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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Odróżnialność a indywidualność
Discernibility and Individuality
Autorzy:
Skrzypulec, Błażej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/965248.pdf
Data publikacji:
2011-09-01
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
The article considers interrelations between three philosophical issues which are relevant for the validity of the identity of indiscernibles principle: (I) different understandings of the „qualitative difference”, (II) features of space - assumptions regarding classical, commonsense and nonstandard characteristics of space, (III) objective or subjective context - assumptions concerning presence of the perceiving subject in thought experiments created to test the validity of the identity of indiscernibles principle. Different sets of assumptions connected with those three issues are discussed and it is tested, by constructing counterexamples describing possible state of affairs, if they entail the necessary validity of the identity of indiscernibles principle. In conclusion the theses about sufficient and necessary conditions for the necessity of the identity of indiscernibles principle are stated. Particularly it is argued that: 1) If the Principle is necessarily true then space necessarily has standard characteristics. 2) If the Principle is necessarily true then objects differ „qualitatively” even if they differ only in possessing relational properties individualized by a reference to an individual object (like being 5m from Empire State Building) 3) Only in the subjective context the Principle can hold necessarily without presupposing also a non-qualitative numerical difference. In addition some implication for the theories of individuation are pointed out. Especially it is stated that theories which postulate that object is composed only of general elements (like some versions of the bundle theory of object) can be valid only in subjective context.
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2011, 19, 3; 13-28
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Biological Individuality and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: A Philosophical Conundrum in a (New) Biological Focus
Autorzy:
Ongay de Felipe, Íñigo
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/967773.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-10-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Opis:
There has been much debate in evolutionary biology concerning the extension of some of the central tenets of the modern synthesis (MS). Due to recent developments in evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo), epigenetics, phenotypic and developmental plasticity, niche construction and ecological inheritance, and animal traditions, an increasing array of leading evolutionary biologists, theoretical biologists, and philosophers of biology agree that the structure of the MS needs to be reconsidered. This paper reflects on the connection between this scientific debate and the notion of biological individuality. The paper proposes a discussion of two levels at which the concept of individuality intersects with the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES), as well as the tension between two roles for individuals in such an extended theoretical framework. First, taken at face value, many developments in evolutionary thinking point to an organismcentered view of evolutionary processes. Second, the concept of individuality appears to have been hugely modified in the history of evolutionary thought. Indeed, both multilevel selection theory and the framing of Darwinian individuality transitioning among levels in evolution entail an expansion of the notion of individuality. Such an extended notion leaves room for aggregations of (classical) organisms counting as evolutionary individuals while (allegedly proper) organisms may coherently be viewed as populations. It follows that while individuality has become increasingly relevant for the renewed view of evolution that the EES presents, the boundaries of the notion seem blurrier and more fluid than ever. The paper concludes with a call for pluralism with regard to individuals (and many other evolutionary concepts).
Źródło:
Filozofia Nauki; 2020, 28, 3; 25-45
1230-6894
2657-5868
Pojawia się w:
Filozofia Nauki
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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