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Wyszukujesz frazę "virtue," wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
What Is Dignity?
Autorzy:
Herrman, Charles
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451415.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-10-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
dignity
honor
culture
virtue ethics
consequentialism
Kant
Opis:
It stands to reason that a criterion is needed that can serve as a common denominator for weighing or assessing different values or ideals. Dignity is offered as a possible candidate, to be presented from religio-legal and cross-cultural vantages. A definition will be offered for dignity and its parts defended throughout the paper. The approach is not only not rigorously analytic – there are no case studies – but is instead a presentation of topic areas where we should expect to find the concept of dignity to be relevant. Utilizing a rights-moral and duties-ethical framework, it is in essence an argument for further elevating the prestige of dignity so that it might provide a widely-accepted groundwork for ethics and morality. .
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2019, 3, 3(9); 103-126
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
“We Must Speak”: Humility and Social Activism
Autorzy:
Wargin, Jennifer
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2143159.pdf
Data publikacji:
2022-10-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
humility
social activism
transcendence
virtue
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Opis:
Humility is enjoying an upsurge of interest among contemporary virtue theorists. Unfortunately, many of these discussions have cast humility as inconsistent with social activism. Humility is assumed to consist of quiet and unobtrusive traits which seem inconsistent with the assertiveness and outspokenness required for social activism. Paul Bloomfield argues that this aspect of humility – being inconsistent with social activism – prevents it from counting as a virtue at all as a virtue must be the kind of thing that is always appropriate to possess and display. Here I attempt to present an account of humility that is not inconsistent with social activism and that can, and should, be considered a virtue where virtue is loosely understood to mean a generally desirable trait of character.
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2022, 6, 2; 51-61
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Education, Philosophy, and Morality: Virtue Philosophy in Kant
Autorzy:
Mueller, Laura
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451517.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-12-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
Kant
morality
virtue
education
pedagogy
enlightenment
higher education
capitalism
consumerism
Opis:
This article investigates the interrelated roles of education, morality, and philosophy in Kant as a response to the transactional view of humanity promoted by the spirit of capitalism, known as the “capital form.” This article investigates the effect of the capital form upon educational institutions and self-cultivation, or Bildung. Kant’s views on the role of education in moral development provide a path forward in the reconstitution of Bildung within persons. I argue that education serves a moral role in Kant, helping humanity achieve enlightenment – in direct contrast to the “un-enlightened” and uncultivated self created by the capital form. I turn to Kant’s views on education, focusing on the role of philosophy in moral development, and the cultivation of virtues such as modesty and appropriate self-love. Finally, I turn to contemporary pedagogical theory, providing practical examples of teaching techniques to help liberate students from their “self-imposed minority.”
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2019, 3, 4(10); 114-137
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Charles Taylor on Ethics and Liberty
Autorzy:
Barry, Conor
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451521.pdf
Data publikacji:
2019-10-31
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
Tematy:
positive liberty
negative liberty
virtue ethics
political philosophy
history of philosophy
Opis:
My argument in this paper is that Charles Taylor’s view of liberty and ethics unites Isaiah Berlin’s liberal pluralism with Elizabeth Anscombe’s virtue ethics. Berlin identifies, in “Two Concepts of Liberty,” a tradition of negative liberty advocated by figures like Locke and Mill. He maintains that this concept of liberty is unique to modernity, and it is the form of liberty best suited to the political sphere. The much older concept of positive liberty, which is found in ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, as well as modern thinkers like Hegel, Berlin regards as ill-suited to the political sphere. Anscombe, in “Modern Moral Philosophy,” specifically identifies and criticizes the Anglo-Saxon tradition of moral philosophy. Utilitarian thinkers like Mill are, for Anscombe, consequentialists. The virtue ethics of Aristotle gives a basis for the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions not in sentiment but reason. Charles Taylor draws upon the views of both thinkers. He advocates a liberal pluralism in a manner comparable to Berlin. However, Taylor strongly emphasizes, with Anscombe, that the most complete conception of ethical and political life must be rooted in virtue ethics and positive liberty. Thus, Taylor’s views constitute a synthesis of the approaches of his two mentors.
Źródło:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2019, 3, 3(9); 83-102
2544-302X
Pojawia się w:
Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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