Theory
    Nash equilibrium
    Government
    economic behavior
    Opis:
    Purpose: This article deals with the problem of forming Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing designed to reduce risks in investment activity. Methodology: Considering the interdependent type (nature) of interactions between related parties, game theory tools were used to model such interactions. Much attention was directed to search for� parameters of interaction leading to certain Nash equilibriums in pure strategies. The formal results obtained with the model were verified by statistical analysis. Findings: Analysis showed that the rational behavior of related parties can lead to unexpected results. Powerful investors will aim to work in socially-oriented economies, whereas primarily small investors will operate in most liberal economies with a�minimum tax burden but with a�higher level of risk. As for governments’ behaviors, the images are the same: small economies tend to liberalize their tax systems and to secure investment faster than powerful ones. Empirical verification based on statistical data of groups of countries generally confirmed the conclusions. These formal and logical conclusions were from statistical analysis of 124 countries divided into 5 groups: OECD countries, post-socialist countries, Latin American countries, APAC countries and ACP countries. Provided that the more powerful ones are covered economies, there was stronger interdependence between the size of economies and tax burden and also between total investment and tax burden, where this dependence is positive. Originality: The results obtained used Nash equilibriums in pure strategies as models of behavioral norms to define behaviors of related parties and also to explain assumptions concerning the behaviors of investors and government.
    Źródło:
    Management and Business Administration. Central Europe; 2015, 3; 47-70
    2084-3356
    Pojawia się w:
    Management and Business Administration. Central Europe
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Evolutionary stability of discriminating social norms
    Autorzy:
    Abramczuk, Katarzyna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1198700.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
    Tematy:
    game theory
    third-party sanctions
    social norms
    social control
    discrimination
    privilege assignment
    social inequalities
    Opis:
    The paper presents an evolutionary model illustrating the dynamics that give rise to discriminatory social norms i.e. such rules of behaviour that fulfil two conditions: (1) they treat differently actors having the same abilities and technical options, but differing in some arbitrary sense (2) they are supported by socially enforced sanctions. In the presented model both discrimination and social norms are necessary to solve a coordination problem that arises when the situation requires different actors to perform different tasks. The properties of behavioural rules relying on discrimination and leading to various degrees of inequality are analysed. It is demonstrated that in general norms ensuring equal payoffs are easier to stabilize, but unfair norms can also be stable.
    Źródło:
    Decyzje; 2016, 26; 27-57
    1733-0092
    2391-761X
    Pojawia się w:
    Decyzje
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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