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Wyszukujesz frazę "Wittgenstein Ludwig" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola

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    Tytuł:
    Ludwiga Wittgensteina krytyka pierwszego twierdzenia Gödla
    Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Critique of Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
    Autorzy:
    Wierzbińska, Greta
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2012892.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2010
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Wittgenstein
    I twierdzenie Gödla
    sprzeczność
    filozofia matematyki
    Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem
    inconsistency
    philosophy of mathematics
    Opis:
    Wittgenstein’s RFM remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem have been widely criticized, ridiculed or dismissed out of hand. The principal reason for this is negative evaluation of Wittgenstein’s critique is not Wittgenstein rejection of the standard interpretation of Gödel’s result but rather an exaggerated reaction to a alleged “mistake” Wittgenstein makes while discussing GIT. The aim of my paper, which due to Wittgenstein’s method is merely a draft, is to pull apart the different and the very distinct strands in these remarks to understand them in the context of Wittgenstein’s own philosophy of mathematics, and to determine what merit they have. To understand Wittgenstein’s attitude I will point out his hostility towards mathematical realism, hostility based on the “rule-following considerations” and his conventionalism. As I shall show, the aim of Wittgenstein’s critique is not a proof itself but it’s certain philosophical interpretation (prose). On a number of occasions this leads Wittgenstein to say that we should simply ‘withdraw’ or ‘give up’ this interpretation as if the contradiction goes away with the natural language interpretation.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2010, 58, 2; 207-235
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Zagadnienia filozoficzne w pracach Lewisa Carrolla
    Philosophical Questions in Lewis Carroll’s Works
    Autorzy:
    Głąb, Anna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2013937.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2005
    Wydawca:
    Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
    Tematy:
    Lewis Carroll
    absurd
    język
    filozofia analityczna
    logika
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
    absurdity
    language
    analytic philosophy
    logic
    Opis:
    The article tries to answer the following questions: Why did Lewis Carroll’s ideas, expressed in the form of fairy tales, fascinate numerous analytical philosophers? What does Carroll’s contribution to the contemporary logic and philosophy consist in? The basic thesis of the article is that Lewis Carroll – remaining in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of David Hume’s and George Berkeley’s philosophy – supplied material illustrating the problems connected with the use of language. He showed how improper use of language leads to formation of philosophical problems. The article presents Carroll’s output. He was one of the pioneers of symbolic logic that he  developed in Boole’s and De Morgan’s tradition – in the field of the so-called recreation mathematics that he popularized in the form of riddles, puzzles, doublets and puns, compared by some logicians to a formal system. The article presents the essence of the theory of language developed by Carroll, in which language may be something hermetic with only one person having access to it (the case of Humpty Dumpty), but also something common, something social (Alice’s conversation with the White King). Attention is paid to the fact that Carroll differentiated between what is nonsensical and what is absurd (the criterion being its relation to logic). It is pointed that Carroll’s aim was first of all discovering the nonsense that is hidden behind the formulation of a metaphysical problem. In the article also the connections are studied between Carroll and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the relation between them being seen in the view that absurd introduced by means of humor is a kind of vaccine that is supposed to protect us from forming absurdity in philosophy. In conclusion it is stated that Carroll’s ideas that are the most significant for analytic philosophers are concerned with the nature of language that is not a transparent medium for him, but something that offers resistance when we communicate with others, as well as something that may be flexible and adjusted to our will. By manipulating language Carroll shows in what way philosophy balances between sense and nonsense and how often philosophical questions arise from erroneous use of language and erroneous posing of problems.
    Źródło:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne; 2005, 53, 1; 55-85
    0035-7685
    Pojawia się w:
    Roczniki Filozoficzne
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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