Temat: predication - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Aristotle’s Solution for Parmenides’ Inconclusive Argument in Physics I.3
Autorzy:: Angioni, Lucas
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016431.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-12-13
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:: Aristotle
sophistical argument
Parmenides
predication
being
Opis:: I discuss the argument which Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23–32. I examine (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it to be eristic and inconclusive and (ii) the solution (lusis) that he proposes against it.
Źródło:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 41-67
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: The Study of Being in Plato and Aristotle
Autorzy:: Nathan, Aidan R.
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28408725.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2023
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:: the verb einai
predication
existence
forms
Parmenides’ Being
Opis:: Usage of the Greek verb ‘to be’ is generally divided into three broad categories — the predicative use, the existential and the veridical—and these usages often inform the way we understand Being in ancient philosophy. This article challenges this approach by arguing that Being is not the product of linguistic reflection in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle; rather, these thinkers treat Being as the ontological and epistemological primary. Though this may overlap with the linguistic senses, it is not the same thing. The article is divided into three sections: the first one raises several basic issues with the predicative interpretation of Being, the second argues that Being is unified and singular in a significant sense and the third brings out the special pre-immanence of Being.
Źródło:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2023, 14, 1; 29-43
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

Skocz do pozycji: 3.

Tytuł:: Bycie – nie bycie, prawda – fałsz w koncepcji Arystotelesa
Autorzy:: Wesoły, Marian Andrzej
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016357.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2021-12-13
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:: Aristotle
Being – Not-Being
Categorical predication
Falsity as Contradiction
Truth as non-contradiction
Philosophy as investigation of truth
Truthfulness and Lying
Opis:: The basis of Aristotle’s arguments about truth and falsity is formulated syntactically according to the distinctions of ‘to be’ as the predicative affirmation - composition and, correspondingly, ‘not to be’ as negation – separation. As the nominal defining characteristic of falsity is contradiction, so of truth is non-contradiction. The expression of truth or falsity in the declarative sentence of affirmation or negation is a function of thinking as a human cognitive disposition under the semantic figures of categorical predication. In addition, we cite Aristotle’s more important texts on the true intellection of non-composites (indivisibles), the investigation of truth and probability, the diagnosis of falsehood, the truthfulness and lying. Finally, a mention of modern adaptations of Aristotle’s concept of truth.
Źródło:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 171-196
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:: Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

Artykuł

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