Informacja

Drogi użytkowniku, aplikacja do prawidłowego działania wymaga obsługi JavaScript. Proszę włącz obsługę JavaScript w Twojej przeglądarce.

Wyszukujesz frazę "POLISH LAW" wg kryterium: Temat


Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10
Tytuł:
Prawa człowieka a zatrzymanie i tymczasowe aresztowanie w polskim prawie i praktyce jego stosowania
Human Rights and Detention in Polish Law and Practice
Autorzy:
Bulenda, Teodor
Hołda, Zbigniew
Rzepliński, Andrzej
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698514.pdf
Data publikacji:
1992
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
prawa człowieka
zatrzymanie tymczasowe
aresztowanie
prawo polskie
human rights
detention
arrest
polish law
human rights
Opis:
The social and political changes in Poland led to abolition of Realsozialismus which is now being replaced with a democratic country governed by Rechtostaat (Art. 1 of the Constitution) from aspirations after national freedom and respect of human rights in public life. The problem of protection of individual freedom made itself particularly felt here; it is also subject of the present paper which discusses the protection of individual subjectivity in the light or the institutions of arrest and detention awaiting trial. Until quite recently, Poland was one of the many Communist countries where human rights were violated much too often, also on the occasion of arrest and detention awaiting trial. Many factors were conductive to this situation, such as faulty legislation; inadequate socjal consciousness; depreciation of the authorities, law and other norms; prevalence of repressiveness in dealing with social pathologies; and absence of social control of the activity of law enforcement agencies, the police and prison staff in particular. But the weakness of legal protection of individual resulted also from a strong relation of the activities of practically all governemental and social bodies those dealing with prosecution and investigation as well as administration of justice included, to politics. This political nature of functioning of those agencies, resulting monopolistic power of the Communist party, led to a limitation of the independance of the judiciary. The adoption of new political principles of Polish State and election of the new Parliament (on June 4, 1989), together with formaion of the non-Communist Cabinet, created the conditions for a new criminal policy based step by step on European standards. The institutions of arrest and detention awaiting trial well illustrate the pathology of functioning of the agencies of legal order and the direction of changes taking place in criminal policy. They also demonstrate a specific paradox; the Polish people’s great devotion to freedom and the simultaneous unfeeling tramling of that freedom. The two institutions have been discussed from the viewpoint of protection of human rights on both the normative plane and in the practice of the years 1980–1990. Arrest is one of the forms of coercion which consists in a short-term deprivation of liberty. The Polish legal system provides for procedural, preventive and administrative arrest. Each of these types has a separate legal regulation (procedural arrest, the Act of 19 April 1969 – Code of criminal procedure; preventive arrest, the Act of 6 June 1990 on the police and another Act bearing that same date on State Protection Office, together with their executory acts; and administrative arrest, the Act of 28 October 1982 on education to sobriety and control of alcoholism). Moreover, each type of arrest is to serve different aims (procedural arrest, protection of propriety of criminal proceedings; preventive arrest, protectton of order and public safety, human life and health, and property; and administrative arrest, control of alcoholism). Also different are the conditions of arrest, the agencies authorized to apply it, and the period for which a person can be detained. The present authors focus mainly on preventive arrest related to the administrative function of the police as guardian of order. That form was particularly abused and human rights were often violated in the course of its execution. Preventive arrest has recently undergone significant changes both in the normative sphere and in practice. As compared to the former one, its present regulation: 1. defines its legal grounds with greater accuracy; 2. broadens the detainee’s rights; and 3. introduced judicial review. This has contributed to the curbing of arbitrary police activities in this sphere. Duration of arrest is specified in the Constitution (Art. 87) and in the provision of Art. 207 of the code of criminal procedure. It cannot be londer than 48 hours from the moment of detention, and 24 hours in the case of administrative arrest (Art. 40 of the act on education to sobriety and control of alcoholism). Violations of these provisions have so far been frequent. In the case of procedural and preventive arrest, the rights of the detainee are the same. According to the valid provisions, the detainee has the following rights among others: the right to be informed in writing as to the time and reasons of arrest; the right to be advised as to the possibility of complaining to the court against the application of that measure, and to the public prosecutor against the way of its execution: the right to health care. The catalogue of the detainee’s rights is insufficient:  e.g. it does not contain the right, to legal assistance (conseul). What particularly impairs the protection of the detainee’s personal interests is the absence of by-laws concerning the execution of arrest in the police house of detention, as the duplicated set of provisions called ,,By-laws for Detainees”, introduced by an order of the Chief of Civic Militia in 1959, hardly comes up to the standards. The provisions now in force have broadened the range  of legal means of vindication of his rights that are at the detainee’s disposal. Particularly notable here is the  reintroduction of the institution of habeas corpus. Namely, the detainee has been granted the right to complain to the court against arrest (Art. 207 point ”a,, of the Code of criminal procedure) and to the public prosecutor against the way of execution of arrest (Art. 15.7 of the Act on the police). If the arrest has been obviously unjustified, the detainee is due indemnity from the Treasury and monetary compensation of moral  injury (Art. 487 of the Code of criminal procedure); the same concerns the situation where he has suffered damage or injury as a result of an improper execution of arest (Art.Art. 417-419 of the Civil code). Besides, the detainee may approach the court with a claim in virtue of protection of his personal interests (Art.Art. 23 and 24 of the civil code). In the latter half of 1990, arrest was executed in 798 