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    Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5
    Tytuł:
    Stanowisko Immanuela Kanta w kwestii „sił żywych”
    Immanuel Kant’s Standpoint Concerning “Vital Forces”
    Autorzy:
    Kupś, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423127.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    KANT
    COGNITION
    INTUITION
    VITAL FORCES
    Opis:
    In his first work entitled “Thoughts Concerning the True Measure of Vital Forces” Kant made an attempt to solve one of the most famous disputes of 17th-century philosophy. Though Kant’s solution is incorrect, it shows the way the philosopher usually solved philosophical problems. In his later works, written during the critical period, Kant came back to the problems he dealt with in his first essay, but the most important continuation of it can be found in the unpublished notes being part of so-called Opus postumum.
    Źródło:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2012, 24; 59-70
    0860-4487
    Pojawia się w:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Możliwości poznawcze analogii według Immanuela Kanta
    Cognitive Abilities of the Notion of Analogy in the Philosophy of I. Kant
    Autorzy:
    Kiełbasiński, Dariusz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423229.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    KANT
    KNOWLEDGE
    NOTION OF ANALOGY
    REASON
    SENSE DATA
    Opis:
    Kant quite often refers to analogy though without really developing the theoretical aspects of the matter itself. Even when introducing in Critique of Pure Reason (“CPR”) an apparently clear distinction between analogy in philosophy and analogy in mathematics he was so succinct that there remain doubts as to whether the distinction is based on the criterion of fields wherein analogy might be applied or rather it refers to the structure of the analogy. The latter leaves room for differences in interpretation. While analogy in philosophy is built of four elements as a relation of two relations (a:b :: c:d), the structure of analogy in mathematics may either be same as this in philosophy or be conceived as built of three elements (a:b :: b:c), depending on the reference to source (with or without G.S.A. Mellin’s change to A179/B222 of CPR). In Lectures on Logic Kant distinguishes between analogy and induction; both these forms of reasoning are proper to the reflecting capacity to judge and, as such, opposed to inference by deduction (especially syllogism) which is specific to the reason (or: determining capacity to judge), closely linked to the understanding. The reflecting capacity to judge produces so-called reflective judgments which are of subjective validity only. Analogy, while hardly differing from induction in its practical use, shares with induction the common principium; let the assertion in the article be that the principium is drawn from the teleology of nature as derived in, inter alia, Critique of Judgment (the principle of purposiveness). Identity of grounds (par ratio) is required to formulate an analogy, which means that the corresponding elements in both pairs of an analogy have to belong to the same class; the classes, however, may only be singled out when, case by case, allowing for the context (category of relation) wherein par ratio is relevant.
    Źródło:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2012, 24; 71-100
    0860-4487
    Pojawia się w:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Warunki możliwości poznania skończonego według Immanuela Kanta
    The conditions of the possibility of finite knowledge in Kant’s theory
    Autorzy:
    Surzyn, Jacek
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423219.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    possibility
    finite knowledge
    Kant
    definition
    możliwość
    poznanie skończone
    definicja
    Opis:
    This article is an attempt at a description in support of “The Critique of Pure Reason” – Kantian conception of finite cognition and its conditions. In reference to cognition, the fundamental question set by Kant concerned the conditions of its possibility. The formulation of conditions of every possible cognition as the cognition finite in its nature is analyzed as the cognition which possesses two sources: intuition and intellect. According to Kant, the finite cognition concerns exclusively man and critique of such cognition depends on the determination of subjective conditions of finite cognition, which means it concerns answers to two questions. Firstly, what are the conditions of the finiteness of human cognition. Secondly, what it concerns in the objective sense of thing. It needs to be kept in mind that Kant is not interested the perfection of such cognition because it should be established with a definition. The man in a natural way is able to use cognitive instruments suitable for his nature and according to t hem he creates and forms objective content which prosecutes to him “from the outside” (from experience with the help of senses) as cognitive content, the final result is knowledge.
    Źródło:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2015, 27; 25-46
    0860-4487
    Pojawia się w:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Różne interpretacje kantowskiego transcendentalizmu
    The different interpretations of Kant’s transcendentalism
    Autorzy:
    Surzyn, Jacek
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423237.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2016
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    Kant
    transcendentalism
    experience
    theory
    cognition
    transcendentalizm
    doświadczenie
    teoria
    poznanie
    Opis:
    The article is an attempt to present different interpretations of transcendentalism of Immanuel Kant. The problem of transcendentalism is placed in a historical perspective, because it seems to be the only correct way for the proper recognition of the essence of Kant's thought. The article focuses on the analysis presented in two Polish interpretations of transcendentalism, one of which has been presented by Marek Siemek, and the other by Andrzej J. Noras. Siemek's interpretation goes toward reading Kant's transcendentalism through the prism of thoughts of J. Fichte, while Andrzej J. Noras tries to understand the transcendentalism of Kant referring to its historical origins and conditions. A. J. Noras’s proposal seems to be closer to Kant’s thought as it captures the essence of transcendentalism as such and could be a sees as a way to understand the true sense of Kant's postulate of "Copernican revolution".
    Źródło:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2016, 28/1; 61-87
    0860-4487
    Pojawia się w:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Kant a Newton (z perspektywy Opus postumum)
    Kant and Newton (From the Perspective of Opus Postumum)
    Autorzy:
    Kupś, Tomasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/423403.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet w Białymstoku. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku
    Tematy:
    Kant
    Newton
    progress of science
    chemistry
    postęp nauki
    chemia
    Opis:
    Kant’s attitude towards Newton is ambiguous though he owes much to him. Although Newton’s physics is a paradigm of science for Kant, he is fully aware that few appearances occur accurately according to the way described by mechanics. When he ties the principles of his philosophy with Newton’s mechanics, Kant makes a mistake, for due to the development of knowledge it began losing its absolute position in science in his day. In Opus postumum Kant recognizes the mistake and no longer refers to the rules of Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft as the ultimate ones. Till the beginning of his work on Opus postumum Newtonian mechanics was a paradigm of science for Kant. It ceases to be so in Opus postumum, where Newton is present mainly as the object of Kant’s polemics. The progress of science, new phenomena, new methods, the development of chemistry. In Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft chemistry was not referred to as science (since it was Newton’s mechanics that was the paradigm of science), whereas in Metaphysik der Sitten (1797) Kant defines Lavoisier’s chemistry as the only chemistry [AA VI 207]; in Anthropologie [AA VII 326] (1798) he ranks Lavoisier as high as Archimedes and Newton. New main problems appeared science which had to deal with: combustibility, origin of acids, the change of the state of matter, electricity, magnetism and – first of all – theory of heat. The main notion of the new theory of chemistry developed by Lavoisier (ether, the caloric) takes the central position also in Kant’s theory of transition (Übergang).
    Źródło:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych; 2015, 27/t.t.; 203-220
    0860-4487
    Pojawia się w:
    IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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