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    Wyświetlanie 1-13 z 13
    Tytuł:
    Poznanie niewyraźne Boga ("cognitio confusa") – Tomasz z Akwinu i Kartezjusz
    Confused cognition of God ("cognitio confusa") – St. Thomas Aquinas and Descartes
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452593.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    Kartezjusz
    poznanie niewyraźne
    naturalne poznanie Boga
    poznanie Boga przez łaskę
    poznanie Boga w chwale
    Thomas Aquinas
    Descartes
    unclear cognition
    natural knowledge of God
    knowledge of God by grace
    knowledge of God in glory
    Opis:
    A man has a natural need for cognition of causes, particularly when he perceives reality, which is an effect of someone’s action. Aristotle, when describing a philosopher (the wise man), emphasizes that he’s a person, who has knowledge about all things (as far as possible) and cognitions of things, which are difficult to cognire and also knows causes, which are cognizable at most. But whether it’s possible recognition of causes and the paradigm of realistic philosophy nowadays, when we inherit principles of Cartesian Philosophy in our mindset and culture? When is everything unclear, inaccurate or mysterious regard as false? And when only mathematical clearness preserves state of knowledge and certainty? Therefore the problem of unclear cognition is so significant. This issue was prepared by St. Thomas Aquinas, who on that basis considered question of cognition of God. Descartes, however, completely negated this kind of cognition and built ‘boundary sign’ for the truth of the cognition. It seems that reinstatement of the right place of confused cognition and its protection in philosophy is possible inasmuch as it is still possible cognition of reality, i.e. cognition of thing-in-itself. A wonderment (admiration), which was the beginning of philosophy (because it express confused cognition of world) in post-Cartesian paradigm of reflection is unconvincing – the essence of the philosophy is purely and simply clear thinking. But emphasize the role of confused cognition is not a recognition it as sufficient and only way to perfect knowledge. Emphasizing confused knowledge is an objection to the thesis of the possession of only excellent knowledge and in the act, and objection to the claims that deny the potentiality and potency of knowing reality. If so, there would be no compromise statement that for the beliver the existence of God is obvious and for non-beliver non-existence of God is equally obvious.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 137-153
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Człowiek i kontemplacja. Antropologiczne podstawy poznania Boga w rozumieniu Aleksandra Żychlińskiego
    Man and contemplation. The anthropological basis for the knowledge of God in the account of of Aleksander Żychlinski
    Autorzy:
    Andrzejuk, Izabella
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452426.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Bóg
    człowiek
    poznanie
    kontemplacja
    Aleksander Żychliński
    God
    man
    cognition
    contemplation
    Opis:
    To explain the structure of man Żychlinski focuses on identifying specific human function, providing for his humanity, which he calls „the ability to reflect on themselves”. In this step, it is all about knowing the truth, and then being able to distinguish good from evil, and finally, the ability to make free decisions in the light of this distinction. As discussed by Żychliński, human cognitive activities are also a place for a philosophical contemplation understood as the pursuit of truth in creatures. Żychlinski placed the whole problem of human cognition in the context of the aim of human life, which is an union with God by direct vision of God’s creatures, hence - beyond philosophical contemplation - the author presents other types of contemplation, which allow recognition of God.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 169-181
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Rola istnienia (bytu) w metafizycznym wyjaśnianiu rzeczywistości
    The role of existence (of being) in the metaphysical explanation of reality
    Autorzy:
    Duma, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2057887.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    byt
    filozofia
    istnienie
    metafizyka
    poznanie
    rzeczywistość
    being
    philosophy
    existence
    metaphysics
    cognition
    reality
    Opis:
    In the article, the author shows the le¬gitimacy of the maximalist approach in the philosophical explanation of reality. He refers to the existential aspect of be¬ing which, in his opinion, defines the right direction of searching for the ulti¬mate foundations of reality itself and hu¬man cognition. Of course, it is not about the ultimacy in the sense of unequivo¬cally pointing to the „substrate” of real¬ity, but more about the cognitive ap¬proach itself, which opens the philosopher to what reality is as fully as possible. He begins his considerations with an outline of a contemporary view of reality and then takes up the problem of the philosophical explanation of real¬ity, the philosophy of being, and the metaphysics of existence. In conclusion, he notes the main elements of a realistic interpretation of reality. The proposed elucidations are very general, but they point to those dimensions of reality, without which the understanding of the latter becomes a pure hypothesis.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2021, 10; 95-113
