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Wyszukujesz frazę "the Ukrainian crisis" wg kryterium: Wszystkie pola


Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
Tytuł:
Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie po Euromajdanie.
Impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Polish – Ukrainian relations.
Autorzy:
Bonusiak, Włodzimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/506276.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
Euromaidan
Verkhovna Rada Ukraine
act inspection pro bandera
politices Poland
perspective
Opis:
Since condemnation of operation Vistula by the Senate, we have conducted a „strategic partnership” policy towards Ukraine, expecting at most symbols, not calling for the memory of thousands of victims murdered in Volyn and Cherven Cities. Driven mainly by Russophobia, we supported the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. On the latter, our politicians didn’t hesitate to join banderite shouts in front of portraits of Bandera and Shukhevych. We should not be surprised then that two hours after the address of the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski, The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted without discussion four Acts, which aim were: the recognition of the OUN and the UPA as fighters for Samostijna Ukraine, erasing from the collective memory shared 70-year history of the Ukrainian nation and increase of divisions in Ukrainian society. In Poland, the Acts have been passed over by the mass media (except for ”Przegląd” and “Nie”). Neither the issue have been raised by the Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz in talks with the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Volodymyr Groysman, nor by the Interior Minister Grezgorz Schetyna during his parliamentary speech on Polish foreign policy and it is even quite carefully sidestepped in the presidential campaign by all parties. Answering the question posed by “Przegląd” – “How Poland should react to the decisions of the authorities of Ukraine regarding members of the OUN and the UPA?” – advisor to the President of Poland, Professor Tomasz Nałęcz, stated, among others, “Let us remember that Ukraine is our neighbour and friend, therefore we should talk to it. I do not think the best way of conversation with a friend is to send a note of protest”. In 2010, we had the courage to raise the question of granting a title of Hero of Ukraine to Bandera and Shukhevych by W. Yushchenko and to persuade the European Parliament to express deep indignation (initiator: Paweł Zalewski from PO) and withdraw this Act. Now, all indications are that we lack this courage. It is very difficult to speak now about the future of Ukraine and Polish – Ukrainian relations. There are only very few groups, which speak now about the need to change of our eastern policy. The borderland communities haven’t obtained in our country organizations which would have an impact on foreign or even economic policy. It can therefore be assumed that regardless of who wins the presidential and parliamentary elections, Poland will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic policy, although resulting from Russophobia of Polish political elites and conducted by them historical policy. Previous actions of the Ukrainian authorities suggest that there may occur a scenario known to us from the period after the Orange Revolution. The current Ukrainian authorities do not seek to unite his people for a common goal, but they increase divisions in society. Ukrainian nation needs an agreement and consensus, not creation of new barriers. Polish experience shows that the actual legal, economic and political transformation needs a national consensus rather than replacing it with settlements with the past and nationalism. It seems that Poland irretrievably lost its positions of expert on East. As correctly pointed out Professor Andrzej Walicki “the prestige of Poland as a supposed export on Russia ceased to exist, because our position in Russian affairs is predictable and does not help to solve real problems”. Poland should act in order to end the conflict in Ukraine, at the same time attempting to understand both sides of the conflict. Different economic and geopolitic interests causes that the positions of various countries on the events in Ukraine are and will remain diverse. Louis Stomma wrote that “the sudden and incredible love of Poles for modern Ukraine is a sad love without reciprocity”. In the interest of Poland is striving for consensus and sensible mediation rather than setting up as a front-line state. A compromise is always possible, but if interest is not mixed with morals and national resentments. Preventing from compromise would reflect on the fate of the whole region and Ukraine would be harmed the most.
Źródło:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2015, 2; 131-140
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kryzys ukraiński. Nowe spojrzenie na wojnę – z rosyjskiej perspektywy.
The Ukrainian crisis. The new view on the war – from the Russian perspective.
Autorzy:
Kraj, Kazimierz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/505707.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
Ukraine
hybrid war
turmoil war (myatezhevoyna)
asimetric war, confl ict, crisis
Russian doctrine
Opis:
The author in the article represents some Russians opinions on the war. He presents, how Russia used its knowledge and experience to conduct unconventional military operations. The author’s another objective was to raise awareness of the necessity for the recognition and research on military concepts which originate and develop in the Russian Federation.
Źródło:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2015, 2; 25-38
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
La crise ukrainienne et le rôle futur de la Pologne en Europe
Kryzys ukraiński i przyszła rola Polski w Europie
The Ukrainian crisis and Poland’s future role in Europe
Autorzy:
d’Aboville, Benoît
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2192190.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
Politique etrangere polonaise (apres 1989)
securite europeenne
OTAN
guerre en Ukraine
Union europeenne
autonomie strategique
Polish foreign policy (post-1989)
European security
NATO
war in Ukraine
European Union
strategic autonomy
polska polityka zagraniczna (po 1989)
bezpieczeństwo europejskie
wojna w Ukrainie
Unia Europejska
autonomia strategiczna
Opis:
Face à l’offensive russe en Ukraine, la Pologne est devenue un pays de première ligne et une plateforme stratégique clé pour les Etats-Unis, l’OTAN et ses principaux partenaires européens dans la fourniture d’une assistance militaire à Kiev. Le renforcement militaire du flanc oriental de l’OTAN, qui peut désormais être considéré comme acquis, se traduira par une importance accrue de la Pologne au sein de l’OTAN. Quelles sont les implications pour la stratégie globale de l’Alliance? Si l’OTAN peut consolider sa position en mer Baltique avec la Suède et la Finlande, on ne peut pas en dire autant a priori pour la mer Noire, compte tenu du rôle ambigu de la Turquie. Quel rôle la Pologne peut-elle jouer dans les deux cas? Les Etats-Unis, dont la Pologne s’est beaucoup rapprochée militairement, considèrent la Pologne comme leur principal point d’ancrage sur le continent européen, n’excluant même pas la possibilité de sa participation au programme de partage nucléaire. La quête de la Pologne pour gagner la place qui lui revient dans le nouvel équilibre européen en tant qu’acteur majeur de l’UE nécessitera une clarification de ses futurs contacts avec la Commission européenne et avec les principaux partenaires européens que sont la France et l’Allemagne, y compris l’avenir du Triangle de Weimar.
