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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
O rozwoju realizmu naukowego jako selektywnego sceptycyzmu
On the Evolution of Scientific Realism as Selective Scepticism
Autorzy:
Kotowski, Mateusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967236.pdf
Data publikacji:
2014-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The article discusses the evolution which scientific realism underwent within the last thirty years. It is argued that this evolution was to a large extent fuelled by at-tempts at arriving at a formulation of realism which would be immune to the pessi-mistic induction argument. The argument, whose most influential formulation is due to Laudan, is targeted at any version of realism about theories understood as unified wholes. The central claim defended in the article is that, although pessimistic induc-tion was presented as a confutation of scientific realism, it has had a very positive effect on the evolution of realistic positions. It is because it has forced realists to limit their claims and, at the same time, to make them more subtle and precise. As a con-sequence, some realists ceased to defend realism as an attitude towards whole theo-ries (or whole scientific knowledge) and tried to distinguish the parts of theories which realist should be committed to as approximate descriptions of the unobservable (and at the same time as the most stable aspects of scientific knowledge) from the parts they should be sceptical about. Any form of realism which makes use of such a strategy may be referred to as selective scepticism. Although the initial attempts at adopting selective scepticism (exemplified by the conceptions of Hacking and Worrall) proved to be problematic, the most recent proposal - Chakravartty’s semirealism, with its commitment to concrete structures - seems to have achieved the general goal and allowed realists to dismiss the problems connected with pessi-mistic induction.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2014, 22, 3; 105-123
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Quo vadis, realisme? O obecnym stanie sporu o realizm naukowy
Quo Vadis, Realisme? On The Current State of the Scientific Realism Debate
Autorzy:
Kotowski, Mateusz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964096.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018-06-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The article investigates the intuition that both scientific realism and scientific antirealism are turning into degenerating research programs. The evolution of realism in reaction to pessimistic (meta)induction has certainly led to its increased sophistication as it has given rise to various versions of selective realism. However, many current discussions seem either too focused on semantic niceties or are turning into endless quarrels over case-study refutations of particular forms of realism. The point of finding a better understanding of the relations of scientific knowledge to the world seems to get lost in the process. Magnus, Callender, and Saatsi are among those who see the problem. Although drawing on different observations, they agree that the source of the problem is the wholesale approach according to which it is possible to resolve the realism debate in one move, by finding a single universal method of interpreting any scientific theory. Instead, they call for a more modest approach, based on case-by-case analyses. Particularly promising is Saatsi’s idea of exemplar realism, according to which realism should be an attitude motivating detailed case studies rather than a specific account of science in general.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2018, 26, 2; 151-164
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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