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Wyszukujesz frazę "Agency theory" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4
Tytuł:
Agency costs of overvalued equity and earnings management in companies listed on WSE
Autorzy:
Kałdoński, Michał
Jewartowski, Tomasz
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/557811.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-03-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
overvalued equity, earnings management, agency costs, agency theory, corporate finance, corporate governance
Opis:
The aim of the paper is to study earnings management activities of companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange from the perspective of Jensen’s agency theory of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005). Specifically, we analyze relations between equity overvaluation and various types of earnings management used by public companies between 2005 and 2015. We provide evidence partially consistent with Jensen’s theory. Specifically, our study reveals that overvaluation intensifies income-increasing accrual earnings management activities. However, we also find that overvaluation is not followed by real transactions management activities, as opposed to previous studies based on the US market. We provide some evidence that this difference might be driven by external monitoring executed by large institutional investors.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2017, 3(17), 1
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Governance of director and executive remuneration in leading firms of Australia
Autorzy:
Riaz, Zahid
Kirkbride, James
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/943135.pdf
Data publikacji:
2017-12-20
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
Corporate governance; globalization; agency theory; institutional theory;
disclosure level of director and executive remuneration
Opis:
The aim of the paper is to examine how the introduction of state regulation and self-regulation impacts on the disclosure of director and executive remuneration in Australia. In doing so, we step beyond the simple state-market dichotomy in the extant literature, and proposes a symbiotic association between both regulatory modes for remuneration governance. The study reveals that remuneration disclosure levels are significantly higher after the advent of both self-regulatory and state regulatory reforms rather than state regulation alone. Furthermore, foreign-MNCs which experience increased agency problems due to spatial complexities and increased liabilities of foreignness do not have a superior disclosure level of director and executive remuneration: findings with important messages for policy makers and for regulators.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2017, 3(17), 4; 66-86
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
(Re)-structuring the CEO’s compensation—the case of Israel
Autorzy:
Mroczek-Dąbrowska, Katarzyna
Shemesh, Yaron
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/1837941.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020-09-30
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
CEO compensation
inequalities
compensation gap
agency theory
principal– agent conflict
corporate governance
Opis:
The executive compensation issue continues to cause protest due to the increasing number of cases of an unjustifiably high level of pay. The main conflict arises from the misalignment of interests between the short-term expectations of the manager and long-term needs of the shareholders. Since there are no universal rules on how to price the executive performance companies reach for different means of establishing the CEO’s compensation and ascertaining manager’s commitment towards maintaining a company’s value. The issue becomes more complex once the compensation rules are not a direct effect of the market power game but are additionally restricted by government. The aim of the paper is to discuss corporate government policies introduced in Israel and their impact on executive compensation level and structure. Israel is amongst those countries that partially regulate CEO compensation and thus the Israeli experience can add to the understanding of the effectiveness of modern corporate governance.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2020, 6, 3; 105-117
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Boardroom leadership: The board of directors as a source of strategic leadership
Autorzy:
Castellanos, Julio David
George, Babu
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/557773.pdf
Data publikacji:
2020
Wydawca:
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Tematy:
board of directors
corporate governance
strategic leadership
agency theory
principal agent problem
stewardship theory
board typologies
Opis:
The aim of this paper is to bring together some of the foundational and recent literature interlinking corporate governance and the leadership role of the board of directors. Strategic leadership is widely assumed to be a responsibility that defaults to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). However, in practice, what most CEOs do is strategic management rather than strategic leadership. While strategic management does share key aspects of strategic leadership CEOs are expected to prioritize the managerial side over the leadership side. This is just one of the situations in which the boardroom assumes the leadership role. This paper discusses how boards of directors conduct the process of strategic leadership in their organizations. In recent years there has been an increasing interest among scholars to understand how boards strategize from a behavioral point of view. This growing interest has resulted in the development of various typologies regarding boards’ involvement in the strategic leadership processes.
Źródło:
Economics and Business Review; 2020, 6(20), 1; 103-119
2392-1641
Pojawia się w:
Economics and Business Review
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-4 z 4

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