police houses of detention all over the country, that is fewer by a whole 71,7 per cent as compared to 1989. The recent changes have made it possible to abolish the division of houses of detention into categories (of which there used to be three according to the duration of detention). The number of arrests amounted to over 500,000 a year at times (with the peak of 572,220 in 1982 – see Table 1). Starting from 1988, it gradually went down to nearly one-third of its original value which reflects above all the general  liberalization of the police approach towards crime and other deviations. In the period under analysis, the living conditions in the police jails were – and still are primitive and many a time offensive to human dignity. This has been confirmed by the present author’s own study and two surveys of those jails carried out by the National Ombudsperson. An acute problem is the right to apply constraint during and upon detention. It is regulated by provisions of the police Act and an Ordinance of the Council of Ministere of 17 September 1990 which specifies the situations, conditions and ways in which direct coercion can be used by the police. Without questioning the grounds for such coercion, not only the legal conditions  of its application but also the faults or even abuses in this sphere have been pointed out. What the authors find the most severe violation of human dignity are neither humiliating conditions of isolation nor illicit prolongation of detention but first and foremost beating of a person after he has surrendered to the power of enforcement officers. Cases of beating have again started growing in number this year (as has been found by the Helsinki Committee in PoIand and the National Ombudsperson). The activities of the public prosecutor’s office in this sphere have been criticised in the article. The paper also discusses the consequences of the introduction of Art. 209 of the Code of criminal procedure which made it possible to commit to the police jails persons detained awaiting trial (for up to ten days or three months), and even those sentenced to a prison term (of up to six months). This provision has recently been quashed, but the police press for its reintroduction. Until quite recently, the police jails were submitted to no supervision whatever. The public prosecutor’s. office remained passive and carried out but most perfunctory supervision, if any. This situation hardly served the protection of detainees’ rights. It was only improved in 1988 when the police jails were submitted to supervision by the Ombudsperson and later also by Commissions: of Administration and Internal Affairs of the Diet and of the Rule of Law and Human Rigths of the Senate, and by other agencies and institutions. Also pre-trial detention is a serious interference with human rights. It is one of the preventive measures provided for by the Code of criminal procedure, and at the stage of execution – by the Code of execution of penalties and the Ordinance of Minister of Justice of 2 May 1989 – by-laws of execution of detention awaiting trial. The discussed measure can be applied by the court, and before the indictment also by the public prosecutor. The present authors find the latter’s right to apply pre-trial detention contradictory to provisions of international law, the covenants ratified by Poland included (see Art. 9,3 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights). The legal provisions fail to specify the upper limit of duration of pre-trial detention. The amendement of the Code of criminal procedure and the changed policy of application of dotention resulted in a fall in the number of those detained awaiting trial. There were 9,722 such detainees on July 31, 1989 (see Tables 4–5). There was also a radical drop in the number of persons detained for over 12  months: in 1990, as few as 0,03 per cent of those kept at the public prosecutor’s disposal had been detained for at least 12 months. However, an alarming upward tendency in the number of persons detained awaiting trial can be noted lately. Discussing the conditions for optional or obligatory pre-trial detention, the authors criticize some of them as estimative in nature, and thus involving the danger of arbitrary use of this measure. The reasoning has been based on decisions of the Supreme Court which is of particular importance for the effective protection of the detainee’s rights. There have been a lot of faults in the practice of application and execution of pre-trial detention which was frequently used as a means of pressure aimed at forcing a person to plead guilty or to denounce an accomplice. In Poland, the application of pre-trail detention is the domain of the public prosecutor’s office. In the years 1975–1989, prosecutors applied this measure in nine out of every ten cases. The population of houses of detention and other penitentiary institutions shaped differently starting from 1945. A comparison of changes in the numer in the number of convicted persons with those of persons detained awaiting trial shows that the latter population was more stable starting from the 1960’s and never changed as radically in number as that of prisoners. That was the case despite the increased frequency of application of detention in the 1970’s. What contributed to this situation above all was the shortening of preparatory proceedings. In the period under analysis, the total number of persons detained awaiting trial in a given year largely approximated that of prisoners in that same year, and showed the same fluctuations resulting from the aggravated or relaxed criminal policy in the country. The trends here have nothing in common with the actual dynamics of crime as such. The authors assume that the number of persons detained awaiting trial reflects decisions in the sphere of criminal policy rather than the actual changes in crime, the economic situation, or even severe political tensions. What is also characteristic of the practice in this respect is the fact of a faulty application of the discussed measure. In the years 1975–1989, at least every 111th and at most every 71st person previously detained awaiting trial was subsequently found not guilty by the court. In some years, there were over 500 such persons. The authors discuss preventive barriers defined by the Supreme Court which are to ban clearly unjustified detention. As follows from analysis of the practical application of conditions for pre-trial detention, the one most frequently quoted was the alleged considerable social danger of the crime. Repressive conditions prevailed over the purely procedural ones. ln order to find out about the actual dimensions of the problem of pre-trial detention, the authors consulted the data concerning the use of preventive measure not involving isolation in criminal proceedings (such measures being financial and non-financial pledge, police supervision, and safe-conduct; see Table 6). It turned out that in the years 1978-1990, preventive measures other than detention awaiting trial never amounted to more than 43,5 and to less than 18 per cent of all preventive measures applied. After the above-mentioned Art. 209 of the code of execution of penalties has been quashed, detention awaiting trial can only be executed in the houses of detention created and run by the Ministry of Justice (Art.Art. 4 and 83 of the code of execution of ponalties). On December 31, 1990, there were 65 such institutions in Poland. Twenty-seven of them had additional wards for convicted persons, while 48 prisons had special wards for those detained awaiting trial. Thus pre-trial detention could be executed in the total of 114 of the 151 institutions of the Prison Department. The houses of detention had the total capacity of  18,263 beds, while the number of detainees was 16,200; the discussed institutions were therefore populated in 88,7 per cent. The rights of the discussed category of detainees are specified in the Code of execution of penalties and by-laws of execution of pre-trial deteotion awaiting trial. What is particularly worthy of attention is the provision which states that the detainee enjoys rights that should at least equal those of a convicted person, and that the only limitations allowed in this sphere are those indispensable for securing the proper course of criminal proceedings, maintaining order and safety in the institution, and preventing mutual demoralization of detainees (Art. 86 para 1 of the Code of execution of penalties). A person detained awaiting trial has many legal measures at his disposal to protect his own rights in relation to the application and execution of detention. Thus the detainee can lodge a complaint with a supreme agency of the penitentiary  administration (Art. 48 para 4 of the Code of execution of penalties); with the public prosecutor and penitentiary judge (Art.Art. 27–33 and 48 point 5); to the  supreme State agencies, the National Ombudsperson included (Art. 48 point 5); he may apeal against a decision of the administration of the house of detention concerning the actual execution of that measure to the penitentiary court (Art. I4,l of the Code of execution of penaltes); he may also sue the Treasury for damage suffered during detention by guilt of functionaries of the penitentiary administration (Art.Art. 417–l9 of the Civil code); he may claim indemnity for obviously unjustified detention (Art.Art. 487–49l of the Code of criminal  procedure); and he may bring legal action by virtue of infringement of his personal interests (Art.Art. 23–24 of the Civil code). As shown by experience, the persons detained awaiting trial either never resort to some of these means or do that ineffectively. The living conditions of the discussed category of detainees are specified mainly in the by-laws of pre-trial detention. Many faults and shortcomings have  been found here in practice. Some of such faults were so drastic as to make it necessary to close several houses of detention in 1990 to mention just one example (the institutions were either liquidated or designed for repairs). The authors also assume an attitude towards the treatment of some categories of offenders (women, particularly dangerous detainees, persons with mental disorders, HIV carriers), and discuss the treatment of juvenile detainees. Ending the paper, the authors stress the gradual improvement in the treatment of detainees since 1989. It results both from the legislative changes and from a relatively liberal criminal policy. The legal and to some extent also the organizational conditions have been created for implementation of the rule of law. Further changes are necessary, though, including in particular the passing of a new Constitution and penal codes. The drafts of the latter suggest, many new solutions in the sphere of arrest and detention awaiting trial which would make those institutions meet the European standards. What can considered valuable are the trends towards limiting the application of the two measures, specifying the conditions of their application, importantly, extending the guaranties of detainees’ rights.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1992, XVIII; 103-146
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Kara konfiskaty mienia w prawie polskim i obowiązującym na ziemiach polskich oraz w praktyce jego stosowania
Forfeiture of Property in Polish Law, the Law in Force on Polish Territories, and the Practice of its Application
Autorzy:
Rzeplińska, Irena
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/699048.pdf
Data publikacji:
1994
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
kara konfiskaty mienia
prawo polskie
kary pieniężne
przestępstwa
forfeiture of property
Polish law
pecuniary penalties
offences
Opis:
Forfeiture of property is one of the oldest penalties in Polish law. Its origins can be traced in pre-state law, in the penalty of exclusion from tribe. Anybody could kill a person thus punished and destroy  his property, and would suffer no penalty for such acts. Later on, in early Middle Ages, the penalty of plunder was introduced: the offender’s possessions were looted, and his house burned. Destruction of the offender’s property as a penal sanction resulted from the conception of crime and punishment of that time. Crime was an offence against God, and punishment was seen as God’s revenge for crime – that offender’s house was destroyed as the place that had become unchaste, inhabited by an enemy of God. The penalties imposed in Poland in the 12th and 13th centuries were personal, material, and mixed penalties. There were two material penalties: forfeiture of the whole or part of property and pecuniary penalties. The utmost penalty was being outlawed which consisted of banishment of the convicted person from the country and forfeiture of his property by the ruler. Being outlawed was imposed for the most serious offences; with time, it became an exceptional penalty. In those days, forfeiture of property was a self-standing, as well as an additional penalty, imposed together with death, banishment, or imprisonment. As shown by the sources of law, forfeiture of property (as an additional penalty) could be imposed for “conspiracy against state” rape of a nun forgery of coins, cheating at games, and profiteering. Other  offences punishable in this way included murder, raid  with armed troops and theft of Church property, murder of a Jew committed by a Christian, and raid of a Jewish cemetery.  