Poland, in the face of the Russian offensive in Ukraine, has become a frontline country, but also a key strategic platform for the United States, NATO and its major European partners to provide military assistance to Kiev. The military reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank, which can now be taken for granted, will give Poland greater weight in NATO. What implications does this have for the Alliance’s overall strategy? If NATO can consolidate its position in the Baltic Sea with Sweden and Finland, the same cannot be said a priori about the Black Sea, given Turkey’s ambiguous role. What role can Poland play in both cases? Warsaw has brought the United States even closer militarily, to the extent that they consider Poland their main anchor on the continent, not even completely excluding the possibility of its participation in the nuclear sharing program. Poland’s quest to win its rightful place in the new European equilibrium as a major EU player will require clarification of what its future contacts with the European Commission and with
Polska w obliczu rosyjskiej ofensywy na Ukrainie stała się krajem frontowym, a dla Stanów Zjednoczonych, NATO i ich głównych partnerów europejskich – kluczową platformą strategiczną w zakresie dostarczania pomocy wojskowej dla Kijowa. Wzmocnienie militarne wschodniej flanki Sojuszu, które teraz można uznać za pewnik, przełoży się na większe znaczenie Polski w NATO. Jakie ma to konsekwencje dla ogólnej strategii Sojuszu? O ile NATO może skonsolidować swoją pozycję na Morzu Bałtyckim ze Szwecją i Finlandią, o tyle nie można tego a priori powiedzieć o Morzu Czarnym, biorąc pod uwagę niejednoznaczną rolę Turcji. Jaką rolę może odegrać Polska w obu przypadkach? Stany Zjednoczone, do których Polska bardzo zbliżyła się pod względem militarnym, uważają Polskę za swoją główną kotwicę na kontynencie europejskim i nie wyłączają nawet możliwości jej udziału w programie nuclear sharing. Dążenie Polski do zdobycia należnego jej miejsca (jako jednego z głównych graczy UE) w nowej równowadze europejskiej będzie uzależnione od tego, jakie będą jej przyszłe kontakty z Komisją Europejską oraz z kluczowymi partnerami europejskimi: Francją i Niemcami. Od tych relacji zależy również przyszłość Trójkąta Weimarskiego.
Źródło:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2022, 1; 51-59
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Relacje Polski i Ukrainy 2010–2015 – ukraiński punkt widzenia
Polish-Ukrainian relations 2010–2015 – the Ukrainian point of view
Autorzy:
Hurak, Ihor
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/506663.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
Ukrainian-Polish relations
European integration
Ukrainian crisis
Russian aggression
Opis:
Poland has repeatedly acted as a reliable ally in promoting Ukraine’s activity on the international stage and during internal political turmoil. Polish leadership played the exceptional role during the Revolution of dignity. Having regard to the aggravation of confrontation, especially Poland’s activity enabled to approve a common position of the EU concerning the events on the Maidan and force Yanukovych to sign the Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine. From the beginning of Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine, Poland stressed the inviolability of Ukrainian borders and encourage to the implementation of sanctions against Russia at the various international forums. Since a Poland’s representative has not been involved at the negotiating group on normalization of the situation in Ukraine, intensity of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on the highest level slightly reduced during 2014–2015. Direct contacts of Ukraine’s leadership with the leaders of Germany and France, which having signifi cant impact on making decisions within the EU and being eligible as partners in the negotiations for Russia, have positive effects. However, they have not allowed to fully using great potential of Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership.
Źródło:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2016, 2; 181-201
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
The geopolitical impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian war on Iran
Autorzy:
Alibabalu, Sayyad Sadri
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/20434588.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego
Tematy:
Iran
Ukraine crisis
securitization
Russia
Middle East
Opis:
Russia’s attack on Ukraine has had huge and destructive consequences for Iran. The war began when the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the Western countries for the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ( JCPOA) were in a promising state and the parties were in the final stages. This paper seeks to examine the effects of this war on Iran’s foreign policy by considering securitization and desecuritization. Considering this, the paper concludes that Iran has faced the direct consequences of the war in its domestic and foreign policies. At the foreign policy level, Iran has faced a decrease in international prestige due to its proximity to Russia, the use Iranian drones by Russia on the battlefield and the ‘death’ of the JCPOA. As the West securitized the issue of Iran, Iranian authorities desecuritized Iran’s relations with Arab countries, while securitized relations with the Caucasus.
Źródło:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe; 2023, XX, 1; 43-54
1733-2680
2451-0610
Pojawia się w:
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
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