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Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Belief as a Cognitive and Practical Commitment
Autorzy:
Djigo, Sophie
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781092.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
agency
belief
practical knowledge
reasons
self-interpretation
Opis:
Exploring the idea of a more practical relationship between the agent and his own mental life leaves room for reconsidering the relevance of the familiar analogy between reasons for belief and reasons for action. Even if their difference is usually admitted, they are also treated as equivalent, in the sense that the connection between reasons to believe and the arising belief would be analogous to the connection between reasons for action and the arising action. If such an analogy might be relevant to a certain extent in the frame of a theoretical stance towards oneself, I'll argue that it cannot be maintained once we have put the agent at the heart of self-knowledge.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2013, 4, 2; 34-45
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Does our Past have a Motivational Effect? Our Reasons for Acting: Sartre’s Philosophy of Action
Autorzy:
Malinge, Yoann
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781094.pdf
Data publikacji:
2013
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Sartre
action
freedom
past
motives
reasons for acting
Opis:
The goal of my paper is to consider how one chooses one’s own action. First, I will try to understand how both his past and his environment can condition someone's action. According to Sartre, we can act without being determined by our past which is always separated from us. It will be important to understand how such a process is possible. Is man completely free to act? Then I will raise the question of our reasons for acting in order to show that reasons do not pre-exist in the world. Motives are always motives for an agent who gives them meaning. They never condition the action completely. By his project, the agent reveals some reasons to act and these reasons have a value only in relation to the project adopted by the agent. Therefore, we can say that everyone is condemned to be free.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2013, 4, 2; 46-53
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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