Data on the extent of the imposition of that penalty in the early feudal period are scarce; as follows from available sources, it was applied but seldom. The consequences of forfeiture were serious in those days. Deprived of property, the convicted person and his family inevitably lost their social and political status which  made forfeiture one of the most severe penalties. From  the viewpoint of the punishing authority (duke), forfeiture was clearly advantageous due to its universal feasibility; to the duke’s officials, it was profitable as they were entitled to plunder the convicted persons’s movables. In the laws of the 16th and 17th centuries, forfeiture was provided for: serious political crimes (crimen leaesae maiestatis – laese-majesty; perduelio – desertion to the enemy), offences against currency and against the armed forces.  As an additional penalty, it accompanied capital punishment and  being outlawed. The law also provided for situations where forfeiture could be imposed as a self-standing penalty. In 1573, the Warsaw Confederacy Act which guaranteed equality to confessors of different religions banned the inposition of forfeiture for conversion to another faith. Initially absolute – the whole of property being forfeited and taken over by the Treasury where it was at the king’s free disposal – forfeiture of  property  was limited already in the 14th century. To begin with, in consideration of the rights of the family  and third to forfeited property, the wife’s dowry was excluded from forfeiture. Later on, in the 16th century, the limitations concerned the king’s freedom of disposal of forfeited property. A nobleman’s property could no longer remain in the king’s hands but had to be granted to another nobleman. Forfeiture of property can also be found in the practice of Polish village courts; as follows from court registers, though, it was actually seldom imposed. European Enlightenment was the period of emergence of ideas which radically changed the conceptions of the essence and aims of punishment, types of penalties, and the policy of their imposition. In their writings, penologists of those days formulated the principle of the offender’s individual responsibility. This standpoint led to a declaration against forfeiture of property as a penalty which affected not  only the offender but also his family and therefore expressed  collective responsibility. The above ideas were known in Poland as well. They are reflected in the numerous drafts of penal law reform, prepared in 18th century Poland. The first such draft, so-called Collection of Jidicial Laws by Andrzej Zamojski, still provided for forfeiture. A later one (draft code of King Stanislaw August of the late 18th century) no longer contained this penalty. The athors argued that,  affecting not only the offender, that penalty was at variance with the principles of justice. The drafts were never to become the law. In 1794, after the second partition of Poland, an insurrection broke out commanded by Tadeusz Kościuszko. The rebel authorities repealed the former legal system and created a new system of provisions regulating the structure of state authorities, administration of justice, and law applied in courts. In the sphere of substantive penal law and the law of criminal proceedings, an insurgent code was introduced, with severe sanctions included in the catalog of penalties. Forfeiture of property was restored which had a double purpose: first, acutely to punish traitors, and second – to replenish the insurgent funds. When imposing forfeiture, property rights  of the convicted person’s spouse and his children’s right to inheritance were taken into account. Yet compared to the administration of justice of the French Revolution with its mass imposition of forfeiture, the Polish insurgent courts were humane and indeed lenient in their practice of sentencing. After the fall of the Kościuszko Insurrection, Poland became a subjugated country, divided between three partitioning powers: Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The Duchy of Warsaw, made of the territories regained from the invaders, survived but a short time. In the sphere of penal law and the present subject of forfeiture of property, that penalty was abolished by a separate parliamentary statute of 1809. After the fall of the Duchy of Warsaw, Poland lost sovereignty and the law of the partitioning powers entered into force on its territories. In the Prussian sector, a succession of laws were introduced: the Common Criminal Law of Prussian States of 1794, followed by the 1851 penal code and the penal code of the German Reich of 1871. Only the first of them still provided for forfeiture: it was abolished in the Prussian State by a law of March 11, 1850. Much earlier, forfeiture disappeared from the legislation of Austria. lt was already absent from the Cpllection of Laws on Penalties for West Galicia of June 17,1796, valid on the Polish territories under Austrian administration. Nor was forfeiture provided for by the two Austrian penal codes of 1803 and 1852. Forfeiture survived the longest in the penal legisation of Russia. In 1815, the Kingdom of Poland was formed of the Polish territories under Russian administration. In its Constitution, conferred by the Tsar of Russia, a provision was included that abolished forfeiture of property. It was also left in the subsequent Penal Code of the Kingdom of Poland, passed in 1818. Forfeiture only returned as a penal sanction applied to participants of the anti-Russian November insurrection of 1831. The Organic Statute of 1832, conferred to the Kingdom of Poland by the Tsar, reintroduced the penalty of forfeiture of property. Moreover, it was to be imposed for offences committed before Organic Statute had entered into force which was an infringement of the ban on retroactive force of law. Of those sentenced to forfeiture in the Kingdom of Poland, Lithuania, and Russia as participants of the November insurrection, few had estates and capital. A part of forfeited estates were donated, the rest were sold to persons of Russian origin. The proces of forfeiting the property of the 1830–1831 insurgents only ended in 1860 (the Tsar’s decree of February 2/March 2,1860). After November insurrection, the Russian authorities aimed at making the penal legislation of the Kingdom of Poland similar to that of the Russian Empire. The code of Main Corrective Penalties of 1847 aimed first of all at a legal unification. It preserved the penalty of “forfeiture of the whole or part of the convicted persons’ possessions and property” as an additional penalty imposed in cases clearly specified by law. It was imposed for offences against the state: attempts against the life, health, freedom or dignity of the Emperor and the supreme rights of the heir to the throne, the Emperor’s wife or other members of the Royal House, and rebellion against the supreme authority. Forfeiture was preserved in the amended code of 1866; in 1876, its application was extended to include offences