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Wyszukujesz frazę "scientific philosophy" wg kryterium: Temat

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    Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10
    Tytuł:
    Struktura cyfrowej rewolucji naukowej
    Structure of the digital scientific revolution
    Autorzy:
    Leciejewski, Sławomir Grzegorz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690912.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    philosophy of science
    scientific revolution
    computer aided scientific research
    Opis:
    Nowadays, computers are in common use, both in experimental and theoretical research. It is worth considering if the implementation of a new, universal research tool has significantly changed the science of the end of 20th century. The crucial question which I will try to answer is if computers have revolutionized the scientific research. In order to find the answer, I will describe modern digitally aided science, taking into consideration the research conducted in the greatest elementary physics laboratory. Subsequently, I will refer to the classic concept of scientific revolution proposed by Thomas S. Kuhn. Finally, I will answer the question related to digital revolution in science.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2018, 64; 117-136
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Piękno jako przykład pozaempirycznego kryterium wyboru teorii naukowej
    Beauty as an example of nonempirical criterion of the scientific theory choice
    Autorzy:
    Ciszewska, Diana
    Szydłowski, Marek
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690902.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2010
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    philosophy of science
    beauty
    scientific theory
    Opis:
    It is sometimes argued that beauty and science have nothing in common. This is not necessarily true. When speaking of beauty in science we are touching two branches of knowledge: aesthetics and physics. We show that they are connected, permeate each other and work together to give good scientific results. Scientific theories and aesthetics theories exhibit some similarities not only during the creation phase, but also during the application phase. We examine two aesthetic criteria, namely symmetry and simplicity, which are valuable tools in choosing the correct scientific theory.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2010, 47; 3-37
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Daniel Dennett’s New Mind: Darwin, Turing but no Bach
    Autorzy:
    Krzanowski, Roman
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690878.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    mind
    philosophy of mind
    cognitive science
    scientific explanation
    Opis:
    Book review: Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The evolution of mind, Penguin Random House, UK 2017, pp. 467.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2018, 64; 209-213
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
    Autorzy:
    Povich, Mark
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763422.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    scientific explanation
    philosophy of science
    philosophy of mathematics
    mathematical explanation
    ontic conception
    conventionalism
    Opis:
    Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 171-223
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część II
    Limits of scientific explanation (II)
    Autorzy:
    Gorazda, Marcin
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690548.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    philosophy of science
    scientific explanation
    model theory
    philosophy of mind
    F. A. von Hayek
    Opis:
    The second part of the text is intended to deal with the anti-naturalistic argument of F.A. Hayek. To present it comprehensively, however, his theory of mind has to be outlined first. According to Hayek, the way in which we perceive the world is entirely grounded in the biological construction of our neural order and thus, from this perspective, he seems to be a naturalist. He excludes any non-natural properties of our cognition like e.g. transcendental free will. However, a closer look at the functioning of our biological apparatus of perception divulges certain inherent and internal restrictions. First of all, we notice that the neural order (biological construction of neurons) is in fact a very complex apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses. Impulses may come from reality which is outer to the neural order as well as from the inside. The apparatus of classification and discrimination of sensory impulses is not stable, but permanently dynamic. An unstoppable attack of sensations and relevant responses of the system creates new classification rules (neural connections) and demolishes those which have been inactive for a longer time. A system of those rules, existing in a particular time unit, forms a model of reality which imperfectly corresponds to the existing, transcendent reality. The final argument for anti-naturalism which is elucidated in the text is Hayek’s idea of what is explanation and where lie its limits. This idea can be reduced to the following quotation: “…any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity that is possessed by an object which it classifies.” In other words: if our cognitive system is an “apparatus of classification”, and if an explanation means modeling, and if a complete explanation requires the explanation of the apparatus itself, then a complete explanation is not possible at all, as the apparatus, which has a certain level of complexity, cannot upgrade this level in order to explain itself. Hayek’s reasoning is generally approved yet it is emphasized, however, that it rests on very strong assumptions which are identified and named at the end of the text.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 53-106
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część I
    Limits of scientific explanation (I)
    Autorzy:
    Gorazda, Marcin
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690994.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    scientific explanation
    naturalism
    unity of science
    philosophy of economics
    complexity
    Opis:
    The purpose of the paper is to challenge one of the most important assumptions of the neo-positivists, namely the unity of science. The idea that all of the sciences, both natural and social, should have the same structure and should deploy similar methods is, after Grobler, called naturalism. I try to argue for anti-naturalism. An interesting example seems to be economics. It does not, however, demonstrate the success, similar to that achieved by natural sciences. Certain naturalistic explanations for this lack of success are reviewed and criticized in the paper. Firstly, complexity: at the beginning of this naturalistic argument, one encounters the problem of definition. Up to nine different notions of complexity are proposed and only a few of them are practically quantitative. Secondly, mathematics: in the natural sciences we explore mathematical theories in order to capture the regularities in the investigated phenomena and to include them in the corresponding equations. However, even if we do not have a perfectly corresponding mathematical model, regularities themselves can be observed. Wherever we do not have a good theory expressed in terms of exact mathematical equations, we should at least be able to judge the existence or non-existence of certain regularities on the basis of linear (statistical) or non-linear methods. Those methods, some of them extremely sophisticated, are being extensively applied in economics and in econometrics (the so called quantitative methods). The results are disappointing. The anti-naturalistic argumentation of Grobler is dealt with separately. Grobler names three anti-naturalistic arguments: complexity (as mentioned above), the free will of humans (which the author did not find interesting enough) and, finally, the reasoning which is called, ”inherent two-way interdependence”. Grobler maintains that we are able to work out a meta-theory which shall include both predictions and the possible impact of those predictions on the theory’s object. This proposal is rejected in the paper.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2012, 51; 41-75
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Filozofia dramatu jako filozoficzna tradycja badawcza
    Philosophy of drama as a philosophical research tradition
    Autorzy:
    Sierotowicz, Tadeusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690938.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    methodology of scientific research traditions
    philosophical research traditions
    philosophy of drama
    philosophy of science
    mental experiment
    Józef Tischner
    Opis:
    This paper presents an attempt to describe Józef Tischner’s philosophy of drama from the point of view of Larry Laudan’s philosophy of science. That is achieved with the help of the concept of Philosophical Research Traditions developed in the paper. A~certain conceptual problem of Tischner’s philosophy, and some future research topics are also presented.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2018, 64; 59-92
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Nauka jako racjonalna doxa. Józefa Życińskiego koncepcja nauki i filozofii nauki – poza internalizmem i eksternalizmem
    Science as a rational doxa. J. Życiński’s understanding of science and philosophy of science – beyond internalism and externalism
    Autorzy:
    Liana, Zbigniew
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690836.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    rationalism
    skepticism
    internalism
    externalism
    metascience
    scientific revolution
    metascientific revolution
    philosophy of science
    Opis:
    Philosophical interests of Joseph Życiński (1948-2011) in the domain of the philosophy of science were focused on the debate concerning the nature of science and philosophy of science that followed the Einstein-Planck revolution in science. The unexpected discovery of the philosophical, extra-scientific presuppositions in science, as well as of the extra-rational factors determining the way these presuppositions are accepted in science were to be explained within the meta-scientific framework. It is the aim of this paper to present ˙ Życiński’s diagnosis of this post-revolutionary situation in the philosophy of science as well as his critique of the metascientific answers to this challenge. The reasons will be given why all those answers are put under two dichotomous rubrics of internalism and externalism. It will be also explained how Życiński intends to supersede this false in his opinion opposition with a new concept of the doxatic rationality. However, the details of the metascientific proposal of Życiński will be given only in the subsequent paper. In order to perform the aim of the paper the metatheoretic tools set out by Popper (1979) will be used.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 66; 147-199
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Imagination, geniuses and thought collectives
    Autorzy:
    Mścisławski, Łukasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1943076.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    scientific revolution
    old quantum theory
    special relativity
    thought collective
    physics
    philosophy of science
    Opis:
    In his book Wojciech Sady attempts to reconstruct the structure of the fundamental transformations that can be described as the relativistic and quantum revolution. Referring to rich historical material and Ludwik Fleck’s reflections on the development of scientific knowledge, the author tries to explain how it is possible that “scientists began to think differently than they had been taught.” Sady’s work, although not devoid of somewhat weaker points, is a brave and thought-provoking attempt to propose his own explanation of the mechanisms of the aforementioned transformations.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2021, 71; 175-190
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Droga ekonomii wolnej od wartościowania do epistemologicznej pychy. Użycie i nadużycie matematyki przez ekonomistów
    Value-free economics’ road towar Value-free economics’ road towards epistemological hubris. The use and abuse of mathematics by economists
    Autorzy:
    Ostapiuk, Aleksander
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691054.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    podejście ekonomiczne
    naukowy program badawczy
    filozofia ekonomii
    ekonomia wolna od wartościowania
    economic approach
    scientific research programme
    philosophy of economics
    value-free economics
    Opis:
    The goal of the article is to substantiate that despite the criticism the paradigm in economics will not change because of the axiomatic assumptions of value-free economics. How these assumptions work is demonstrated on the example of Gary Becker’s economic approach which is analyzed from the perspective of scientific research programme (Lakatos). The author indicates hard core of economic approach (maximization of utility, instrumental rationality) and the protective belt which makes hard core immune from any criticism. This immunity leads economists to believe that they are objective scientists and, consequently, it results in epistemological hubris. Due to its tautological nature (and other problems), economic approach is considered to be a degenerative programme. This conclusion is extended on value-free economics. In spite of these problems, many economists still believe in positive economics and they dismiss normative approaches. It has a negative influence on people (well-being, choices over time). The conclusion of the article is that thanks to axiomatic assumptions economists do not have objective and ironclad methodology and they should accept normative values in their research.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 67; 153-202
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10

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