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Wyszukujesz frazę "Philosophy of economics" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
Tytuł:
Believable world of economic models
Autorzy:
Gorazda, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691074.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
economic models
philosophy of economics
Opis:
Book review: Łukasz Hardt, Economics Without Laws. Towards a New Philosophy of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2017, pp. 220.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 67; 251-261
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Problem istoty i pomiaru dobrobytu
The problem of the essence and measurement of well-being
Autorzy:
Rybka, Wojciech
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691076.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
well-being
welfare
quality of life
economics
philosophy of economics
Opis:
Well-being is becoming an increasingly popular issue in economics. The aim of the article is to present the concept of well-being and the methods of its measurement and to examine the statistical significance between the results obtained by specific indicators. The article was written based on the meta-analysis of the books and scientific papers on the subject, as well as well-being and welfare measurement reports. The study shows that there is a very wide range of theories and concepts related to well-being which are sometimes exceptive. The most important conclusion from the study is that the correlation between welfare and well-being represented respectively by GDP and HDI is very strong, while the correlation between welfare and life satisfaction as well as well-being and subjective well-being are negligible.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 67; 203-248
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Granice wyjaśnienia naukowego, część I
Limits of scientific explanation (I)
Autorzy:
Gorazda, Marcin
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/690994.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
scientific explanation
naturalism
unity of science
philosophy of economics
complexity
Opis:
The purpose of the paper is to challenge one of the most important assumptions of the neo-positivists, namely the unity of science. The idea that all of the sciences, both natural and social, should have the same structure and should deploy similar methods is, after Grobler, called naturalism. I try to argue for anti-naturalism. An interesting example seems to be economics. It does not, however, demonstrate the success, similar to that achieved by natural sciences. Certain naturalistic explanations for this lack of success are reviewed and criticized in the paper. Firstly, complexity: at the beginning of this naturalistic argument, one encounters the problem of definition. Up to nine different notions of complexity are proposed and only a few of them are practically quantitative. Secondly, mathematics: in the natural sciences we explore mathematical theories in order to capture the regularities in the investigated phenomena and to include them in the corresponding equations. However, even if we do not have a perfectly corresponding mathematical model, regularities themselves can be observed. Wherever we do not have a good theory expressed in terms of exact mathematical equations, we should at least be able to judge the existence or non-existence of certain regularities on the basis of linear (statistical) or non-linear methods. Those methods, some of them extremely sophisticated, are being extensively applied in economics and in econometrics (the so called quantitative methods). The results are disappointing. The anti-naturalistic argumentation of Grobler is dealt with separately. Grobler names three anti-naturalistic arguments: complexity (as mentioned above), the free will of humans (which the author did not find interesting enough) and, finally, the reasoning which is called, ”inherent two-way interdependence”. Grobler maintains that we are able to work out a meta-theory which shall include both predictions and the possible impact of those predictions on the theory’s object. This proposal is rejected in the paper.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2012, 51; 41-75
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Czy konstruktywiści społeczni mówią nam o czymś realnym w ekonomii?
Do social constructivists tell us something real about economics?
Autorzy:
Kurkowski, Bartosz Paweł
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691056.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
realizm
konstruktywizm społeczny
filozofia ekonomii
intersubiektywność
rzeczywistość
prawda
realism
social constructivism
philosophy of economics
intersubjectivity
reality
truth
Opis:
Social constructivists use to say that economists cannot study objective reality, absolute truth does not exist, and economic knowledge is being constructed, not discovered and it depends on temporary culture. Realists notice and admit social conditions which may affect economic theories and unrealistic assumptions of models, but they claim that these models describe the real world, at least to some extent. The notions of truth and reality are crucial in both of these concepts. In this papar they are analysed based on Hilary Putnam theory developed by Adam Grobler.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 67; 61-95
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Droga ekonomii wolnej od wartościowania do epistemologicznej pychy. Użycie i nadużycie matematyki przez ekonomistów
Value-free economics’ road towar Value-free economics’ road towards epistemological hubris. The use and abuse of mathematics by economists
Autorzy:
Ostapiuk, Aleksander
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/691054.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019
Wydawca:
Copernicus Center Press
Tematy:
podejście ekonomiczne
naukowy program badawczy
filozofia ekonomii
ekonomia wolna od wartościowania
economic approach
scientific research programme
philosophy of economics
value-free economics
Opis:
The goal of the article is to substantiate that despite the criticism the paradigm in economics will not change because of the axiomatic assumptions of value-free economics. How these assumptions work is demonstrated on the example of Gary Becker’s economic approach which is analyzed from the perspective of scientific research programme (Lakatos). The author indicates hard core of economic approach (maximization of utility, instrumental rationality) and the protective belt which makes hard core immune from any criticism. This immunity leads economists to believe that they are objective scientists and, consequently, it results in epistemological hubris. Due to its tautological nature (and other problems), economic approach is considered to be a degenerative programme. This conclusion is extended on value-free economics. In spite of these problems, many economists still believe in positive economics and they dismiss normative approaches. It has a negative influence on people (well-being, choices over time). The conclusion of the article is that thanks to axiomatic assumptions economists do not have objective and ironclad methodology and they should accept normative values in their research.
Źródło:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce; 2019, 67; 153-202
0867-8286
2451-0602
Pojawia się w:
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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