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Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Pretor urzędnikiem magistratury rzymskiej. Zarys problematyki
Praetor as a Magistrate in the Ancient Rome. A Few Remarks
Autorzy:
Kołodko, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/621276.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
Pretorship, Roman public law, Roman law, magistrates of the Rome.
Opis:
The main point of this text is an attempt to present a few duties of the praetor and try to stipulate the origins of them. First of all it should be noted that the term praetor was not consistently used to describe only the jurisdictional magistrate, and it was used in relation, for example, to the consuls. This was probably because the sound etymological sense of the word (praeire: “to go before, to precede, to lead the way”). The appointment of praetor urbanus in 367 BC under leges Licniae Sextiae was not associated with the need to carry out a jurisdictional competence. The origins of the magistrate were strictly military in its nature, which since the end of the third century BC gave way to the area of jurisdiction. Raised considerations apply also to the praetor for foreigners (praetor peregrinus), who has not resolved disputes between the Romans and foreigners (peregrini), and his role was to ensure the military security of Italy. The jurisdictional competence of the pretorship as the most “famous” begins to emerge in the late third century BC, which is likely to be linked not only with the increase in the number of praetors, but mainly obviates external threat from the Carthage. It seems to indicate that the jurisdictional competence (civil and criminal) was not assigned to pretorship at the beginning of this office. It appears at least at the end of the third century BC and starts to become predominant among others which were associated with this office in ancient Rome.
Źródło:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica; 2013, 12; 31-55
1732-9132
2719-9991
Pojawia się w:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Aaron Aleksander Olizarowski profesorem prawa Akademii Wileńskiej
Aaron Alexander Olizarowski as a Professor of Law University of Vilnius
Autorzy:
Niczyporuk, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/621396.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
profesor prawa, prawo rzymskie (cywilne), prawo kanoniczne, Aka- demia Wileńska, wydział prawa
Professor of the Law, Roman Law (Civil), Canon Law, Vilnius Academy, Faculty of Law
Opis:
The professors of law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Vilnius were: Simon Dilger, John George Schauer and Aaron Alexander Olizarowski. On the other hand it raises doubts whether, in accordance with the act of foundation, only one chair of civil law (Roman) were established. Undoubtedly, canon law was taught at the two cathedrals. With high probability, Aaron Alexander Olizarowski also taught canon law. However, all indications are that he could take second chair in civil law (Roman) and lectures on this discipline. It is true that Aaron Alexander Olizarowski also promoted a few doctors of canon law, but in this period Vilnius Academy were other specialists who are likely to teach canon law. In addition, he was a layman, which could also be an obstacle to entrust lectures in canon law. In addition, CV, publications and complete education Olizarowski’s indicate that undoubtedly took a second chair in civil law (Roman) and lectured in this discipline. Having a doctorate both laws was adequate preparation to teach this course. Thus, Alexander Olizarowski, educated abroad, was the only lawyer and the right candidate for the role of professor of civil law (Roman) at the University of Vilnius.
Źródło:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica; 2015, 14, 2; 181-206
1732-9132
2719-9991
Pojawia się w:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Tortury w świetle bulli Ad extirpanda (1252) papieża Innocentego IV
Torture in Light of the Bull Ad extirpanda (1252) of Pope Innocent IV
Autorzy:
Sadowski, Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/27308720.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
Innocenty IV
tortury w średniowieczu
prawo rzymskie
Innocent IV
torture in the Middle Ages
Roman law
Opis:
W niniejszym artykule autor omawia treść bulli Ad extirpanda z 1252 r. i szuka odpowiedzi na pytanie dlaczego papież Innocenty IV zezwolił w niej władzy świeckiej i kościelnej na stosowanie tortur w procesach przeciwko heretykom. Dotyczyło to tak oskarżonych jak i świadków. Ceniony romanista, jakim był Sinibaldo Fieschi działał w okresie średniowiecznej odnowy prawa rzymskiego. Niewątpliwie to, jak i wiele innych czynników, np. rozwój inkwizycji, rzutowało na decyzję papieża. Sama kwestia tortur w bulli potraktowana została dość marginalnie, a dokument bardziej dotyczył postępowania inkwizycyjnego. W artykule dominuje metoda historyczno-prawna, ale autor sięga także do tych dogmatyczno-prawnych czy porównawczych. Zanim szczegółowo omowi treść bulli i racje jej ogłoszenia pochyla się nad postacią i nauczaniem Innocentego IV, który między 1213, a 1225 r. studiował prawo w Bolonii. Bulla z 1252 r. była adresowana do przywódców wszystkich komun Italii, czyli do podestów, rektorów, rad Lombardii, Romanii, Marchii Trewizańskiej. Tortury były środkiem do uzyskania przyznania się do winy, które było bardzo ważne w katalogu rożnych środków dowodowych, jak przysięga stron, świadkowie, sądy boże czy dokumenty. Tortury w świetle konstytucji 25 omawianej bulli nie powinny prowadzić do utraty członków ciała czy samego życia. Ich celem było doprowadzenie heretyków do wypowiedzenia swoich błędów i oskarżenia innych heretyków im znanych. Sama zaś procedura inkwizycyjna wzmacniała władzę papieża czy biskupów. Była bardziej racjonalna od ordaliów.
