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    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Zagadnienie bezpośredniości dostępu poznawczego do własnych stanów mentalnych
    The Problem of the Directness of the Cognitive Access to Ones Own Mental States
    Autorzy:
    Pacholik-Żuromska, Anita
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966616.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2010-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The question of subject's cognitive access to his own mental states contains an assumption, that this cognition is direct and authoritative, what is also a condition of subject's self-knowledge. The directness means, that this kind of cognition is not burdened by the intermediaries as Fregean senses or representations. Now arises the problem, how the self-knowledge, which has a propositional character can be direct, hence nonrepresentational. In this paper I considered the three kinds of representations, which are present in self-knowledge and I have tried to answer the question, whether it is possible to preserve the directness of self-knowledge, despite of its representational constituents. First I have asked about the representation of self, then I assumed that to have self-knowledge a subject has to conceptualise his state as a belief or other experience of a certain kind and he has to think about himself as a subject of this state. Then I considered the representation of the modality of the state. Finally I analysed the representational character of the content of mental states. The conclusion of these investigations was that even if the self-knowledge in its epistemological aspect is representational (for example because of its propositional structure) it preserves its directness in its essential form, i.e. psychological aspect.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2010, 18, 1; 53-66
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    The Role of Attention in the Perceptual Model of Self-Knowledge
    Autorzy:
    Pacholik-Żuromska, Anita
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967918.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2015-12-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    This article is addressed to the problem of the psychological constitution of self-knowledge, considered in the light of its perceptual model. The starting point is the hypothesis that attention, understood here as a psychological element of the mental ability that is self-knowledge, plays an important role in the process of gaining self-knowledge. According to this assumption, we need to build a model of self-knowledge that can adequately explain the path that leads from attention to self-knowledge. Thus the second claim made here is that the perceptual model of self-knowledge can help us with this task. While this model has been criticized in philosophy, the metaphor of the mind's eye has been successfully used in psychology to define a special kind of attention. The perceptual model should explain how it happens that inner mental states to which attention is paid appear in the field of consciousness due to the special kind of self-reflection that stems from the intentional character of consciousness. Paying attention to one's own mental states is understood here as a type of introspection, whereas paying attention to higher-level mental states involves creating compositions from mental and phenomenal components to develop a self-representation of the subject of these states. Observations of one's own mental states constitute the subject of these states, i.e. the self. Introspection is, therefore, a psychological method for exploring self-consciousness that leads to self-knowledge, which is, however, described in philosophical terms. The former is an object of psychological - hence empirical - research; the latter is an object of philosophical consideration. But the question of introspection - and consciousness itself as a basis for gaining self-knowledge - determines the psychological account of self-knowledge. Thus the aim of this paper is to argue that, first, attention is the most important component of inner perception, and second, that attention plays a crucial role in gaining self-knowledge.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2015, 23, 4; 55-69
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Modele jaźni w samowiedzy
    Models of Self in Self-Knowledge
    Autorzy:
    Pacholik-Żuromska, Anita
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968658.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-10-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    This article argues for an externalist self-model in self-knowledge, as an answer to the question of how to defend self-knowledge in the face of evident errors in self-cognition such as self-illusions. The externalist model is contrasted with an internalist model, although both are based on a predictive coding mechanism. The main thesis is that for preserving the status of self-knowledge as knowledge an external element is needed - namely, some feedback from the environment - which corrects not only cognitive prediction errors regarding the world but also errors in self-cognition by forcing the proper action of the subject (agent) and dynamic adaptation of the model of the embodied self. The mechanism of self-corrections is best described by externalist models.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 3; 55-76
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

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