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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    O definicji prawdy za pomocą pojęcia stanu rzeczy opisywanego przez zdanie
    On the Definition of Truth by Means of the Concept of a State of Affairs Described by a Proposition
    Autorzy:
    Borkowski, Ludwik
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016316.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1993
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    Taking into account my papers: (1) A Proof of the Equivalence of Two Formulations of the Classical Definition of Truth, (2) Supplementary Remarks to My Paper: A Proof of the Equivalence of Two Formulations of the Classical Definition of Truth and analyzing anew the objection presented at the beginning of the paper (2) we arrive at the following conclusions concerning the possibility of defining the concept of a true propositions by means of the concept of a state of affairs described by a proposition:1. A more careful analysis of the objection presented at the beginning of the paper (2) shows that its conclusion stating that the states of affairs described by two different true propositions are identical does not follow from the statement about the identity of the states of affairs described by false propositions (which are equal to the empty set).2. Hence we can accept that a state of affairs described by a proposition is:a) a suitable relation restricted to a sequence of objects (conception presented in (1)), or b) a determinant of such a relation (conception presented in (2)),or c) a suitable relation restricted to a sequence of objects if a proposition is true or a determinant of such a relation if a proposition is false.3. The standpoint a) is based on the intuitive assumption concerning states of affairs described by propositions but it has the consequence that all false propositions describe the same state of affairs. In this point there is a divergence between a natural language and the classical logical calculus and set theory which was discussed in the initial part of the paper (2).
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1993, 41, 1; 23-25
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Bezkwantyfikatorowy założeniowy system rachunku zdań. Część druga
    A Quantifier-less Suppositional System of the Calculus of Names. Part II
    Autorzy:
    Borkowski, Ludwik
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016317.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1993
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    The restrictions occurring in the formulations of the rules of adding and omitting the constants π and σ in the suppositional proofs of the theses of the suppositional system of the calculus of names are simplified. Various theorems containing these constants are proved, among others the theorems corresponding to the basic theses for quantifiers with a limited range in the predicate calculus.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1993, 41, 1; 11-21
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Definicja operatora epsilonowego w ontologii Leśniewskiego
    Definition of the Epsilon Operator in Leśniewski’s Ontology
    Autorzy:
    Borkowski, Ludwik
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106740.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1992
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    The epsilon operator, introduced in the predicate calculus by D. Hilbert, is indefinable in this system. The paper presents the definition of this operator in Leśniewski’s ontology. In Leśniewski’s ontology we can distinguish:1) the epsilon operator occurring in the expression εaP(a), defined by D1 and read: an a such that P(a),2) the epsilon operator restricted to objects, occurring in the expression εa′P(a), (i.e. in the expression εa(aεa P(a))), defined by D1’ and read: an object a such that P(a) (or read: an object having the property P). The sense of this second operator corresponds to the sense accepted in the predicate calculus, since in this system the nominal variables are individual variables for which we can substitute the individual names of objects of a given domain. By virtue of the definitions D1, D1’ the basic theorems concening these operators are proved (T1-T4, T1’-T4’). According to the remarks given at the end of the paper the definitions D1, D1’ can be formulated also in the standard form accepted in Leśniewski’s ontology.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1992, 39-40, 1; 79-83
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Logiczna analiza wyrażenia „jakiś (jakaś, jakieś) a”
    The Logical Analysis of the Expression „an a (a certain a)”
    Autorzy:
    Borkowski, Ludwik
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016319.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1993
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    The notation “σ|a|” is used for the expression “an a (a certain a)”. In Lesniewski’s ontology the sense of the functor “σ” is determined by the axiom: ex(a) → σ|a|εa or by the definition: b = σ|a| ≡ ex(a)ΛⱯ(a ⸦ c → bεc)V ~ ex(a)Λ b = Λ                                 c By virtue of this definition we can prove the following theses: ex(a) → Ɐ(a ⸦ c → σ|a|εc                 c ex(a) → σ|a|εa ~ ex(a) → σ|a| = Λ aeV → σ|a| = a σ|Λ| = Λ ex(a) → σ|σ|a|| = σ|a| σ|σ|A|| = σ|Λ| If a is an individual or empty name then — by virtue of the theses 4, 5 — the denotations of the expressions “σ|a|”, “a” are identical. Hence, for pragmatical reasons we do not precede such names by the functor “σ”. We do not use the iterations of the sign “σ”, treating such iterations as superfluous, since — by virtue of the theses 6, 7 — the denotations of the expressions “σ|σ|a||” , “σ|a|” are identical.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1993, 41, 1; 5-9
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Uzupełniające uwagi do mego artykułu Dowód równoważności dwóch sformułowań klasycznej definicji prawdy
    Supplementary Remarks to My Paper A Proof of the Equivalence of Two Formulations of the Classical Definition of Truth
    Autorzy:
    Borkowski, Ludwik
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2106908.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    1990
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Opis:
    In the paper cited in the title of these remarks the state of affairs described by a proposition is defined as a suitable relation restricted to a sequence of objects. Against this conception the following objection is raised: Under this interpretation the states of affairs deseribed by two false propositions are identical, since each of them − as nonexisting − is equal to the empty set. In consequence the states of affairs described by the negations of these propositions, which are true propositions, are also identical. This objection is not directed against the theorems and proofs given in the above mentioned paper but only it is directed against the applying of the concepts introduced in the paper to suitable examples. The source of the divergenee between the treating of the conception of states of affairs in a natural language and the treating of this conception presented in the above mentioned paper is explained in the present paper. Such a modification of the definition of a state of affairs introduced in the above mentioned paper is now formulated that this objection does not refer to it. The determinant of a relation restricted to a sequence of objects is defined as such an ordered pair that this relation is its first element and the sequence of objects to which it is restricted is its second element. The state of affairs described by a proposition is defined as the determinant of a suitable relation restricted to a sequence of objects. We say that this determinant exists if and only if this relation is nonempty. After introducing suitable definitions, especially the definitions D10−D14, which define the operations of the extended product, extended sum, complement, generalization and particularization of the determinants of relations restricted to sequences of objects, all theorems about states of afairs presented in the above mentioned paper are proved. The states of affairs described by equivalent, and even logically equivalent propositions can be different.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 1990, 37-38, 1; 325-336
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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