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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Widerspruch und Aphairesis in Platons Politeia
Contradiction and Aphairesis in Plato’s Republic
Autorzy:
Gutiérrez, Raúl
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/938534.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Contradiction
Aphairesis
Prosthesis
Idea of the Good
Cause and Idea of Evil
Opis:
The purpose of this paper is to show that Plato uses contradictions in the Republic as an impulse to think and to advance in the ascent to the Idea of the good. The procedure to dissolve the main contradictions in the text is that of aphairesis, complementary to that of prosthēsis. Also if they are explicitly named just at the beginning and at the end of the ascent (Books II and VII), I will show that aphairesis and prosthēsis are consistently applied throughout the ascendant argument of Republic I-VII. Starting with the separation of the opposites at the sensible level, the process will continue separating the rational and the irrational in the soul and culminate when explicitly naming the aphairesis of the One/Good at the intelligible level. As will be seen, the opposites in question are unity and indeterminate/indefinite multiplicity. But also if named, the culminating aphairēsis of the Idea of the Good will not be consistently developed in the Republic. Some important allusions to it will also be found in the Parmenides allowing us to solve the main unresolved contradictions in the Republic in consonance with the theory of principles of the agrapha dogmata.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2015, 6, 1; 71-92
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Idea of the Good in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6
Autorzy:
Mouzala, Melina G.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/633559.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Aristotle
Aristotle’s criticism of Plato
Plato’s Idea of the Good
praxis
prakton agathon
phronēsis
Opis:
In Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, Aristotle directs his criticism not only against the Platonic Idea of the Good but also against the notion of a universal Good. In this paper, I also examine some of the most interesting aspects of his criticism of the Platonic Good and the universal Good in Eudemian Ethics 1.8. In the EN, after using a series of disputable ontological arguments, Aristotle’s criticism culminates in a strong ethical or rather practical and, simultaneously, epistemological argument, from which a dialectical postulatum emerges. This argument aims to show that we have to discover the dialectical stages or grades which constitute the relation between the ultimate End, i.e., the Good simpliciter or the absolute Good, and the relational goods till the last prakton good in which each specific praxis ends. According to the present reading, Aristotle sets out to establish a kind of Dialectic of the ends (Dialektikē tōn telōn) or Dialectic of the goods (Dialektikē tōn agathōn), which puts emphasis on the descent to the specific good, which is appropriate to and cognate with each individual, be that a person, praxis, science or craft. It is also suggested that this might be relevant to Aristotle’s tendency to establish a separation of phronēsis, i.e., practical wisdom, from sophia, i.e., wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics.
Źródło:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua; 2017, 8, 1; 309-342
2082-7539
Pojawia się w:
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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