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Naturalne poznawanie aniołów konsekwencją ich ontycznej struktury – zarys ujęcia Tomasza z Akwinu
    Angels’ natural cognition as a consequence of their ontological structure – Thomas Aquinas’ account
    Autorzy:
    Kazimierczak-Kucharska, Anna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452565.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    aniołowie
    poznanie
    forma
    materia
    Thomas Aquinas
    angels
    cognition
    form
    matter
    Opis:
    In the 13th century metaphysics gained quite innovative shape. It resulted in boost of interest in angelology, which has become scientific science. The famous debate between Thomas Aquinas and Avicebron finished with Aquinas’s theory of angelic ontological structure. He has proved that angels are not composed of matter and form, but their composition should be rather regarded in the categories of essence and existence, whereas act of existence plays primary role. The new account of angelic nature let Thomas to show perfection of higher separated substances’ cognition. It is, of course, the consequence of their ontological structure – Angelic cognition is abstracted from the matter, because angels are immaterial, so there is no possibility of processes of abstraction, which belongs only to the bodily beings. Aquinas’ conclusion is simple: angels do not achieve the truth, so there is no process of deduction in their cases, because they are immaterial, which brings about intellectuality of their cognition.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2012, 1; 149-159
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy poznanie jest wyższe niż miłość? Uzasadnienie wyższości intelektu nad wolą w ujęciu Tomasza z Akwinu
    Is cognition better than love? Justification of intellect’s superiority over will in Thomas Aquinas’ account
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452475.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    intelekt
    wola
    miłość
    poznanie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intellect
    will
    love
    cognition
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    Thomas Aquinas in his works sympathizes with the priority and thus superiority of intellect over will definitely. Presenting various ways of arguing he intends to point out the perfection of intellect, which becomes perfect in its act of cognition, it assures the proper action of will. Because of its object – truth about reality – as well as final and formal causation intellect moves will which aims to good. Only in the situation of such an object of intellect, which somehow exceeds human cognition potencies, will could acquire superiority over cognition. Thus a man only in an act of love of God is able to love by will that, which he cannot cognize. In other cases, particularly in case of natural cognition of sensual reality, in which man grasps an essence, cognition always goes before volition. Stressing superiority of intellect over will is not a matter of introducing into the consideration of their mutual relations additional topic. It is crucial problem, which allows proper understanding issue of freedom in Aquinas’ account.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2014, 3; 75-97
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Zdroworozsądkowe poznanie w praktyce edukacji ekologicznej Kościoła katolickiego
    Common sense cognition in the practice of environmental education of the Catholic Church
    Autorzy:
    Klimski, Marcin
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075573.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    edukacja ekologiczna
    poznanie
    zdrowy rozsądek
    praktyka edukacyjna
    environmental education
    cognition
    common sense
    educational practice
    Opis:
    The issue of common-sense cognition is an important source of knowledge from the point of view of environmental protection issues. Such cognition allows for a proper, distortion-free assessment of the current state of the social and natural environment, and consequently orientates man to take preventive and protective measures in those areas that require such undertakings. The article presents holistic issues related to the urgent need to cover the social and natural space with protective measures, which are reflected in the practice of the educational mission of the Catholic Church together with their associations and charitable organizations. The aforementioned mission is related to the humanistic reflection on the environmental crisis and constitutes a practical and educational platform. Both activities of Christian communities use data taken from common-sense cognition, which is a valuable tool in obtaining and determining reliable information.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2020, 2, 9; 173-185
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Ogół czy konkret przedmiotem ludzkiego poznania? Rozważania na podstawie q. 2 a. 6. "Quaestiones disputatae De veritate – De scientia Dei"
