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Wyszukujesz frazę "Równowaga Nash" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
Tytuł:
Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
Autorzy:
Karpowicz, M. P.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/331251.pdf
Data publikacji:
2012
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
równowaga Nasha
system hierarchiczny
sterowanie rozproszone
Nash equilibrium
coordination in hierarchical systems
decentralized control
asymmetric information
Opis:
This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem. An equilibrium design procedure is proposed and applied as an analytic tool in a study of mechanism design games. In the setting considered the well-known fact is demonstrated that gains from reaching a desired solution to a coordination problem in a Nash equilibrium point need not balance the overall costs of its implementation. However, it is also demonstrated how these costs can be distributed among the agents and related to the particular organization of interactions in the system. Finally, application of the developed framework in the field of Internet traffic engineering is presented.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2012, 22, 4; 951-969
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A symbolic shortest path algorithm for computing subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
Autorzy:
Góngora, P. A
Rosenblueth, D. A.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/329934.pdf
Data publikacji:
2015
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
shortest path
Bellman–Ford algorithm
Nash equilibrium
BDD
model checking
najkrótsza ścieżka
równowaga Nasha
sprawdzanie modelu
Opis:
Consider games where players wish to minimize the cost to reach some state. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a collection of optimal paths on such games. Similarly, the well-known state-labeling algorithm used in model checking can be viewed as computing optimal paths on a Kripke structure, where each path has a minimum number of transitions. We exploit these similarities in a common generalization of extensive games and Kripke structures that we name “graph games”. By extending the Bellman–Ford algorithm for computing shortest paths, we obtain a model-checking algorithm for graph games with respect to formulas in an appropriate logic. Hence, when given a certain formula, our model-checking algorithm computes the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (as opposed to simply determining whether or not a given collection of paths is a Nash equilibrium). Next, we develop a symbolic version of our model checker allowing us to handle larger graph games. We illustrate our formalism on the critical-path method as well as games with perfect information. Finally, we report on the execution time of benchmarks of an implementation of our algorithms.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2015, 25, 3; 577-596
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
A communication network routing problem: Modeling and optimization using non-cooperative game theory
Autorzy:
Dubey, Sapana P.
Kedar, Ganesh D.
Ghate, Suresh H.
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1838181.pdf
Data publikacji:
2021
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Zielonogórski. Oficyna Wydawnicza
Tematy:
communication network
routing problem
game theory
focal points
Nash equilibrium
Pareto optimal solution
sieć komunikacyjna
teoria gier
punkt ogniskowy
równowaga Nasha
Opis:
We consider a communication network routing problem wherein a number of users need to efficiently transmit their throughput demand in the form of data packets (incurring less cost and less delay) through one or more links. Using the game theoretic perspective, we propose a dynamic model which ensures unhindered transmission of data even in the case where the capacity of the link is exceeded. The model incorporates a mechanism in which users are appropriately punished (with additional cost) when the total data to be transmitted exceeds the capacity of the link. The model has multiple Nash equilibrium points. To arrive at rational strategies, we introduce the concept of focal points and get what is termed focal Nash equilibrium (FNE) points for the model. We further introduce the concept of preferred focal Nash equilibrium (PFNE) points and find their relation with the Pareto optimal solution for the model.
Źródło:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science; 2021, 31, 1; 155-164
1641-876X
2083-8492
Pojawia się w:
International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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