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    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
    Tytuł:
    O niearbitralnym kryterium posiadania struktury obliczeniowej
    On a Non-arbitrary Criterion of Having a Computational Structure
    Autorzy:
    Grabarczyk, Paweł
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/966600.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013-12-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    In the paper I defend the view that having a computational structure (which I understand as a property enabling the object to realize computations) is an empirically detectable feature of selected objects which is not observer relative. I start by presenting a naďve definition of realization of computation and show how it leads to pancomputationalism. Then I test existing strategies of dealing with this unwanted conclusion and show why they are not satisfactory for my aim. The main reason for this is that some of the notions these solutions use (for example notions of “mechanism” and “causality”) can be easily exploited by the skeptic. In the remaining part of the paper I present a candidate for a non-arbitrary criterion of having a computational structure and deal with some obvious objections to it. I propose to treat the mapping of physical states of a given object to an algorithm as a task of translating between two languages used for physical and formal descriptions respectively. The object can be said to contain a computational structure when it is possible to create a closed and effective translation manual between its physical states and states of any possible computation. The translation manual is closed when it either contains every expression of the translated language or rules for obtaining every expression of the translated language. It is effective when it is shorter than the sum of all expressions it helps to translate.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2013, 21, 4; 31-50
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Czy Saul Kripke mógłby być fenomenologiem?
    Could Kripke Be a Phenomenologist?
    Autorzy:
    Grabarczyk, Paweł
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967008.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2003-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    In this article I am trying to compare the methods of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Such a general comparison is of course impossible in a small article. In order to make it possible I am comparing selected authors. Phenomenology is thus represented by Husserl and Ingarden, analytic philosophy by Putnam and Kripke (they are chosen because of their realism and essentialism). I am trying to analyze the way the authors describe their methods. First I am analyzing analytic philosophy from the phenomeneological point of view, then phenomenology from the point of view of analytic philosopher. I'm. pointing out that Kripke and Putnam often say about intuition, and that they do not understand it as any kind of linguistic intuition. Then I'm. pointing out that phenomenologists often refer to the way w describe things, although they are convinced that their experience is always prior to any linguistic form. I am suggesting that even if we agree that the practice of both schools is similar, and that the description of methods could be translated, there is no chance of a real agreement between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. My thesis is that neither the practice nor the description of the way we obtain our philosophical goals is important. What really is important is all the philosophical background (ontology, philosophical assumptions and the like). In this particular situation considered in my article, the most important factor is the answer for the following question: Can we think without the language? Phenomenologist can not answer 'no' to this question. If he did he would admit that his philosophy isn't free of assumptions. Analytic philosopher can not answer 'yes' to this question. If he did he would admit that he is interested only in some kind of 'package for thought'. The answer itself depends on some kind of philosophical faith. Thus, the answer for the main question of my article depends only on Kripke's will of changing his declaration of faith.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2003, 11, 1; 43-52
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Eksperymenty myślowe w służbie esencjalizmu
    Thought Experiments in Essentialisms Service
    Autorzy:
    Grabarczyk, Paweł
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968366.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2009-03-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    Thought experiments are often employed by philosophers who try to differentiate between essential and accidental properties. These experiments are said to stimulate the intuition of the reader (be it eidetic, linguistic or any other type of intuition). But sometimes they rather persuade the reader than test his intuition. How can we test the readers without revealing to them the role of test subjects they play? I suggest that some works of fiction can be treated as massive thought experiments because they are very similar to the stories philosophers use. The trouble is, that in the case of fiction our intuition is much more liberal and we accept things we would have certainly called impossible had they been presented to us in a philosophical article. I use some examples to show that our notion of impossibility depends on our naive, commonsense preconceptions of what objects and technologies exist in the world we are talking about. But this is exactly the type of knowledge philosophers ask us to suspend when they present their thought experiments.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2009, 17, 1; 23-29
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Między receptorem a interpretatorem. Rola pojęcia „konsumenta” w teorii mechanizmów wyposażonych w konsumowany model
    Between a Receptor and an Interpreter. The Role of a Concept of “Consumer” in the Theory of Model Consuming Mechanisms
    Autorzy:
    Grabarczyk, Paweł
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968785.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2017-10-01
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Opis:
    The paper discusses the role of the concept of “consumer” in the theory presented in Paweł Gładziejewski’s book Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych (Explaining with Mental Representations). The main claim Gładziejewski makes is that representational systems can be recognized as model consuming mechanisms. I argue that the way Gładziejewski characterizes models is insufficient (as it is still too liberal) and that it is hard to differentiate between the notion of “consumer” and that of “interpreter”. I propose an alternative way of defining consumers that is compatible with Gładziejewski’s theory and free of the issues of the original formulation.
    Źródło:
    Filozofia Nauki; 2017, 25, 3; 69-79
    1230-6894
    2657-5868
    Pojawia się w:
    Filozofia Nauki
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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