    Is the Generality or the Concrete Thing the Object of Human Knowledge? Reflections based on Article 6 of the Question 2 of "Quaestiones disputatae De Veritate – De scientia Dei"
    Autorzy:
    Sulenta, Paulina
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452701.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    ogół
    konkret
    intelekt
    ludzkie poznanie
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    generality
    concrete thing
    intellect
    human knowledge
    Thomas Aquinas
    Opis:
    Presented article is an attempt to answer the question: what, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, is the object of human knowledge – the generality or the concrete thing? In the introduction the author remarks that the purpose of her reflections is not to make an ultimate subjective rational justification for the possibility or impossibility of knowing what is individual, but her reflections form a reconstruction of St. Thomas Aquinas’ position contained in article 6 in the second question of Quaestiones disputatae De veritate – De scientia Dei. It is mainly a question here of showing in Aquinas’ analyses a factor that would allow us to resolve whether the human intellect is capable of knowing what is individual. In the first part of the article, the author presents a fundamental difficulty that led St. Thomas to study the problem. The difficulty arose from the Aristotelian theory of the faculties and of abstraction. The theory allowed him to explain how the passage occurs from the sensory apprehension of the concrete thing to the intellect’s reading of the concrete thing’s general, necessary, and constant content, but the theory did not explain how one can recognize the concrete thing as such in which the general nature is realized. Next, the author concentrates on an analysis of the corpus of article 6 of the second question of Quaestiones disputatae De veritate – De scientia Dei. St. Thomas says there that the impressed intellectual-cognitive form (species intelligibilis impressa) that determines the intellect to know a thing does not contain individualizing material conditions, and thereby the intellect through itself (per se) knowls only generalities, but does not know concrete things. Thomas notes, however, that per accidens the human intellect can know what is individual. Therefore also in the third part of the article the author considers how, according to Aquinas, the concrete thing can be apprehended by the intellect. St. Thomas in this passage looks to the operation of conversio ad phantasmata in which the intellect indirectly knows the concrete content of a thing as the reason for a general concept. However, the author remarks that this is not the only possibility that man has for knowing what is individual. This is because Thomas in his analyses emphasizes that ultimately it is not the intellect but the entire man who is the subject of knowledge. For the operation of a turn to mental images to be possible, it is necessary that a faculty should exist that makes it possible to recognize earlier the concrete thing as that in which the general nature is realized. According to Aquinas, this faculty is the particular reason (ratio particularis, vis cogitativa).
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2013, 2; 113-135
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Wyznaczniki realizmu filozoficznego w rozumieniu M.A. Krąpca i É. Gilsona
    Determinants of philosophical realism according to Étienne Gilson and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec
    Autorzy:
    Worek, Marcin
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2078941.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    realizm
    tomizm egzystencjalny
    przedmiot
    metoda
    cel
    poznanie
    filozofia
    realism
    existential thomism
    object (of cognition)
    method
    objective
    cognition
    metaphysics
    Opis:
    Étienne Gilson and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec notice essential elements that determine philosophical realism. Such discovery allows a philosopher to build realistic concept of object, method and objective of metaphysical cognition thus standing against idealistic tendencies. Realistic object of metaphysical cognition is characterized by realism (intelligibility, self-evidence, extrasubjectiveness), universalism (unity and pluralism), neutralism (beings constituted in the existence considered as a real element of cognition). Realistic method of cognition according to Krąpiec and Gilson has to reject irrational understanding of common sense, abstractionism and cartesianism, while making use of thomistic understanding of common sense, existential judgements and metaphysical separation. Realistic objective of metaphysical cognition is oriented on cognition of causality, cognition of the first cause, understanding of the four Aristotle's causes, recta ratio and recta voluntas and analogous cognition. Due to determinants of realism mentioned before, it is possible to practice thomistic philosophy based on riches of the world given in the cognition.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2019, 8; 241-255
