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Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?
Autorzy:
Oleksowicz, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763439.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
new mechanical philosophy
mechanistic explanation
ontic
epistemic
explanatory norms
explanatory constraints
Opis:
In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 259-291
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The ontic-epistemic debates of explanation revisited: The three-dimensional approach
Autorzy:
Gim, Jinyeong
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28763418.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
mechanistic explanation
scientific representation
explanatory norms
Wesley Salmon
Opis:
After Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical stance on explanation in the 1980s, the ontic-epistemic debate of scientific explanations appeared to be resolved in the philosophy of science. However, since the twenty-first century, this debate has been rekindled among philosophers who focus on mechanistic explanations. Nevertheless, its issues have evolved, necessitating scrutiny of the new trends in this debate and a comparison with the original controversy between Carl Hempel and Salmon. The primary objective of this paper is to elucidate three categorical dimensions in the ontic-epistemic debates, spanning from the original to the recent controversies. Subsequently, it will explore why the conception of explanation is linked to representations, what conditions are necessary for linguistic expressions to be explanatory, and what roles norms play in explanation. Consequently, contrary to the common stereotype, it will be argued that mechanistic explanations are more likely to be epistemic rather than ontic.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2023, 74; 99-169
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Rozumienie dowodu matematycznego a zagadnienie wyjaśnienia w matematyce
The Notion of Mathematical Proof and the Problem of Explanation in Mathematics
Autorzy:
Wójtowicz, Krzysztof
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690770.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
philosophy of mathematics
mathematical proof
explanation in mathematics
explanatory proofs
mathematical intuition
Opis:
In the article, I present two possible points of view concerning mathematical proofs: (a) the formal view (according to which the formalized versions of mathematical proofs reveal their “essence”); (b) the semantic view (according to which mathematical proofs are sequences of intellectual acts, and a form of intuitive “grasp” is crucial). The problem of formalizability of mathematical proofs is discussed, as well as the problem of explanation in mathematics – in particular the problem of explanatory versus non-explanatory character of mathematical proofs. I argue, that this problem can be analyzed in a fruitful way only from the semantic point of view.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2015, 58; 89-114
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kilka uwag o problemie demarkacji ze stanowiska informacjonizmu
A Few Remarks on Demarcation Problem from the Perspective of Informationism
Autorzy:
Gorzula, Bartosz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690552.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
demarcation problem
pseudoscience
informationism
falsificationism
confirmationism
abduction
epistemology of information
explanatory power
semantic information
Opis:
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a different perspective on the problem of demarcation. It presents the results achieved by J. Hintikka and the Finnish school of the philosophy of science. However, the origins of this approach can be traced to the work of R. Carnap and Y. Bar-Hillel. The controversy over confirmationism and falsificationism is based on false assumptions. We need both probability and informative content. Our theories must have a connection with reality (high probability) and reflect its deep structure (information). Expected informational content allows us to define a “negative” demarcation criterion between science and pseudoscience.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2013, 52; 107-130
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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