In this paper, the author discusses the content of the bull Ad Extirpanda of 1252 and seeks an answer to the question why Pope Innocent IV allowed in it for secular and ecclesiastical authorities to use torture in trials against heretics. This applied to both the accused and the witnesses. Sinibaldo Fieschi, the valued Romanist, was active during the medieval renewal of Roman law. Undoubtedly, this and many other factors, such as the development of the Inquisition, influenced the Pope's decision. The very issue of torture in the bull was treated quite marginally, and the document was more concerned with inquisitorial proceedings. This paper is dominated by the historical and legal method, but the author also reaches for the dogmatic and legal or comparative methods. Before discussing in detail the content of the bull and the reasons for its announcement, the paper focuses on the figure and teaching of Innocent IV, who, between 1213 and 1225, studied law in Bologna. The bull of 1252 was addressed to the leaders of all Italian communes, i.e. to the podests, rectors, councils of Lombardy, Romagna, and the Marchia Tervisina. Torture was a means of obtaining a confession, which was very important in the catalogue of various sources of evidence, such as oaths sworn by the parties, witnesses, God's judgments, or documents. In light of Constitution 25 of the bull in question torture should not lead to the loss of body members or life itself. It purpose was to get heretics to recant their errors and accuse other heretics known to them. The inquisitorial procedure itself strengthened the power of the Pope and the bishops. It was more rational than trial by ordeal.
Źródło:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica; 2023, 22, 1; 435-454
1732-9132
2719-9991
Pojawia się w:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Czy stosunek do prawa rzymskiego jest miarą kultury prawnej? Rozważania na przykładzie III Rzeszy
If the attitude to Roman Law is a measure of legal culture? Reflections on the example of the Third Reich
Autorzy:
Zmierczak, Maria
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/621921.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
Tematy:
odrzucenie prawa rzymskiego przez reżim nazistowski, prawo rzym- skie w programie NSDAP, paremie rzymskie a praktyka III Rzeszy.
rejection of Roman law by Nazi regime, NSDAP Programme and Roman legal tradition, Roman legal paremiae in the practice of the III Reich.
Opis:
The NSDAP programme of 1920 contained the point 19, where one reads “We demand replacement of Roman law, serving the materialistic world order, by the German com- munity law”. This phrase was repeated by all Nazi lawyers and politicians, one can find it not only in Roland Freisler’s, Hans Frank’s and the statements of other politicians, but in almost all doctoral thesis, academic manuals and the like. The question here, is what did it mean. Analysis of the Nazi texts leads to the conclusion, that it was used to break with and justify rejection of many of the Roman general legal rules (paremiae), for instance “lex retro non agit”, “dura lex sed lex”, “nulla poena sine lege”, to annihilate and destroy the difference between “ius publicum and ius privatum”, and especially the Roman idea of property, understood as “ius utendi, fruendi et abutendi”. The verbal rejection of Roman legal tradition enabled justification of the deep changes in law, both criminal and civil, which not only presented the possibility of retroaction in criminal law, of which lex van der Lubbe was the best known but not unique example, it also served to deny the essence of property changing it into a kind of feudal possession, which meant that the owner had to act only on behalf and in the interest of the German people. Generally, because the Roman law meant certain formalism, clear formulation of legal notions and because the Nazis refused to accept any limitation of state activity, they fre- quently repeated that law is not in the statutes but it is in the hearts of Germans. It seems, that Roman law was also rejected in any totalitarian states, such regimes in principle reject any legal control over the scope of state activity. Carl Joachim Friedrich once stated, that they don’t even deserve the name “state”, because they don’t accept the legal basis of state power. Adam Lityński’s studies on Soviet law also confirm that Roman law and especially its most general rules, cannot be accepted by any totalitarian regime.
Źródło:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica; 2016, 15, 2; 73-83
1732-9132
2719-9991
Pojawia się w:
Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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