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Kontemplacja i poznanie per raptum. Tomaszowe źródła rozumienia istoty doświadczenia mistycznego
    Contemplation and cognition per raptum. Thomas’s sources of understanding the essence of the mystical experience
    Autorzy:
    Andrzejuk, Izabella
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452438.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    kontemplacja
    poznanie per raptum
    doświadczenie mistyczne
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    tomizm
    contemplation
    cognition per raptum
    mystical experience
    Thomas Aquinas
    thomism
    Opis:
    The aim of the article is to present the problem of contemplation and knowledge per raptum in St. Thomas Aquinas’s account. Both of these methods of cognizing seem to be an inspiration for the twentieth-century and contemporary Thomists to build the concept of mystical experience. Mystical experience is defined differently in various thomistic interpretations. However, we are primarily interested in the recognition of M. Gogacz, who understood the mystical experience as a sudden, unexpected and unearned experience of God by the human potential intellect. Although Thomas himself was not concerned with the mystical experience as such, but the analysis of selected texts allows us to accept the thesis that mystical experience, which was shared by the great mystics (St. Teresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross) contains some elements of Thomistic contemplation, and above all, the cognition per raptum.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 59-76
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Filozoficzne podłoże mistyki św. Jana od Krzyża
    Philosophical Grounds of Mysticism of St. John of the Cross
    Autorzy:
    Andrzejuk, Izabella
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075940.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    św. Jan od Krzyża
    mistyka
    filozofia
    poznanie Boga
    St. John of the Cross
    mysticism
    philosophy
    the cognition of God
    Opis:
    The article contains a philosophical analysis of some aspects of the mysticism of St. John of the Cross. St. Jan was not a philosopher, but he used philosophical views in his ascetic and mystical views. The article is built in sucha a way that it brings out the philosophical content of the well-known Carmelite. First of all, the article focuses on John’s metaphysical views which are conainted in his writings. Next, the basics of the concept of man (philosophical anthropology) is discussed. After that, the problem of human cognition and the man’s way of getting to know God is presented. The issues of cognition turned out to be the most comprehensive subject matter, because it is the issus that Saint John devoted the most space in his works. This is understandable, because the aim of the Spanish mystic was to allow his readers to show a reliable way to unite with God. As a result of the analysis, it turned out that Saint John of the Cross captures reality with the help of philosophy, which is a certain mix of Neoplatonic, Aristotelian and Thomistic threads.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2018, 7; 229-240
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Tomaszowy argument „z blokowania” za niematerialnością działań intelektu.
    Aquinas’s impediment argument for the immateriality of the intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/452485.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    Tomasz z Akwinu
    intelekt możnościowy
    niematerialność intelektu
    poznanie intelektualne
    dusza i ciało
    Thomas Aquinas
    possible intellect
    immateriality
    intellectual cognition
    soul and body
    Opis:
    Argument for spirituality of soul appears in a few places of Aquinas’ text and is sometimes called “the impediment argument”, “the argument for plasticity of intellect”, “the argument from common dimension”. The names differ as far as Thomas did not establish himself any name for his reasoning in this matter. There is no doubt that the argument derives from the Aristotelian On the soul, however, Aquinas does not develop it. The argument is present in four places and its most important presumptions would be summarized as follows: (1) man can cognize the nature of all bodies by his own intellect; (2) that what is able to cognize everything can not in itself have a nature of the cognized object – the nature of body would block a process of cognition; (3) it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body – it would not be possible for the principle of intellectual action to act through a bodily part; (4) the intellectual principle which is called the intellect or the mind acts per se does not contain any bodily involvement in its action. Hence, according to Aquinas, soul is something subsisting with regard to actions which are not the acts of body. However, this statement is disturbingly mistaken. In Summa, nevertheless, Thomas develops this issue further. In response to some objections he would emphasize that none of parts (as far as part is understood as a part of a whole) could not exist separately and act separately – neither soul nor body (as well as an eye or a hand). This is for the fact that soul is something subsisting (quod est) and inherited in matter (quo aliquid aliud est). Aquinas tries to explain the status of soul significantly, nevertheless left some questions open to make analysis on a whole human being possible, including body for which soul serves as a form. Thus, through the intellect we would observe a unique characteristic of human soul as a rational being.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2017, 6; 77-98
