Autor: DERRA, Aleksandra - Katalog OPAC zbiorów

Skocz do pozycji: 1.

Tytuł:: Deflacyjna teoria prawdy Paula Horwicha i jej trudności
Selected Problems of Paul Horwich Theory of Truth
Autorzy:: Derra, Aleksandra
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/964146.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2006-06-01
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:: The author characterize Paul Horwich's view on truth formulated in his deflationary theory of truth. She presents selected problems which arise when one analyze the elements of the theory in a more detailed way. She investigates the mentioned problems in order to show the importance of such categories like truth, acceptance, understanding, proposition and property for philosophy of language. The author concludes with a claim that philosophical acceptance (or antipathy) for minimalism in theory of truth is connected with some metaphysical assumptions which are taken for granted in advance.
Źródło:: Filozofia Nauki; 2006, 14, 2; 13-21
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:: Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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Skocz do pozycji: 2.

Tytuł:: Czy minimalizm w teorii prawdy prowadzi do relatywizmu?
Does Minimalism in Theory of Truth Leads to Relativism?
Autorzy:: Derra-Włochowicz, Aleksandra
Powiązania:: https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968424.pdf
Data publikacji:: 2003-09-01
Wydawca:: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:: The author considers the problem of relation between the so called minimalist theories of truth and relativism in philosophy - trying to answer the question: Does minimalism in the theory of truth result in relativism? In order to make the above question more precise, the author takes two steps. Initially, she defines minimalism (deflationism) with respect to truth in philosophy, enumerates various theories which are counted as deflationary and submits basic claims of deflationary views trying to find their theoretical hard-core. She takes Paul Horwich's deflationary theory of truth as a representative example of minimalist approaches and present the goals which Horwich is trying to reach in this theory. She points out its elementary assumption and Horwich's solution to the problem of truth. Afterwards, the author confronts the problem of relativism. Firstly, she distinguishes various ways of understanding the very notion of 'relativism'. Secondly, she points out what kind of relativism can be dangerous (and why) in philosophy. Finally, she concludes that minimalism in the theory of truth does not result in such philosophically dangerous standpoint.
Źródło:: Filozofia Nauki; 2003, 11, 3-4; 133-141
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:: Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:: Biblioteka Nauki

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