Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

English (EN)·Polski (PL)·Yкраїнський (UK)
Przejdź do strony domowej biblioteki Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa Link otwiera się w nowym oknie Logo biblioteki Prolib Integro - strona głównaCentralna Biblioteka Wojskowa

Wyszukujesz frazę "Pragmatism" wg kryterium: Temat

  Lista filtrów
Wyrównaj
    Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6
    Tytuł:
    The road to hell is paved with good intentionality
    Autorzy:
    Knoop, Carin-Isabel
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1968839.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-07-01
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    diversity
    equity
    language
    pragmatism
    Opis:
    The dislocation of the Pandemic caused social convulsions around the world. The middle and ruling classes seem to have rediscovered humans – essential workers, employees, members of underrepresented minorities, and children. In our rush to atone our sins and redress imbalances, we are not stopping to define words nor, as the pragmatists would want us to, think through what our moral precepts mean in practice. Nor do we have the tools in accounting, the “language of business,” to capture our efforts. However, teams that do not take the time to establish ground rules and standard definitions often get a faster start but don’t always do the best work nor have the most impact. Let’s give ourselves better changes.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2021, 12, 24; 11-15
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pragmatic Objectivity
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036331.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    Objectivity
    Pragmatism
    Realism
    Idealism
    World
    Rationality
    Opis:
    Nicholas Rescher writes that “objectivity is not something we infer from the data; it is something we must presuppose. It is something that we postulate or presume from the very outset of our dealings with people’s claims about the world’s facts”. Such definition is just the opposite of objectivity conceived of in classical terms, but it cannot be equated with an idealistic viewpoint according to which objectivity is something that our mind simply creates in the process of reflection. It is, rather, a sort of cross-product of the encounter between our mind-shaped capacities, and a surrounding reality made up of things that are real in the usual meaning of the term. Science itself gives us some crucial insights in this direction, since it shows that we see, say, tables and trees in a certain way which, however, does not match the image that scientific instruments are able to attain. Does this mean that our commonsense view of the world is totally wrong and that nature deceives us? This is not the case. The difference between the commonsense and the scientific image of the world is explainable by the fact that we are evolutionary creatures. Nature has simply endowed human beings with tools and capacities that enable them to survive in an environment which - at least in remote eras - was largely hostile. Our way of seeing tables and trees is what is requested for carrying on a successful fight for the survival of the species: nothing more - and nothing less - is needed for achieving this fundamental goal. Turning once again to the problem of ontological objectivity, the picture has now gained both strength and clarity. If we recall that human endeavors, although occurring in a largely autonomous social and linguistic world, are nevertheless limited by the constraints that natural reality forces upon us, we begin to understand that the social-linguistic world itself is not a boat freely floating without directions. If the boat is there, it means that an explanation of its presence is likely to be obtained if only we are patient enough to look for it. Some kind of hand must be on the wheel, giving the boat indications on Contrary to other pragmatist-flavored positions popular nowadays, this approach maintains that universality has a fundamental and unavoidable function in our rational endeavors. This is due to the fact that “presupposition” and “hypothetical reasoning” are key ingredients of our very capacity to rationalize the world in which we live. Indeed, there can be no rationality without universality.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2014, 09; 43-54
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pragmatism and Political Pluralism - Consensus and Pluralism
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036574.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    pragmatism
    science
    cultural evolution
    political philosophy
    consensus
    social contract
    Opis:
    A pragmatist thinker like Nicholas Rescher deems the idea that social harmony must be predicated in consensus to be both dangerous and misleading. An essential problem of our time is the creation of political and social institutions that enable people to live together in peaceful and productive ways, despite the presence of not eliminable disagreements about theoretical and practical issues. Such remarks, in turn, strictly recall the “practical” impossibility of settling philosophical disputes by having recourse to abstract and aprioristic principles. In the circumstances, the social model of team members cooperating for a common purpose is unrealistic. A more adequate model is, instead, that of a classical capitalism where - in a sufficiently well developed system - both competition and rivalry manage somehow to foster the benefit of the entire community (theory of the “hidden hand”). Certainly the scientific community is one of the best examples of this that we have, although even in this case we must be careful not to give too idealized a picture of scientific research. Consensus, however, in the Western tradition is an ideal worth being pursued. At this point we are faced with two basic positions. On the one side (a) “consensualists” maintain that disagreement should be averted no matter what, while, on the other, (b) “pluralists” accept disagreement because they take dissensus to be an inevitable feature of the imperfect world in which we live. A pluralistic vision, therefore, tries to make dissensus tolerable, and not to eliminate it. All theories of idealized consensus present us with serious setbacks. This is the case, for instance, with Charles S. Peirce. As is well known, Peirce takes truth to be “the limit of inquiry,” i.e. either what science will discover in the (idealized) long run, or what it would discover if the human efforts were so extended. By taking this path, thus, truth is nothing but the ultimate consensus reached within the scientific community. We can be sure that, once a “final” answer to a question has been found which is thereafter maintained without change, that one is the truth we were looking for. This fascinating theory, however, has various unfortunate consequences. In our day the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has in a way revived these Peircean insights, putting forward an influential theory to the effect that consensus indeed plays a key role in human praxis, so that the primary task of philosophy is to foster it by eliminating the disagreement which we constantly have to face in the course of our daily life. In his “communicative theory of consensus,” furthermore, he claims that human communication rests on an implicit commitment to a sort of “ideal speech situation” which is the normative foundation of agreement in linguistic matters. Consequently, the quest for consensus is a constitutive feature of our nature of (rational) human beings: rationality and consensus are tied together. A very strong consequence derives from Habermas’ premises: were we to abandon the search for consensus we would lose rationality, too, and this makes us understand that he views the pursuit of consensus as a regulative principle (rather than as a merely practical objective). Rescher opposes both Peirce’s eschatological view and Habermas’ regulative and idealized one.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2015, 12; 47-58
