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Wyszukujesz frazę "theory of law" wg kryterium: Temat

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    Tytuł:
    Artura Kozaka cierpliwość wobec prawa
    Artur’s Kozak patience to law
    Autorzy:
    Pichlak, Maciej
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/950228.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2014-06-14
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    iuriscentrism
    artur kozak
    institutional theory of law
    legal
    transcendentalism
    judicial discretion
    Opis:
    The essay treats on a legal-theoretical project of ‘iuriscentrism’, proposed by Polish legal philosopher Artur Kozak. It begins with an exploration of theoretical and axiological foundations of this theory, which are, first and foremost, sociological institutionalism (as for a social ontology), philosophical transcendentalism (as for a theory of knowledge and action), and affirmative approach towards axiological foundations of the legal order. Subsequently, the article focuses on practical consequences of the above choices, which are a limitation of the judicial discretional power, and a unique way of legitimating the legal practice. According to iuriscentrism, the law is said to play a focal role in the contemporary, ethically pluralist and functionally differentiated societies; for those reasons a special approach to the legal order, the one termed as ‘a faith in law’ or ‘a patience to the law’, is necessarily required.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna; 2014, 3, 1; 226-242
    2299-1875
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dualizm bytu i powinności w czystej teorii prawa Hansa Kelsena
    The problem of is/ought dichotomy in Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law
    Autorzy:
    Huk, Marta Z.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/950186.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-12-15
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    hans kelsen
    pure theory of law
    is/ought dichotomy
    imputation
    principle of retribution
    causality
    Opis:
    Following paper is concerned with the problem of Is/Ought dichotomy in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. This is one of the most important problems which needs to be addressed in order to provide autonomous legitimacy of law in terms of normativism. The claim that those two spheres ought to be separated, is analysed from three different philosophical perspectives: ontological, epistemological and normative. Each of them posits Kelsen’s dichotomy as essential to a development of his concepts. The paper is an attempt to answer the question why this distinction is necessary in the context of legal validity and effectiveness.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna; 2015, 4, 2; 77-90
    2299-1875
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy pragmatyka jest u Kelsena możliwa?
    Is Pragmatics in Kelsen’s Legal Philosophy possible?
    Autorzy:
    Zalewska, Monika
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/950243.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013-12-15
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    hans kelsen
    pure theory of law
    legal theory
    pragmatics
    normativism
    imputation
    ought
    allgemeine theorie der normen
    basic norm
    Opis:
    The main goal of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is to build a science of law. Kelsen is looking for a valid conditions of legal science and find them in neokantian philosophy. However, in the last phase when he turns into linguistic paradigm, he can’t explain science of law through neokantian terms anymore. In this case the question arises, how to recognize law from other linguistic expressions. Normally one could recall context of such expression (pragmatical context). In Kelsen’s case this is impossible as he distinguishes between is and ought and postulates that we should study law only on ought sphere. Despite this I will try to demonstrate that the pragmatics is possible in Pure Theory of Law by transforming previous neokantian categories into pragmatic ones.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna; 2013, 2, 2; 169-180
    2299-1875
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Teoria prawa Zygmunta Ziembińskiego
    Theory of Law by Zygmunt Ziembiński
    Autorzy:
    Kordela, Marzena
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/950106.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-06-15
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    theory of law
    analytical philosophy
    legal axiology
    law
    competence norm
    thetic norms
    axiological norms
    validation rules
    rules of exegesis of law
    inference rules
    collision rules
    conventional acts
    legal norm
    rational legislator
    interpretation rules
    Opis:
    Zygmunt Ziembiński was one of the most prominent theoreticians of law in Poland in the second half of the 20th century. He developed an original theory of law defined as a theory of legal phenomena, which covered both logical-linguistic as well as real aspects of law. The theory served as a base for the development of a unique so-called advanced normative conception of sources of law, one of the greatest achievements of theory of law in Poland. This conception encompasses all the indispensable elements of a coherent system of binding legal norms: 1) indication of a political justification (ideological assumptions) of the entire system of law; 2) pre judgment of law-making competence of government agencies; 3) determination of the status of custom and precedent; 4) compilation of a catalogue of permissible interpretation rules; 5) compilation of a catalogue of permissible inferential rules (permissible rules of legal inferences); 6) compilation of a catalogue of permissible collision rules.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna; 2015, 4, 1; 230-249
    2299-1875
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Mit pewności prawnej, czyli dlaczego nieprecyzyjne standardy prawne mogą być lepsze dla kapitalizmu i liberalizmu
    The fallacy of legal certainty: why vague legal standards may be better for capitalism and liberalism
    Autorzy:
    Raban, Ofer
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/950236.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013-12-15
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Tematy:
    legal theory
    bright line rules
    vague legal standards
    certainty and predictability of the law
    legal formalism
    Opis:
    This article reviews key aspects of the theoretical debate on the distinction between bright-line rules framed in clear and determinate language and vague legal standards. It is generally believed that legal rules provide more certainty and predictability, while legal standards afford flexibility, accommodate equitable solutions, and allow for a more informed development of the law. Furthermore, the article seeks to refute the idea that bright-line rules are superior to vague standards in regard to certainty and predictability. In first section, the author articulates the claims that legal certainty and predictability are essential for both capitalism and liberalism, and that these systems of economic and political organization therefore require legal rules framed in clear and determinate language. Second section undertakes a critical  valuation of that claim and argues that, oftentimes, the best-drafted clear and determinate rules would result in less certainty than alternative vague and indeterminate standards. Third section provides explanations why things are so, arguing that the law is but one of many normative systems; that competing economic, social, and moral standards are often couched in vague and indeterminate terms; and that many of these standards cannot be reduced to clear and determinate rules. As conclusion author pointed out  on the extensive use of vague legal standards that with no doubt harbors dangers. Vague standards can easily mask arbitrariness, inconsistency, and injustice, and can also generate uncertainty. their proper use requires good faith, professionalism, and intelligence, and therefore depends on a high caliber legal profession.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna; 2013, 2, 2; 22-47
    2299-1875
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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