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Poznanie intelektualne duszy ludzkiej oddzielonej od ciała (anima separata) a intelekt czynny i możnościowy
    Intellectual Cognition of the Human Soul Separated From the Body (anima separata) and Active and Possible Intellect
    Autorzy:
    Zembrzuski, Michał
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/5940131.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022-12-31
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    poznanie duszy po śmierci
    nieśmiertelność
    intelekt czynny i możnościowy
    „światło chwały”
    knowledge of the soul after death
    immortality
    intellect active and possible
    „light of glory”
    Opis:
    The purpose of this paper is to attempt the answer to the question of how the soul comes to know, not as a form of the body, but as a subsistent form, independent in its existence from the body, but dependent on its own created act of being (ipsum esse). We will be interested in the question of how the separated soul comes to know: Whether the two intellectual powers that are naturally in the soul - the possible intellect and the active intellect - will realize their acts, and therefore whether the soul will come to know at all, and whether it will come to know individual reality? There will be a theological theme in the paper, that is, a theme determined by the issue of the completion of the human structure in the body (the resurrection of the body) and the related beatific vision, which is the achievement of the end of human intellectual activities. It seems that the question of anima separata is not a purely speculative problem, since it contains the answer to the question of understanding human nature, an answer that is most relevant to philosophy in its practical field. For Aquinas, the existence of a separated soul, suspended, as it were, between existence in an animated body and existence in a glorified body, is “hypothetical”, and the humanity of such an entity is incomplete. However, given that Thomas is essentially considering real and not possible entities, the topic of the existence and workings of the separated soul should not be within the field of his subject matter. It seems, however, that Thomas was interested in confronting such a theme, which would reveal the uniqueness of human nature also in this aspect.
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2022, 11; 89-109
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Gilson - voudrait-il deconstruire la metaphysique?
    Czy Gilson chciał dekonstruować metafizykę?
    Autorzy:
    Moscicki, Nicolas
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2075875.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-12-30
    Wydawca:
    Naukowe Towarzystwo Tomistyczne
    Tematy:
    (De)konstrukcja [metafizyki]
    Historyczność [metafizyki]
    Historialność [bytu - ens/esse]
    Poznanie [bytu - ens/esse]
    Przedmiot [metafizyki]
    Zapomnienie [bytu - esse]
    Connaissance-événement [de l’étant-être]
    (De)construction [de la métaphysique]
    Historicité [de la métaphysique]
    Historialité [de l’étant-être]
    Objet [de la métaphysique]
    Oubli-retrait [de l’être]
    Opis:
    This presentation - following, as closely as possible, the book of Pierre Aubenque “Do we have/need to deconstruct the metaphysics? / Faut’il déconstruire la métaphysique?” (PUF Paris 2009) - will be focused just on Gilson’s doctrine: on some, « in a sense, deconstructing approaches » which, according to Aubenque, Gilson (as a metaphysician and as an historian of metaphysics, knowingly or not…) put in fact in practice… The « sense of deconstructing approaches » in question (let us say: the « what-why-when-which way… in singular or in plural, of the practiced deconstruction ») will not be fixed-made explicit at the beginning, but, step by step, will become more and more clear all along the study… Inevitably, the screening of deconstruction practiced here, will put in evidence « its reverse side » - namely, what, within metaphysics, is - can (must?) be - a matter for « construction »… During his screening, Aubenque approaches Gilson on the background of continuous confrontation with Heidegger, punctual confrontation with Bergson; and, in some proximity with Descartes and Kant (tacit-unspoken and what’s more, a bit undecided between them both)… The presentation will finish-culminate with/in a series of global-essential conclusions: Aubenque’s conclusions, related to Gilson, to Heidegger, to convergences-divergences between them; and mines, related to his (especially, to the limitations-confusions-discrepancies… in his own approach) …
    Źródło:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny; 2018, 7; 79-104
    2300-1976
    Pojawia się w:
    Rocznik Tomistyczny
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-13 z 13

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