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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    Widerspruch und Aphairesis in Platons Politeia
    Contradiction and Aphairesis in Plato’s Republic
    Autorzy:
    Gutiérrez, Raúl
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938534.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Contradiction
    Aphairesis
    Prosthesis
    Idea of the Good
    Cause and Idea of Evil
    Opis:
    The purpose of this paper is to show that Plato uses contradictions in the Republic as an impulse to think and to advance in the ascent to the Idea of the good. The procedure to dissolve the main contradictions in the text is that of aphairesis, complementary to that of prosthēsis. Also if they are explicitly named just at the beginning and at the end of the ascent (Books II and VII), I will show that aphairesis and prosthēsis are consistently applied throughout the ascendant argument of Republic I-VII. Starting with the separation of the opposites at the sensible level, the process will continue separating the rational and the irrational in the soul and culminate when explicitly naming the aphairesis of the One/Good at the intelligible level. As will be seen, the opposites in question are unity and indeterminate/indefinite multiplicity. But also if named, the culminating aphairēsis of the Idea of the Good will not be consistently developed in the Republic. Some important allusions to it will also be found in the Parmenides allowing us to solve the main unresolved contradictions in the Republic in consonance with the theory of principles of the agrapha dogmata.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2015, 6, 1; 71-92
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Idea of the Good in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6
    Autorzy:
    Mouzala, Melina G.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633559.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    Aristotle’s criticism of Plato
    Plato’s Idea of the Good
    praxis
    prakton agathon
    phronēsis
    Opis:
    In Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, Aristotle directs his criticism not only against the Platonic Idea of the Good but also against the notion of a universal Good. In this paper, I also examine some of the most interesting aspects of his criticism of the Platonic Good and the universal Good in Eudemian Ethics 1.8. In the EN, after using a series of disputable ontological arguments, Aristotle’s criticism culminates in a strong ethical or rather practical and, simultaneously, epistemological argument, from which a dialectical postulatum emerges. This argument aims to show that we have to discover the dialectical stages or grades which constitute the relation between the ultimate End, i.e., the Good simpliciter or the absolute Good, and the relational goods till the last prakton good in which each specific praxis ends. According to the present reading, Aristotle sets out to establish a kind of Dialectic of the ends (Dialektikē tōn telōn) or Dialectic of the goods (Dialektikē tōn agathōn), which puts emphasis on the descent to the specific good, which is appropriate to and cognate with each individual, be that a person, praxis, science or craft. It is also suggested that this might be relevant to Aristotle’s tendency to establish a separation of phronēsis, i.e., practical wisdom, from sophia, i.e., wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 309-342
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part One
    Autorzy:
    Mazzara, Giuseppe
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633548.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    the argument by affinity
    the final argument
    analogy
    metaxy
    oikeios logos
    definition
    eidos
    idea
    logic of the contrarys
    Opis:
    The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine what Plato alludes to. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study has been divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and its opposites as well as the opposites of opposites.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2019, 10, 1; 13-44
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Platone e Antistene nel Fedone: una lettura in controluce.
    Plato and Antisthenes in the Phaedo: A Reflexive Reading. Part Two
    Autorzy:
    Mazzara, Giuseppe
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1178753.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2020-12-23
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    the argument by affinity
    the final argument
    analogy
    metaxy
    oikeios logos
    definition
    eidos
    idea
    the logic of contraries
    Opis:
    The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2020, 11, 1; 33-66
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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