Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

English (EN)·Polski (PL)·Yкраїнський (UK)
Przejdź do strony domowej biblioteki Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa Link otwiera się w nowym oknie Logo biblioteki Prolib Integro - strona głównaCentralna Biblioteka Wojskowa

Wyszukujesz frazę "Scheler" wg kryterium: Temat

  Lista filtrów
Wyrównaj
    Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3
    Tytuł:
    Scheler and the Very Existence of the Impersonal
    Autorzy:
    Auxier, Randall E
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451375.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018-04-27
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Tematy:
    Scheler
    person
    Whitehead
    Royce
    existence
    feeling
    Opis:
    Usually philosophers worry about the existence of mind, or consciousness, or persons, or other difficult-to-explain phenomena. Having posited matter or nature, or fields, they wonder where can person or consciousness originate? This kind of thinking is backward. Only persons ask such questions. Persons exist. I turn the tables on the traditional problem of person by asking whether anything impersonal really exists. I argue that the impersonal almost exists, using the theory of feeling of Max Scheler and supplementing it with insights from Alfred North Whitehead and Josiah Royce. Even though feeling almost succeeds in divesting itself of the pre-supposed act of the person, but its concrete actuality blocks such complete self-abstraction.
    Źródło:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2018, 2, 1(3); 74-86
    2544-302X
    Pojawia się w:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Max Scheler’s Two Approaches to Philosophy of Culture
    Autorzy:
    Stikkers, Kenneth W.
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/985700.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-03-31
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Tematy:
    max scheler
    philosophy of culture
    values
    axiology
    ordo amoris
    ethos
    sociology of knowledge
    real and ideal sociological factors
    Opis:
    Max Scheler seems to present two distinct approaches to philosophy of culture. In the early period of his Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik and “Ordo Amoris,” he describes cultures as being defined by their distinct order of value preferencings. In his later period of his “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens,” however, Scheler explains the dynamics of culture in terms of the interaction of what he calls “real” and “ideal sociological factors,” rooted in various drives (Triebe) and spirit (Geist), respectively. These approaches are fully compatible and complementary, the former describing culture’s vertical structure and the latter, its horizontal structure. Together these two approaches offer a comprehensive philosophy of culture, deserving greater attention.
    Źródło:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2020, 4, 4; 36-44
    2544-302X
    Pojawia się w:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Value Commensurability in Brightman and Scheler: Towards a Process Metaethics
    Autorzy:
    Hackett, J. Edward
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/451473.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2019-04-30
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Filozofii
    Tematy:
    Edgar Sheffield Brightman
    Max Scheler
    process metaethics
    value rankings
    value commensurability
    table of values
    phenomenological ethics
    personalism
    personalist ethics
    Opis:
    In the following paper, both Max Scheler and Edgar Sheffield Brightman’s rankings of value are compared. In so doing, Brightman’s table of values is found wanting along the lines of Scheler’s value rankings. The reason is, in part, that Scheler’s ordering of preference and hierarchy of feelings more readily explain what Brightman’s account presupposes: affective intentionality. What is more, we can apply Brightman’s test of consistency to Scheler’s account and find it more desirable than how Brightman defines what values are in his A Philosophy of Religion (1940). Between both thinkers an account will emerge that can help clarify the commensurability of values in experience-based accounts of value in both thinkers. In doing so, a blended account reaches three conclusions about how each personalist might adopt points the other would have suggested to him. (1) Love is the process of coalescement in rough outlines; (2) The ordo amoris should reflect the rational coherence of Brightman’s more systematic laws; (3) And the demand of coherence means that phenomenology in Scheler becomes a system of idealistic metaphysics concerning values despite the fact that Brightman thinks the moral law system will hold phenomenologically regardless of which metaphysical interpretation of reality holds sway about values.
    Źródło:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture; 2019, 3, 1(7); 104-121
    2544-302X
    Pojawia się w:
    Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-3 z 3

      Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies