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Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7
Tytuł:
The Issue of Intentionality in Contemporary Thomis
Autorzy:
Freile, Alvaro
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057141.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-03-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
intentionality
epistemology
Neo-Thomism
esse intentionale
Thomas Aquinas
realism
Opis:
The issue of intentionality is one of the pivotal points in the theory of knowledge. Depending on how intentionality is understood, one can be a realist, a nominalist, or an idealist. For that reason, modern Thomists widely discuss this theme. The four different positions in this debate are: the first three, which are considered reductive views are: “identity view of representationalism,” “direct realism,” and “similarity theory.” The fourth is considered a non-reductive view and can be called primitive intentionality theory. The paper concludes that the most adequate way to understand intentionality is a non-reductive view, not exactly the same as the “primitive intentionality theory,” but rather a view that considers esse intentionale as a metaphysical mode of being which solves the question of the existence of known objects.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2022, 11, 2; 207-228
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Western Culture: A Collective Achievement
Autorzy:
Dougherty, Jude P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507260.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-08-20
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
Western culture
metaphysics
realistic epistemology
human intellect
scholasticism
modernity
science
religion
Christianity
Opis:
By examining selected works by Stephen Gaukroger, Alfred North Whitehead, Lynn White, Jr., Benjamin Farrington, and Paul Gans, the author discusses the formation of Western culture and the intellectual tools and the social conditions that contributed (and still contribute) to its being. He concludes that a metaphysics and a realistic epistemology—based on an ancient Greek confidence in the human intellect, in its ability to reason to truths that acknowledge the immaterial character of human intellection—is required for the West to retain its identity and develop its own culture.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2019, 8, 3; 751-758
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Evaluating the Metaphysical Realism of Étienne Gilson
Autorzy:
Kemple, Brian
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507342.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015-12-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
realism
critique
metaphysics
being as first known
ens reale
Thomas Aquinas
epistemology
Opis:
While there is an absence of treatises devoted to the question of ens ut primum cognitum, there is no shortage of brief and implicit treatments; indeed, nearly every Thomist of the past seven centuries seems to have at least something to say about the notion that being is the first of our intellectual conceptions. Most recent Thomist thinkers—including Gilson—assume this ens to be nothing other than the ens reale of things entitatively considered, operating as they do out of a framework within which realism and idealism are presumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive attempts to answer the question of human knowledge. It is the intent of this essay to examine how Gilson arrives at his position, which he calls “metaphysical realism,” and to point to some of the difficulties it entails.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2015, 4, 4; 363-380
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Primo Cadit in Intellectu Ens: Gilson, Maritain, and Aquinas on Knowing Being
Autorzy:
Hayden, Evagrius
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507580.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-03-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
Gilson
Maritain
Thomas Aquinas
existentialism
essentialism
epistemology
knowledge of being
intellect
ens
esse
actus essendi
Opis:
The author compares the views of Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, and Thomas Aquinas on the order in our knowledge of being. While Gilson and Maritain maintain that esse and the actus essendi are what are first known, Aquinas maintains consistently that it is the existent thing or the ens itself that is first known. The paper proceeds by first laying out the positions of Gilson and Maritain as evidenced in their respective works Being and Some Philosophers and Existence and the Existent. Then, it manifests what in their positions is correct and in what they err. And finally, it argues that ens is the first thing known by appealing to the proper object of the intellect, the order between the acts of the intellect, and the intellect’s mode of procedure. In the course of these arguments, the primary authoritative sources used are the works of Aquinas.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2020, 9, 1; 33-62
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The Dispute between Gilson and Maritain over Thomist Realism
Autorzy:
Chamberlain, Stephen
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/507480.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-06-30
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
Thomist realism
critique
epistemology
ontology of knowledge
critical realism
retorsion
principle of identity
thing-object distinction
Opis:
This paper considers the proper location and function of critique in establishing a Thomist realism. The author begins by providing a brief explanation of Étienne Gilson’s understanding of critique and why he thinks a “critical realism” is incoherent. Next, the author considers the criticisms made by John Knasas who, from a Gilsonian perspective, argues that Jacques Maritain employs a version of the transcendental method of retorsion in order to justify his realism. Finally, the author offers a Maritainian response to Knasas in which it is argued that Maritain’s account provides a via media between the Transcendental Thomists, on the one hand, and the strict Aristotelian or a posteriori Thomists, on the other.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2017, 6, 2; 177-195
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Disputatio on the Distinction between the Human Person and Other Animals: the Human Person as Gardener
Autorzy:
Savino, Damien Marie
Wagner, Daniel C.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2138115.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-09-26
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
human uniqueness
gardening
person
personalism
philosophical anthropology
philosophical biology
thomas Aquinas
Aristotle
human intelligence
animal intelligence
cognition
epistemology
metaphysics
philosophy of language
evolutionary biology
ecology
logic
ethics
disputatio
Opis:
While the catholic intellectual tradition upholds the uniqueness of humans, much contemporary scientific research has come to the opposing conclusion that humans are not significantly different from other animals. to engage in robust dialogue around the question of human uniqueness, we utilize Aquinas’s model of disputatio to focus on an attribute of human beings that is unexplored in the literature – namely, the human capacity to garden – and address five scientific and philosophical objections to our position that the capacity to garden makes humans distinct. engaging with various branches of science, we demonstrate that human capacities and modes of gardening are not only incrementally different, but also fundamentally different in kind, from those of nonhuman creatures. Philosophically, we utilize the power-object model of division and Aristotle’s categorization of knowledge to express the difference in kind between human beings and other animals. these responses allow us to set aside each major objection.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2022, 11, 3; 471-530
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics
Autorzy:
Polis, Dennis
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057089.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021-12-20
Wydawca:
International Étienne Gilson Society
Tematy:
Aristotelianism
Thomism
evolution
substance-accident distinction
epistemology
projective realism
nominalism
relativism
intentional existence
laws of nature
species problem
intelligent design
problem of universals
exemplar ideas
creationism
moderate realism
teleology
abstraction
Opis:
I respond to Michał Chaberek’s and Robert A. Delfino’s criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution’s directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new species concepts. This accords with projective realism, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based on the mul-tiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nom-inalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowledge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek’s thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species con-cept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) con-fuses Aristotle’s four causes and (4) limits God’s creative omnipotence. Finally, Cha-berek is out of step with contemporary theology.
Źródło:
Studia Gilsoniana; 2021, 10, 4; 847-891
2300-0066
Pojawia się w:
Studia Gilsoniana
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-7 z 7

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