against official enactments. The penalty could soon be applied – towards the participants of January insurrection of 1863 which broke out in the Russian Partition. The insurgents were tried by Russian military courts. After the January insurrection, 6,491 persons were convicted in the Kingdom of Poland; 6,186 of tchem were sentenced to forfeiture of property. Of that group, as few as 28 owned the whole or a part of real estate; 60 owned mortgage capital and real estate. The imposition of forfeiture on January insurgents stopped in 1867 in the Kingdom of Poland and as late as 1873 in Lithuania. The penalty was only removed from the Russian penal legislation with the introduction a new penal code in 1903. As can be seen, the Russian penal law – as opposed to the law of Prussia and Austria retained forfeiture of property the longest. It was designet to perform special political and deterrent functions as the penalty imposed on opponents of the system for crimes against state. It was severe enough to annihilate the offender’s material existence. It was also intended to deter others, any future dare-devils who might plan to resist authority. It was an   fitted element of the repressive criminal policy of the Russian Empire of those days. Forfeiture of the whole of property of the convicted person can be found once again in the Polish legislation, of independent Poland this time: in the Act of July 2, 1920 on controlling war usury where forfeiture was an optional additional penalty. At the same time, the act prohibited cumulation of repression affecting property (fine and forfeiture could not be imposed simultaneously). It originated from the special war conditions in Poland at the time. The ban on cumulation of repression affecting property is interesting from the viewpoint of criminal policy. The Polish penal code of 1932 did not provide for the penalty of forfeiture, and the Act on controlling war usury was quashed by that code’s introductory provisions. In the legislation of People’s Poland after World War II, forfeiture of property was re-established and had extensive application.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1994, XX; 79-96
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Wiktymologiczny obraz handlu ludźmi i niewolnictwa na tle prawa międzynarodowego i polskiego prawa karnego
Victimological Picture of Human Trafficking and Slavery in the Light of International Law and Polish Penal Law
Autorzy:
Sitarz, Olga
Sołtysiak-Blachnik, Anna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698969.pdf
Data publikacji:
2006
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
handel ludźmi
niewolnictwo
wiktymologia
prawo międzynarodowe
polskie prawo karne
human trafficking
slavery
victimology
international law
Polish penal law
Opis:
In order to understand the essence of the crime, two issues have to be taken into account: not only do we analyse features of the perpetrator, but also the victim’s behaviour. Both measures have to be recognised in the light of their mutual relations. In such a case, victimology is instrumental for criminology. It answers the fundamental question: who and why becomes a victim of a crime? It is victimology that draws our attention to a post-crime victimisation problem in the psychological, social and legal aspects. These issues are particularly vital in the case of human trafficking. First, the victim of the crime has to be defined. Over the centuries, the word ‘victim’ came to have an additional meaning. Nowadays, the legal definition of a victim in many countries typically includes the following: it is a person who suffered direct or threatened physical, emotional or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime. In the Polish legal system, a legal definition of a victim is given in the Polish Charter of Victims’ Rights, whereas the Polish penal law speaks of an aggrieved party and defines it in Article 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, one fact draws our attention. The aggrieved or those objectively recognised as aggrieved do not agree with such a qualification. Let us take a closer look at the reasons why they see themselves in a different role. There is no doubt that one of the reasons is the fact that victims are often qualified as persons offending the law, as criminals. Another problem, is the victims’ return to their previous life situation, which had led them to being recruited by a human trafficker. We also need to point out that the relations between human traffickers and their victims are extremely complex. However, the key issue is that there is an agreement for a crime. The decision-making processes have to be analysed. The victims of human trafficking find themselves in a situation where they have a considerable limitation of free decision making. One of the major examples reflecting these problems that always takes place in a compulsory situation in the wide sense of this expression is job undertaking which leads to the abuse of the potential worker’s situation. A very specific example is a job agency. The question that appears is when we should speak of an unlawfully acting job agent, and when we can start calling this human trafficking? Is every illegal job agency dealing with human trafficking? What is the difference between these two? And finally when does a worker become a victim and an aggrieved party? What types of slavery and slaves exist today? bounded labour affects at least 20 milion people around the world. People become bounded labourers by taking or being tricked into taking a loan for as little as the cost of medicines for a sick child. To repay the debt, many are forced to work overtime, seven days a week, up to 365 days a year. They receive basic food and shelter as ‘payment’ for their work, but may never pay off the loan, which can be passed down for another generation; eaily and forced marriage affects women and girls who are married without choice and are forced into lives of servitude often accompanied by physical violence; forced labour affects people who are illegally recruited by individuals, governments or political parties and forced to work usually under threat of violence or other penalties; slavery by descent is where people are either born into a slave class or are from a group that the society views as suited to be used as slave labour; trafficking involves the transport and/or trade of people: ‘woman, children and men’, from one area to another for the purpose of forcing them into slavery conditions; worst forms of child labour affects an estimated 179 million children around the world in work that is harmful to their health and welfare. Children work on the land, in households as domestic workers, in factories making products such as matches, fireworks and glassware, on the streets as beggars, in the outdoor