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Wyszukujesz frazę "deliberation" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2
Tytuł:
Deliberation and Automaticity in Habitual Acts
Autorzy:
Douskos, Christos
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/781205.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
habit
deliberation
automaticity
action explanation
Opis:
Most philosophers and psychologists assume that habitual acts do not ensue from deliberation, but are direct responses to the circumstances: habit essentially involves a variety of automaticity. My objective in this paper is to show that this view is unduly restrictive. A habit can explain an act in various ways. Pointing to the operation of automaticity is only one of them. I draw attention to the fact that acquired automaticity is one outgrowth of habituation that is relevant to explanation, but not the only one. Habituation shapes our emotional and motivational make up in ways that affect deliberation itself. Hence mentioning a habit might be indispensable in explaining an act which nevertheless ensues from deliberation. The view that habitual acts are direct responses to the circumstances implies an impoverished conception of habit, which fails to do justice to its rich explanatory potential in theoretical and pre-theoretical contexts, as well as to its role in the history of philosophy.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2018, 9, 1; 25-43
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Prudent Reflective Equilibrium
Autorzy:
Coitinho Silveira, Denis
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/29433362.pdf
Data publikacji:
2023
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Reflective equilibrium
prudence
moral deliberation
moral knowledge
John Rawls
Opis:
The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent within the procedure of reflective equilibrium by adding a disposition for identifying reasonable beliefs. This can be seen as the starting point of the method, and would safeguard against the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. In order to do this, I will begin by analyzing the core characteristics of the method and its main weaknesses. I will then investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition for identifying an adequate means for achieving a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure which is carried out by an agent who deliberates well and can identify reasonable moral beliefs. These beliefs must be justified according to their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be interpreted as a kind of moral knowledge.
Źródło:
Ethics in Progress; 2023, 14, 1; 46-63
2084-9257
Pojawia się w:
Ethics in Progress
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-2 z 2

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