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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    The Study of Being in Plato and Aristotle
    Autorzy:
    Nathan, Aidan R.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28408725.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2023
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    the verb einai
    predication
    existence
    forms
    Parmenides’ Being
    Opis:
    Usage of the Greek verb ‘to be’ is generally divided into three broad categories — the predicative use, the existential and the veridical—and these usages often inform the way we understand Being in ancient philosophy. This article challenges this approach by arguing that Being is not the product of linguistic reflection in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle; rather, these thinkers treat Being as the ontological and epistemological primary. Though this may overlap with the linguistic senses, it is not the same thing. The article is divided into three sections: the first one raises several basic issues with the predicative interpretation of Being, the second argues that Being is unified and singular in a significant sense and the third brings out the special pre-immanence of Being.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2023, 14, 1; 29-43
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Aristotle’s Solution for Parmenides’ Inconclusive Argument in Physics I.3
    Autorzy:
    Angioni, Lucas
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2016431.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-12-13
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Aristotle
    sophistical argument
    Parmenides
    predication
    being
    Opis:
    I discuss the argument which Aristotle ascribes to Parmenides at Physics 186a23–32. I examine (i) the reasons why Aristotle considers it to be eristic and inconclusive and (ii) the solution (lusis) that he proposes against it.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2021, 12, 1; 41-67
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Opposizione e verità: l’enigmatica via di Parmenide
    Opposition and Truth: Parmenides’ Enigmatic Way
    Autorzy:
    Tarca, Luigi Vero
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938304.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Parmenides
    not-being
    negation
    difference
    truth of being
    negation of non-being.
    Opis:
    In Parmenides’ B 8 37–41, we find a question that raises a difficult problem: how can Parmenides handle the opposition between “being and not” (i.e. being and not being) in the same way as the oppositions which characterize the mortals’ opinions? This question is especially relevant for answering the following theoretical question: how do we to treat the fundamental philosophical question of oppositions at large? To answer these question we need to reinterpret some major points of Parmenides’ thought: the second part of his poem, but also the identification of πέλειν and εἶναι in B 6 8, as well as other passages of the poem. But, above all, the question makes us introduce some distinctions within the concept of negation and, consequently, between difference and negation. This allows us to distinguish the affirmation of the truth of being from the negation of the negation of being (i.e. the negation of nonbeing). This distinction has a major philosophical relevance, as can be seen by referring it to such thinkers as Plato, Hegel and Heidegger.
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2013, 4, 1; 105-124
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Les deux manières d’expliquer la réalité proposées par Parménide
    Parmenides’ Two Ways of Explaining Reality
    Autorzy:
    Cordero, Nestor Luis
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/28408711.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2022
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    Truth
    Opinions
    Doxography
    Fülleborn
    Simplicius
    Plato
    Being
    Parmenides
    Opis:
    Towards the end of fragment 1 of his Poem, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that a priori explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the Poem, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the Poem that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has “Platonised” the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the “opinions” (which are only points of view) to the “appearances” (in the Platonic sense of the term).
    Źródło:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2022, 13, 1; 13-24
    2082-7539
    Pojawia się w:
    Peitho. Examina Antiqua
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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