industry, brick kilns, mines, construction sector, in bars, restaurants and tourist establishments, in sexual exploitation, as soldiers. It seems that pursuant to the Employment and Unemployment Countering Act (Ustawa o zatrudnieniu i przeciwdziałaniu bezrobociu) a model contrary to the one in the act can create a criminological model of modern human trafficking. It would be then running a business to gain financial benefits in the way that the businessperson exploits the position of the aggrieved party and provides the future employer with employees. The latter group, however, even if agreeing to move abroad, becomes completely dependant on the employer which is often combined with a deprivation of liberty, because they have no possibility to choose their place of staying or withdraw from the previous agreement. A number of international regulations, e.g. the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography of 2000, the Slavery Convention of 1926 together with a Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery dated l956 show, that the issue under discussion still remains a contemporary problem, and needs regulations aiming at finding relevant solutions. There can be no doubts in the light of the nullum crimen sine lege certa that a precise description of the crime is essential. Only a precise definition of a separate crime of human trafficking will enable to recognise the scope of the problem and will create internationally accepted circumstances to overcome it. Such a definition must include at least: acts: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person; means: threat to use or the use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability; purposes: forced labour or services, slavery slavery-like practices or servitude. Everyone, government and non-governmental organisations, must focus on the crime which must be precisely described including a detailed description of a victim. It is highly urgent and important to harmonise all legislative measures in order to prevent human trafficking, which would guarantee an effective protection of victims and prosecution of criminals.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 2006, XXVIII; 367-374
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Granice nieletniości w polskim prawie karnym
The Statutory Age-Limits of Juvenile Delinquenta in Polish Penal Law
Autorzy:
Rdzanek-Piwowar, Grażyna
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698533.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
nieletni przestępcy
nieletni
polskie prawo karne
kodeks karny
juvenile delinquents
juveniles
polish penal law
penal code
Opis:
The entering into force on 13 May l983 of the Act on the treatment of juveniles of 26 October 1982 ended the period of over fifty years of validity of provisions of the penal code of 1932 (Chapter XI) and code of criminal procedure of 1928 (Chapter II of Book XI) which regulated the principles of responsibility of juvenile perpetrators of “acts prohibited under penalty”. Authors of the pre-war legislation, at the first stage of its preparation in particular, intended to make it specific and educational in nature through omission in the treatment of juveniles of the elements of responsibility and punishment. The finally adopted solution was a compromise: responsibility of juveniles have been related to age, discernment, and type of measures applied. With respect to undiscerning juvenile perpetrators of acts prohibited under penalty under the age of 13, and also to those aged 13–17, only educational  measures could be applied (admonition; supervision by the parents, former guardians, or a probation officer; placement in an educational institution) Juveniles aged 13–17 who discerned the meaning of their act were to be placed in a correction al institution; educational measures were to be applied in their cases if the circumstances, the juvenile’s personality or his living conditions made such placement inexpedient. Thus the legislation concerning juveniles remained part of the system of penal law in spite of the special features it started to acquire. That was also the direction, after the war in particular, of interpretation of the legal provisions. As a result, the measures applied to juveniles were given an explicitly educational character. This was done through the relation of those imeasures  to the perpetrator’s personality and not to the act, and through abolition of the institution of discernment. Since discernment. Since mid–1950s, the juvenile courts followed instructions which  changed the legal status of a juvenile. The age limit of penal responsibility of juveniles was set initially at ten and then at 13 years; younger children were not to be brought before the courts unless the case concerned guardianship. Many changes in the post-war provisions were also introduced by means of statutes. They concerned organization and functioning of the system of treatment of juveniles  (strengthening of the role of judge, introduction of the so-called family courts, increased number of probation officers). This way, a socially desirable continuation of the legal tradition was secured by means of reforms which were evolutionary and dictated by the current needs, and without liquidation of the existing structures, tested in the practice of many decades. The new statute adopted many of those changes more or less directly. Setting the upper age limit of juveniles, the post-war penal code of 1969 preserved the principle according to which criminal responsibility is conditioned upon the offender’s age of at least 17 (Art. 9). At the same time, though, Art. 9 made it possible to apply to offenders aged 17 the measures normally designed for juveniles, and to sentence juveniles aged 16 guilty of the most serious crimes to the ordinary but extraordinarily mitigated penalties. The final shape of the Act on the treatment of juveniles of 26 October 1982 was influenced both by the intent to preserve the developed and tested solutions, and by the discussion that preceded its introduction when optional conceptions of the treatment of juveniles were submitted. The following stages of the thirty-two years’ period of legislative works can be distinguished: – the years 1950–1956; long works on a new penal code were in progress and attempts were made at aggravating the responsibility of juveniles through the introduction of penalties (according to a draft of 1950, penalties were to be imposed on juveniles starting from the age of 12); – the years 1956–1960; in 1956, it was decided to work on a separate statute on juvenil and not within the preparation of a new penal code; a special team of the Codification Commission failed to agree upon a draft of the statute; – the years 1961–65;  no legislative works were formally in progres but two different conceptions