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Logic and its Pragmatic Aspects
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1037570.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    logic
    formal logic
    logical pluralism
    pragmatism
    analytic philosophy
    praxis
    Opis:
    A pragmatist conception of logic rejects any kind of logical constructionism, based on the appeal to privileged ontological and epistemological items and to a perfect language supposedly provided by mathematical logic. Even in logic, “pluralism” must be the key-word if one does not want to be locked in the cage of conceptions that become rapidly outdated. Dealing with the dichotomy Absolutism/Relativism in logic, it may be observed that the enterprise of logic can be considered in several - and substantially different - perspectives, among which we find (1) the psychologistic, (2) the Platonistic, and (3) the instrumentalistic viewpoints. According to (1) logic is viewed as fundamentally descriptive, and its task is taken to be that of outlining a “theory of reasoning,” i.e. a systematic account of how we humans proceed when reasoning successufully. According to (3), instead, logic’s task is that of constructing rigorous systems codifying not only actual, but also possible instrumentalities for conducting valid inferences, and these would be available (should someone want to avail himself to them) for adoption as an organon of reasoning, but no empirical claims are made that anyone has (or will) avail himself of this opportunity. The logician devises a tool or instrument for correct reasoning, but does not concern himself about the uses of this instrument. Philosophy and logic cannot be linked so closely, and today the idea that the analytic style of philosophizing is just one style among many others, and not the only possible one, is gaining increasing acceptance.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2018, 17; 46-53
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Pragmatism and Science
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1036147.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    Pragmatism
    Science
    Scientific Realism
    Ideal Science
    Final Theory
    Relativism
    Opis:
    Logical empiricism gave rise to a powerful paradigm and it took some decades to overthrow it, even though it should be judged respectfully since, after all, philosophy of science and logic as we know them stemmed from that ground. The basic assumptions on which the paradigm of the “received view” rested are essentially the following. In the first place, verificationism seemed almost a truth of faith. Secondly, logical empiricists never offered good arguments in support of their thesis that assertive discourse must be preferred to more pragmatic forms of language. Thirdly, they too easily assumed that something like “objective truth” really exists. Last but certainly not least, the logical empiricists did not fully recognize the historical dimension of the scientific enterprise, which subsequently turned to be something different from the “universal science” they were talking about. In the paper it is argued that scientific realism (and the nature of scientific knowledge at large) is a theme where the originality of pragmatist positions clearly emerge. Nicholas Rescher, for example, claims - against any form of instrumentalism and many postmodern authors as well - that natural science can indeed validate a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. Scientific conceptions aim at what really exists in the world, but only hit it imperfectly and “well off the mark”. What we can get is, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality itself. This means that the scientific knowledge at our disposal in any particular moment of the history of mankind must be held to be “putative”, while its relations to the truth (i.e. how things really stand in the world) should be conceived in terms of tentative and provisional estimation. Even the optimistic visions that see science as growingly approaching the “real” truth have, at this point, to be rejected on pragmatic grounds.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2013, 08; 101-109
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Post-Empiricism and Philosophy of Science
    Autorzy:
    Marsonet, Michele
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1037876.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Academicus. International Scientific Journal publishing house
    Tematy:
    science
    philosophy of science
    logical positivism
    post-empiricism
    pragmatism
    methodological anarchism
    Opis:
    The aim of this paper is to provide some sketchy remarks on the post-empiricist phenomenon in philosophy of science, taking into account the themes of the relationships between language on the one side and reality on the other, and the parallel problem of the alleged elimination of metaphysics. Unlike the logical empiricists, Popper believes that a clear separation between (i) analytic and synthetic sentences, and (ii) between theory and observation, is an impossible task. According to his view, theory and observation are intimately linked to each other, and no pure observation is ever possible. A position very similar to Popper’s was endorsed by the American pragmatists in the last two centuries with Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. There also are important similarities between what Popper says and William James’ theses. It is clear that if we recognize that the theoretical dimension precedes observation, and if we claim furthermore that scientific theories have a creative character, then we may explain the “jumps” that often take place in the history of science. Later on Feyerabend and his followers have turned philosophy of science into something mysterious and not easily classifiable in philosophical or scientific terms. The anything goes undermines the meaning itself of the discipline. If science is equated to any other dimension of spirit - art, religion, or even witchcraft - the specific and cognitive character of scientific rationality is eliminated. It follows that philosophy of science loses any meaningful role within the field of human knowledge, while even philosophy as such becomes more similar to a joke than to a serious endeavor.
    Źródło:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal; 2018, 18; 26-33
    2079-3715
    2309-1088
    Pojawia się w:
    Academicus International Scientific Journal
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-6 z 6

      Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies