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    Wyświetlanie 1-9 z 9
    Tytuł:
    Minimal Information Structural Realism
    Autorzy:
    Krzanowski, Roman
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691098.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    information
    information ontology
    structure
    structural realism
    information structural realism
    Opis:
    This paper presents Minimal Information Structural Realism (MISR), that claims that information (signified by I) is an ontologically and epistemologically objective entity (signified by R) and is apprehended as, but not identical to structures perceived in nature (signified by S). Two informal arguments are presented in support of this claim. One argument is based on the conclusions from models of quantum mechanics (QM) and cosmology, while the other argument is referred to as incompleteness of epistemic definitions of information. MISR is not associated directly with the structural realism (SR) of the ontic or epistemic kinds, and is only remotely related to the concept of information structural realism (ISR) defined by Floridi.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2017, 63; 59-75
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Possible physical universes
    Autorzy:
    McCabe, Gordon
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691328.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2005
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    models of universe
    multiverse
    structural realism
    Opis:
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various types of physical universe which could exist according to modern mathematical physics. The paper begins with an introduction that approaches the question from the viewpoint of ontic structural realism. Section 2 takes the case of the 'multiverse' of spatially homogeneous universes, and analyses the famous Collins-Hawking argument, which purports to show that our own universe is a very special member of this collection. Section 3 considers the multiverse of all solutions to the Einstein field equations, and continues the discussion of whether the notions of special and typical can be defined within such a collection.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2005, 37; 73-97
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Co to jest „argument z cudu”? Próba obrony realizmu naukowego oparta na fakcie sukcesu nauki
    What is a 'miracle argument'? An attempt of defense of scientific realism based on the fact of the scientific success
    Autorzy:
    Rodzeń, Jacek
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690888.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2006
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    miracle argument
    scientific realism
    success in science
    Opis:
    The so-called 'miracle argument', or the argument from the success of science, is probably one of the best-known arguments in favor of scientific realism. We first present a short history of philosophical anticipations of the main idea, which can be found in the works of C. Clavius, W. Whewell and P. Duhem. Then we consider three 'classical' versions of the 'miracle argument' proposed by J.J.C. Smart, H. Putnam and R.N. Boyd. The views of three other authors (B. van Fraassen, L. Laudan and A. Fine), critical with respect to the argument, are also briefly presented. We suggest a possible development of the 'miracle argument' by taking into account other aspects of the success in science, such as: success in the road to unification, effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, success of laboratory technologies.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2006, 38; 3-34
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    How science tracks understanding
    Autorzy:
    Malfatti, Federica Isabella
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/31804110.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    Truth
    scientific realism
    understanding
    Explanation
    scientific knowledge
    Opis:
    This review article discusses the book Understanding How Science Explains the World by Kevin McCain, published by Cambridge University Press (2022). With an impressive combination of clarity and depth, McCain provides the reader with a firm grasp of how science works, of what science aims to achieve, and of what makes science a successful epistemic enterprise. The review article reconstructs the book’s overall dialectic and identifies one potential point of tension which concerns the role of truth or accuracy in scientific knowledge.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 317-320
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    On the adequacy of qualifying Roger Penrose as a complex Pythagorean
    Autorzy:
    Grygiel, Wojciech P.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691078.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    Roger Penrose
    mathematical platonism
    realism
    pythagoreism
    complex numbers
    Opis:
    The aim of the presented article is to provide an in-depth analysis of the adequacy of designating Penrose as a complex Pythagorean in view of his much more common designation as a Platonist. Firstly, the original doctrine of the Pythagoreans will be briefly surveyed with the special emphasis on the relation between the doctrine of this school and the teachings of the late Platonic School as well as its further modifications. These modifications serve as the prototype of the contemporary claims of the mathematicity of the Universe. Secondly, two lines of Penrose’s arguments in support of his unique position on the ontology of the mathematical structures will be presented: (1) their existence independent of the physical world in the atemporal Platonic realm of pure mathematics and (2) the mathematical structures as the patterns governing the workings of the physical Universe. In the third step, a separate line of arguments will be surveyed that Penrose advances in support of the thesis that the complex numbers seem to suit these patterns with exceptional adequacy. Finally, the appropriateness of designation Penrose as a complex Pythagorean will be assessed with the special emphasis on the suddle threshold between his unique position and that of the adherents of the mathematicity of the Universe.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2018, 65
