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Wyszukujesz frazę "guilt" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola

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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    The Impact of Human Dignity on the Principles of Criminal Liability. The Example of Guilt
    Autorzy:
    Krzysztof, Szczucki,
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902957.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    criminal law
    constitutional law
    human dignity
    guilt
    culpability
    criminal liability
    Opis:
    Human dignity is a well-known concept among Western countries since after World War II, when states, in an effort to create a new platform of cooperation with a view to guaranteeing peace, were looking for an axiological foundation of the new order. The findings described in the article may serve to underpin the following notions, which have to be the object of further research on relations between the human dignity principle and rules of criminal liability, guilt in particular. First, the “guilt standard” is obligatory, whenever a state intends to punish a person. Second, punishment can be meted out only to an offender with an ability to bear responsibility. In other words, only a person whose characteristic derived from the principle of dignity is fully actualized can be punished. Third, punishing should be preceded by an analysis of the degree of guilt. The more eager the perpetrator was to act against the legal system and against the values protected by it, the severer punishment should be meted out. Finally, law should provide for exclusion of culpability when the human dignity principle demands one to act in a manner that is outwardly criminal, but was committed due to a motivation that ought to be excused in the light of the dignity principle.
    Źródło:
    Studia Iuridica; 2016, 67; 11-31
    0137-4346
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Iuridica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Guilt as a premise of administrative liability of a penal character
    Autorzy:
    Błachnio-Parzych, Anna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/48899539.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2024-03-09
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    principle of guilt
    nullum crimen sine culpa
    administrative-criminal liability
    presumption of innocence
    Opis:
    Liability for offences subject to administrative monetary sanctions formally belongs to administrative law, where the prevailing position is that guilt does not constitute a prerequisite for this liability. However, the punitive nature of some sanctions at the same time places this kind of liability under broadly understood criminal law (penal law). Their penal nature raises doubt as to the legitimacy of the aforementioned position concerning guilt. The aim of this article is to answer the question whether guilt should constitute a premise for administrative liability of a penal nature. First, analysis of the standards in the matter developed in the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the European Union will be presented. Next, selected provisions of administrative law in force will be examined to answer the question whether they are compatible with the aforementioned standards.
    Źródło:
    Studia Iuridica; 2023, 100; 28-43
    0137-4346
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Iuridica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Responsibility – an Anthropological Outline
    Autorzy:
    Stanisław, Jędrczak,
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902637.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-03-08
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    proleptic view on personhood
    responsibility
    pseudo-Diodorian modality
    freedom of will
    consensus
    guilt
    proleptyczna koncepcja osoby
    odpowiedzialność
    modalność pseudo-Diodorowa
    wina
    Opis:
    In the article, I try to present an outline of the theory of responsibility. Its double root – based on the logical distinction between criterion and testimony – is derived from Abelard’s anthropology of action and the theory of personhood developed by Timothy Chappell. Initially, I discuss the metaphysical difficulties related to the problem of freedom (especially linked with determinism). Afterwards, following Abelard, I try to indicate an anthropological justification of punishment based on guilt. The last part of the paper is devoted to the attempt to enter the free will into a broader view of Chappell’s theory. The aim of the work is to prepare the ground for future studies on the proleptic notion of personhood and its further application within the philosophy of law.
    Źródło:
    Studia Iuridica; 2019, 82; 131-148
    0137-4346
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Iuridica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Die Bedeutung von „Können” bei Fahrlässigkeit und Schuld
    Autorzy:
    Schmoller, Kurt
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/48899332.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023-01-23
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    negligence
    guilt
    free will
    determinism
    meaning of “(s)he could have”
    purpose of punishment
    Opis:
    In connection with criminal negligence, the focus is regularly on whether the perpetrator “could have” recognized and avoided the situation he brought about, whether (s)he “could have” acted more carefully or complied with the requirements of due diligence. When examining guilt, it is also important (in the case of intentional as well as negligent offenses) whether the perpetrator “could have” recognized the wrongfulness of his/her act and “could have” acted according to this insight. If the “(s)he could have” perspective is rejected, the offender remains unpunished. On the other hand, there is a controversy regarding the extent humans can freely choose their perceptions and behaviour at all or whether these are ultimately determined by external and internal circumstances. The article explores the question of how a “(s)he could have” requirement can be conceived in law and especially in criminal law in a way that remains unaffected by the unsolved debate between “free will” and “determinism”. The author proposes that in the phrase “(s)he could have” the word “can” should not be understood in the (indeterministic) sense of alternative perceptions or behaviour, but simply as the existence of specific psycho-physical properties which, according to empirical knowledge, are necessary for compliance with a norm, just as it can be said, for example, that someone “can” speak French or that he “can” play the piano. It is also compatible with the function of “punishment” in modern (secular) criminal law to understand the “(s)he could have” requirement of punishability as a mere statement about existing, empirically ascertainable psychophysical properties of a person (and in this way to decouple it from the problem of determinism).
    Źródło:
    Studia Iuridica; 2022, 93; 209-225
    0137-4346
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Iuridica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Artykuł 28 § 1 k.k. po nowelizacji z dnia 20 lutego 2015 r. Uwagi na temat konieczności oddzielania strony podmiotowej czynu zabronionego od winy
    Autorzy:
    Zbigniew, Jędrzejewski,
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/902838.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
    Tematy:
    prohibited act
    mens rea
    intentional character of an offence
    unintentional character of an offence
    guilt
    act committed while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act
    Opis:
    The object of analysis is the amended art. 28 § 1 of the Penal Code, which stipulates that „whoever commits an act while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act, shall not commit a crime”. The new regulation of 28 § 1 of the Penal Code is the next attempt to statutorily define the concept of an offence based on the methodology of a strict separation of the object of evaluation from the evaluation itself, that is, primarily a radical separation of mens rea of a prohibited act from guilt. Therefore, the authors of the change have consistently attempted to eliminate all normative attributes from the scope of „recklessness” and „negligence”. This is a result of the view that assumes a pure descriptive character of the set of criminal offence features (Ger. „Tatbestand”) including subjective features (offences of intentional and unintentional character). In this context, acts committed while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of a prohibited act exclude guilt, however the fulfilment of the features of criminal acts of unintentional character is limited to the fulfilment of objective features (a consequence of the concept of the unintentional character of an offence as a plain negation of intent). The negative wording of art. 1 § 3 of the Penal Code, the objective and general interpretation of the term found in art. 9 § 2 „could have foreseen” (a transfer of the so-called objective foreseeability to the category of objective attribution) and the concept of committing an act while being in justifiable error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of a prohibited act excluding guilt lead, in the area of unintentional character of an offence, to the presumption of guilt on the basis of the fulfilling only the objective features of a criminal act. The author of the article demonstrates the inaccuracy of this argument for a strictly descriptive character of the features of a prohibited act, and in particular the features of intent (intentional character of an offence). The object of intent (a feature of a criminal offence) has a evaluative character (evaluation), therefore determining intent can generally constitute a premise for accepting guilt (intended), unless the circumstance of excluding guilt exceptionally occurs. In the case of an unintentional character of an act, such a relation does not occur, and the guarantee functions (the rule of positive establishment of the perpetrator’s guilt) thus require subjective (specific and individual evaluation) interpretation of the premise „could have foreseen” found in art. 9 § 2 of the Penal Code.
    Źródło:
    Studia Iuridica; 2016, 65; 25-40
    0137-4346
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Iuridica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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