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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: Good Examples Still to Be Found
Autorzy:
Prelević, Duško
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/968644.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn famously argued that scientific revolutions consist in paradigm shifts in which the superseded and the new paradigms are incommensurable. My aim in this paper is to show that neither Kuhn’s examples nor Yafeng Shan’s recently proposed example adequately support this incommensurability thesis. Starting from the distinction between global and local incommensurability, I argue that, on the one hand, local incommensurability does not imply that paradigms are globally incommensurable, and, on the other, that it is likely that real support for Kuhn’s thesis that “the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds” requires global incommensurabilities. Thus, I argue that the Kuhnian view is not capable of providing satisfactory evidence that those incommensurabilities ever occurred in the history of science.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2019, 27, 4; 64-77
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Znaczenie logiczne a psychologiczne czyli Davidson vs Kuhn (rozprawa z zakresu filozofii analitycznej)
Logical and Psychological Concept of Meaning: Davidson vs Kuhn
Autorzy:
Godlewski, Roman Piotr
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/909852.pdf
Data publikacji:
2005-06-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
logic of science
meaning
psychology of science
Opis:
The objection raised by Davidson against Kuhn in article "On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme" that the argument presented in "The Structure of Scientific Revolution" was inconsistent is incorrect. Kuhn's conception belongs to psychology and sociology and his work could be titled "An Outline of Psychology and Sociology of Scientific Research". Consequently he is interested only and only in psychologi-cal reasons that affect scientists' theoretical decisions. E.g. his considerations concerning neutral observational language are polemous against thesis that language like that could be somehow useful for interpretation of what scientists do and also against thesis that it could be useful for scientists themselves. The difficulty of un-derstanding above paradigmata does not consist on conceptual schemata meant logically as Davidson reads it but on different cognitive attitude and different manual sets of concepts. To explain the controversy logical and psychological concepts of meaning are distinguished. Davidson means the proper, Kuhn does the latter. Psy-chological meaning concists on what associations and feelings are evocated by utterances in the recever's mind. When Kuhn says that after a revolution scientists live in another world he means only that the language with witch they describe the reality has different psychological meaning. And this is that kind of meaning that cannot be translated and is lost when you discuss above paradigmata. From Kuhn's point of view it is possible to translate logical meaning of scientific utterances from before a revolution, and he does it. The psychological meaning can be only described but not translated.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2005, 13, 2; 69-86
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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