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Status poznawczy teorii: realizm epistemologiczny w ujęciu F. Bonsacka
    The cognitive status of a theory: F. Bonsacks epistemological realism
    Autorzy:
    Kaczmarek, Jerzy
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691176.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2007
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    François Bonsack
    Ferdinand Gonseth
    conditions of cognition
    epistemological realism
    référentiels
    Opis:
    This paper puts forward mainly F. Bonsack's and Gonseth's conception of epistemological realism. In their opinion theory is characterized by schematic correspondence with the reality. It regards current controversy between realists and antirealists and conditions of cognitive world view. The cognitive objectivism may increase through exploring and elimination subjective determinants. It considers the criterion of physical reality of the object of cognition, which was set up by F. Bonsack. This criterion is associated with invariable cognitive contents. In this article this criterion and its hypothetic character are shown.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2007, 40; 30-58
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Oblicza matematycznego quasi-empiryzmu
    The kinds of mathematical quasi-empirism
    Autorzy:
    Wójtowicz, Krzysztof
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690708.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    Imre Lakatos
    mathematical realism
    quasi-empiricism
    Willard Van Orman Quine
    Opis:
    The received view concerning mathematics is the one, that mathematics is a priori, and that mathematical knowledge develops via 'intelektuelle Anschauung' rather than by analyzing empirical data. Mathematical proofs seems to be immune to empirical refutation, and in particular the development of mathematics does not in any way resemble the development of e.g. physics. On the other hand, it is quite clear, that mathematics play a fundamental role in science, and it is often considered to be rather just a useful tool, which provides a language and a conceptual system allowing to express statements concerning empirical world. Such views stress the dependence of mathematics upon physics. In the article, the author presents two quite different aspects of this problem: the ontological and the methodological aspects. According to Quine, our argumentation in favor of mathematical realism should be based on the analysis of ontological commitment of empirical theories. There is no other compelling argument for mathematical realism. According to Lakatos, mathematical knowledge develops in a way similar to empirical science: it is fallible, and the proper model to describe it is the model of proofs and refutations. In the article the author describes and contrast these two points of view.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2009, 44; 61-83
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Matematyka - nauka o fikcjach?
    Mathematics - science about fictions...?
    Autorzy:
    Wójtowicz, Krzysztof
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691150.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    fictionalism
    field
    mathematical realism
    Quine's indispensability argument
    philosophy of mathematics
    Opis:
    According to mathematical realism, mathematics describes an abstract realm of mathematical entities, and mathematical theorems are true in the classical sense of this term. In particular, mathematical realism is claimed to be the best theoretical explanation of the applicability of mathematics in science. According to Quine's indispensability argument, applicability is the best argument available in favor of mathematical realism. However, Quine's point of view has been questioned several times by the adherents of antirealism. According to Field, it is possible to show, that - in principle - mathematics is dispensable, and that so called synthetic versions of empirical theories are available. In his 'Science Without Numbers' Field follows the 'geometric strategy' - his aim is to reconstruct standard mathematical techniques in a suitable language, acceptable from the point of view of the nominalist. In the first part of the article, the author briefly presents Field's strategy. The second part is devoted to Balaguer's fictionalism, according to which mathematics is indispensable in science, but nevertheless can be considered to be a merely useful fiction.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2009, 45; 3-26
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy konstruktywiści społeczni mówią nam o czymś realnym w ekonomii?
    Do social constructivists tell us something real about economics?
    Autorzy:
    Kurkowski, Bartosz Paweł
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691056.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Copernicus Center Press
    Tematy:
    realizm
    konstruktywizm społeczny
    filozofia ekonomii
    intersubiektywność
    rzeczywistość
    prawda
    realism
    social constructivism
    philosophy of economics
    intersubjectivity
    reality
    truth
    Opis:
    Social constructivists use to say that economists cannot study objective reality, absolute truth does not exist, and economic knowledge is being constructed, not discovered and it depends on temporary culture. Realists notice and admit social conditions which may affect economic theories and unrealistic assumptions of models, but they claim that these models describe the real world, at least to some extent. The notions of truth and reality are crucial in both of these concepts. In this papar they are analysed based on Hilary Putnam theory developed by Adam Grobler.
    Źródło:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 67; 61-95
    0867-8286
    2451-0602
    Pojawia się w:
    Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-9 z 9

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