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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Ronald Dworkin o prawie do eutanazji
Ronald Dworkin on the Right to Euthanasia
Autorzy:
Pełka, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/518646.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Fundacja Utriusque Iuris
Opis:
The article tackles the problem of euthanasia from the perspective of the ideas developed by an American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In the first part the essential elements of his conceptions are described. The most important is Dworkin’s view on the nature of the dispute concerning euthanasia and the distinction between a derivative and a detached understanding of the value of human existence. This part also lays out a classification of categories of people in respect of whom euthanasia could be applied and a division is made between experiential and critical interests, which in turn provides a basis for establishing the criteria for assessing the correctness of decisions involving the taking of the life of ill patients. Considerations are also made with regard to the seminal concepts in Dworkin’s system, such as autonomy, beneficence and dignity. The second part of the article presents a critique of arguments put forward by the author of “Life’s Dominion”. The main objection is directed against Dworkin’s understanding of the doctrine of sanctity of life. Additionally, the article points out shortcomings in his theory, including his insufficient discussion on slippery slope arguments, the principle of double effect, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary medical procedures, and avoidance of consideration regarding the idea of palliative care. The paper ends with remarks about the need for reviewing the problem of euthanasia not from an extreme, individualistic viewpoint, as Dworkin does, but from a more social perspective.
Źródło:
Forum Prawnicze; 2017, 2 (40); 28-44
2081-688X
Pojawia się w:
Forum Prawnicze
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Ronald Dworkin o prawie do aborcji
Ronald Dworkin on the Right to Abortion
Autorzy:
Pełka, Michał
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/518692.pdf
Data publikacji:
2016
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Jagielloński. Fundacja Utriusque Iuris
Opis:
The article deals with the problem of abortion from the perspective of the ideas developed by the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin. The main concern is to identify strengths and weaknesses of Dworkin’s position on this matter. In the first part the paper describes the main components of his theory, especially the distinction between derivative and detached opposition to abortion and the three kinds of values which are relevant to the discussion, namely subjective, instrumental and intrinsic values. Then the very important value for Dworkin’s proposal is described – the category of sacred values. The second part of article contains critical remarks on Dworkin’s theory, particularly its inadequate presentation of the stance of the conservative side to the dispute and embracing of an incomplete conception of rights. To that end, the author makes use of Rawls’s intellectual tools to debate and contest termination of pregnancy, tools termed “reflective equilibrium” and “veil of ignorance”. The paper ends with the author’s own outline of the resolution to the abortion controversy, named ethical contextualism.
Źródło:
Forum Prawnicze; 2016, 1 (33); 34-46
2081-688X
Pojawia się w:
Forum Prawnicze
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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