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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    The Dispute between Gilson and Maritain over Thomist Realism
    Autorzy:
    Chamberlain, Stephen
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507480.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017-06-30
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    Thomist realism
    critique
    epistemology
    ontology of knowledge
    critical realism
    retorsion
    principle of identity
    thing-object distinction
    Opis:
    This paper considers the proper location and function of critique in establishing a Thomist realism. The author begins by providing a brief explanation of Étienne Gilson’s understanding of critique and why he thinks a “critical realism” is incoherent. Next, the author considers the criticisms made by John Knasas who, from a Gilsonian perspective, argues that Jacques Maritain employs a version of the transcendental method of retorsion in order to justify his realism. Finally, the author offers a Maritainian response to Knasas in which it is argued that Maritain’s account provides a via media between the Transcendental Thomists, on the one hand, and the strict Aristotelian or a posteriori Thomists, on the other.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2017, 6, 2; 177-195
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Primo Cadit in Intellectu Ens: Gilson, Maritain, and Aquinas on Knowing Being
    Autorzy:
    Hayden, Evagrius
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507580.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-03-30
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    Gilson
    Maritain
    Thomas Aquinas
    existentialism
    essentialism
    epistemology
    knowledge of being
    intellect
    ens
    esse
    actus essendi
    Opis:
    The author compares the views of Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Thomas Aquinas on the order in our knowledge of being. While Gilson and Maritain maintain that esse and the actus essendi are what are first known, Aquinas maintains consistently that it is the existent thing or the ens itself that is first known. The paper proceeds by first laying out the positions of Gilson and Maritain as evidenced in their respective works Being and Some Philosophers and Existence and the Existent. Then, it manifests what in their positions is correct and in what they err. And finally, it argues that ens is the first thing known by appealing to the proper object of the intellect, the order between the acts of the intellect, and the intellect’s mode of procedure. In the course of these arguments, the primary authoritative sources used are the works of Aquinas.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2020, 9, 1; 33-62
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics
    Autorzy:
    Polis, Dennis
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057089.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-20
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    Aristotelianism
    Thomism
    evolution
    substance-accident distinction
    epistemology
    projective realism
    nominalism
    relativism
    intentional existence
    laws of nature
    species problem
    intelligent design
    problem of universals
    exemplar ideas
    creationism
    moderate realism
    teleology
    abstraction
    Opis:
    I respond to Michał Chaberek’s and Robert A. Delfino’s criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution’s directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new species concepts. This accords with projective realism, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based on the mul-tiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nom-inalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowledge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek’s thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species con-cept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) con-fuses Aristotle’s four causes and (4) limits God’s creative omnipotence. Finally, Cha-berek is out of step with contemporary theology.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2021, 10, 4; 847-891
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Disputatio on the Distinction between the Human Person and Other Animals: the Human Person as Gardener
    Autorzy:
    Savino, Damien Marie
    Wagner, Daniel C.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2138115.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-09-26
    Wydawca:
    International Étienne Gilson Society
    Tematy:
    human uniqueness
    gardening
    person
    personalism
    philosophical anthropology
    philosophical biology
    thomas Aquinas
    Aristotle
    human intelligence
    animal intelligence
    cognition
    epistemology
    metaphysics
    philosophy of language
    evolutionary biology
    ecology
    logic
    ethics
    disputatio
    Opis:
    While the catholic intellectual tradition upholds the uniqueness of humans, much contemporary scientific research has come to the opposing conclusion that humans are not significantly different from other animals. to engage in robust dialogue around the question of human uniqueness, we utilize Aquinas’s model of disputatio to focus on an attribute of human beings that is unexplored in the literature – namely, the human capacity to garden – and address five scientific and philosophical objections to our position that the capacity to garden makes humans distinct. engaging with various branches of science, we demonstrate that human capacities and modes of gardening are not only incrementally different, but also fundamentally different in kind, from those of nonhuman creatures. Philosophically, we utilize the power-object model of division and Aristotle’s categorization of knowledge to express the difference in kind between human beings and other animals. these responses allow us to set aside each major objection.
    Źródło:
    Studia Gilsoniana; 2022, 11, 3; 471-530
    2300-0066
    Pojawia się w:
    Studia Gilsoniana
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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