were discussed: of inclusion of prevention in the act (which would thus apply to the socially maladjusted juveniles as well) and of introduction of social courts; – the years 1966–1971; attempts were made at partly realizing those conceptions in a succession of draft statutes; – the years 1972–76; the works were conducted by the Ministry of Education which tried to include the problems of prevention of juvenile delinquency and treatment of juveniles in a broader statute called the young generation code; – the years 1977–82 when the works on a statute were again taken over by the Ministry of Justice and a succession of versions of the draft were prepared. The Act of 26 October 1982 on the treatment of juveniles changed the scope of the notion of “juvenile”. According to the statutory definition, juveniles are: 1) persons with respect to whom provisions of  the act apply in the sphere of prevention and control of demoralization; the upper age limit in this category is 18 years, and the lower limit is not specified; 2) persons with respect to whom provisions of the statute apply in the sphere of proceedings in cases of punishable acts; such proceedings can be instituted towards persons who have been aged over 13 but under 17 while committing a punishable act; 3) persons with respect to whom provisions of the statute apply in connection with the carrying out of educational or corrective measures; the upper age limit of this category is 21 years. Tlerefore, the statute goes beyond the sphere traditionally reserved for penal law. The aim at making the statute educational in nature is manifested above all by the principle that the commission by a juvenile of a punishable act is not the only condition of the institution of proceedings in the case of that juvenile. The statute sanctions the need for intervention in the early stage of social maladjustment not only in cases where that maladjustment manifests itself in a punishable act. If a juvenile does commit an act of this  kind, his offence is not examined in the categories of guilt and responsibility. This is manifested by the abolition of the criteria of discernment, by the term “punishable act” used to designate an  offence committed by a juvenile, and by the absence of the term “responsibility of juveniles” in the name and provisions of the statute discussed. The statute bases on the assumption of education; its basic notion is demoralization. In its first meaning in which it has been used by the legislator, “demoralization'” is treated as a prerequisite of initiation of proceedings. Were the educational assumptions adopted to the full, commission of a punishable act could and should be treated as one of the symptoms of demoralization, not different in any way from the other symptoms. Assumed in the statute, however, is a special treatment of the juveniles with respecr to whom provisions of the statute apply in the sphere of prevention of demoralization, and in the sphere of control of demoralization. With respect to the latter, provisions of  the statute on  proceedings in cases of punishable acts apply, and with respect to the former – provisions on civil proceedings. The differentiation introduced by the statute (which is not consistent for that matter) results from a specific compromise: a combination of the ideas of prevention and  education with the approach typical of penal law where the legal response is conditioned upon the gravity of the act.  A conflict of the tendencies which clash nowadays all over the world – to preserve the model of treatment of juveniles within the institutions of penal law on the one hand, and to give the statute an educational character on the other  hand – can be noticed in other provisions of the statute discussed as well. In the classical system, the age limits of juveniles were clear and had just as clearly defined functions – they marked out the age of the so-called conditional criminal responsibility, provided discernment could be ascertained. Today, the upper limit of the age of juveniles is usually also the limit of full criminal responsibility, although many legislations provide for an exceptional possibility of imposition of penalties upon the oldest juveniles who commit a crime or a serious offence. The problem of the lower limit is more entangled , the modern legislations adopting several age limits here which results usually from the need to determine different scopes of intervention of the legal provisions in the sphere of juvenile law. Therefore, what still remains an important issue  is for the juvenile law to define an age limit below which provisions of penal law never apply, not even as auxiliaries.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1993, XIX; 191-231
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Culture defence a polskie prawo karne
Culture Defence and Polish Penal Law
Autorzy:
Sitarz, Olga
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698748.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
cultural defence
prawo karne
prawo zwyczajowe
kultura
mniejszości narodowe
polskie prawo karne
Polish Penal Law
cultural offence
culture
minority
culture defence
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 2008, XXIX-XXX; 643-652
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zgwałcenie. Gdy termin nabiera nowej treści. Pozorny brak zmian i jego skutki
Rape : When an Old Term Acquires a New Meaning. A Consequence of False Sameness
Autorzy:
Płatek, Monika
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698782.pdf
Data publikacji:
2018
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
zgwałcenie
przestępstwo zgwałcenia w kodeksie karnym z 1997
zgwałcenie w Konwencji antyprzemocowej
autonomia seksualna
wolność seksualna
Konwencja antyprzemocowa
Konwencja CEDAW
wyrok ETPCz M.C. v. Bułgaria
rape
sexual autonomy
sexual freedom
Art. 197 of the Polish Criminal Law
Istanbul Convention (CETS210)
Art. 36 of CETS210
CEDAW Convention
ECHR M.C. v. Bulgaria
Istanbul Convention
Polish Criminal Law
Opis:
The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence againstwomen and domestic violence (further: CETS210, Istanbul Convention, Anti-violenceConvention) became part of the Polish legal system on 1 August 2015. The IstanbulConvention incorporates a specific legal provision on rape, namely Art. 36 CETS210.It states that the Parties should take the necessary legislative or other measures toensure that the intentional conduct described in Art. 36 CETS210 is criminalised.Article 36.1a CETS210 states that rape takes place when engaging in non-consensualvaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person withany bodily part or object.Rape is respectively regulated in Art. 19 7 of the Polish Criminal Code 1997 (further,k.k.). However, the context of Art. 197 k.k. significantly differs from the wordingof Art. 36 CETS. Whereas Art. 36 CETS protects freedom, autonomy and sexualautonomy of the person, Art. 197 k.k. protects merely sexual freedom combined withprotecting the social customs. In order to establish the presence of rape, one needs toprove the presence of violence, psychological aggression and/or deception. Protectingsocial customs implies an additional burden because it allows evaluating the behaviourof the victim rather than the one of the perpetrator. The Istanbul Convention is orientedon eager elimination of violence against women and domestic violence. Therefore, itestablishes that the Parties should take the necessary measures to promote changesin the social and cultural patterns and behaviour of women and men with a view toeradicating prejudice, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based onthe idea of the inferiority of women or stereotyped roles for women and men (Art.12.1 CETS210). It is within this line that rape regulation should follow.The question that is tackled in this article is as follows: to what extent doesthe difference in the legal description of the act of “rape”, and the difference in protectedvalues by legal provision in Art. 36 CETS210 and in Art. 197 k.k. make an ontologicaland normative difference? Are they not possible to be reconciled? Or, is the meredifference in the words describing what “rape” not an obstacle to achieving the goalsexpected by Art. 36 CETS210?The problem is not an artificial one especially in view of the fact that the Polishlegislators did not amend the text of Art. 197 k.k. upon the ratification of CETS210. It would suggest that the Polish legislator was of the opinion that there is no definitedifference between Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. The text examines what happen eswhen an old term acquires new meaning.Is Art. 197 k.k. despite the lack of amendments filling the value required by Art.36 CETS210? Or, is the sameness expected by the Polish legislator false? By demonstratingvital differences in the protected values and the action required establish ingthe presence of the rape, I call for amendments to fulfill the state legal obligations toobserve the Istanbul Convention.The article deals with the ontological difference in the legal concept behind the textof Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. While Art. 197 k.k. is built on the concept of sexualfreedom, Art. 36 CETS is developed on the concept of sexual autonomy. I elaborateon that.The changes in the protected values incorporated in Art. 36 CETS210 lead toabandoning the concept of sexual freedom established in Art. 197 k.k. and adoptingthe concept of sexual autonomy. While the former concept of sexual freedom, asin Art. 197 k.k., uses violence, psychological aggression and/or deception to establishthe presence of rape, for sexual autonomy as defined in Art. 36 CETS210 the line iscrossed where the consent was not present. While sexual freedom limits freedom to torefusal, sexual autonomy demands the presence of consent. Not violence, aggressionor deception, but the lack of consents matters.The term and concept of sexual autonomy was first explored by the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights in the landmark European Court of Human Right (furtherECHR) judgment M.C. v. Bulgaria (No. 39272/98). The case is thoroughly analysedto further illuminate the difference between the two concepts behind the differentapproaches to defining “rape”.The article, however, starts with an in-depth introduction to the goal of the IstanbulConvention, which is to place the issue of rape in a proper perspective. Apart froma criminological analysis of the concept of rape, the article discusses the values protectedby, respectively, Art. 36 CETS210 and Art. 197 k.k. and compares the similarities andactual differences. A similar examination is related to the description of “rape” in Art.36 CETS and Art. 197 k.k. Last but not least, the subject is evaluated, taking the Polishcriminal dogmas into consideration.The conclusion of the examination leaves no room for assuming that Art. 197 k.k.fulfills the requirement stipulated by Art. 36 CETS210. It is, therefore necessary, toamend Art. 197 k.k.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 2018, XL; 263-325
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zakład Kryminologii INP PAN z perspektywy współczesnej
Department of Criminology of the Institute of Law Studies in a Modern Perspective
Autorzy:
Buczkowski, Konrad
Klaus, Witold
Woźniakowska-Fajst, Dagmara
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698876.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
Instytut Nauk Prawnych Polskiej Akademii Nauk
Zakład Kryminologii INP PAN
Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences
Department of Criminology of the Institute of Law Studies
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 2008, XXIX-XXX; 49-63
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Obraz polityki karnej lat osiemdziesiątych i początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych (1980‒1991)
Penal Policy in the 1980s and early 1990s (1980‒1991)
Autorzy:
Jasiński, Jerzy
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/962416.pdf
Data publikacji:
1993
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
polityka karna
sądy polskie
prawo karne
penal policy
Polish courts
penal law
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1993, XIX; 27-105
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Zjawisko wiktymizacji wtórnej: pojęcie, przyczyny, przeciwdziałanie (na przykładzie niektórych polskich regulacji karnych)
Secondary Victimisation: Definition, Causes, Prevention (Example of Selected Polish Penal Regulations)
Autorzy:
Bieńkowska, Ewa
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/698870.pdf
Data publikacji:
2008
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
wiktymizacja wtórna
prawo karne
wiktymologia
powództwo adhezyjne
polskie prawo karne
postępowanie mediacyjne
secondary victimization
adhesion procedure
Polish Penal Regulations
penal law
victimology
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 2008, XXIX-XXX; 65-74
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
Tytuł:
Polska myśl kryminologiczna od schyłku XIX w. do 1939 r.
The Polish Criminological Thought from the Close of the 19th Century till 1939
Autorzy:
Nelken, Jan
Powiązania:
https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/699220.pdf
Data publikacji:
1986
Wydawca:
Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Prawnych PAN
Tematy:
kryminologia
prawo karne
historia
filozofia
szkoła antropologiczna
psychopatia
socjologia
osobowość
przestępca
polityka kryminalna
criminology
criminal law
history
philosophy
anthropological school
psychopaty
sociology
personality
criminal
criminal policy
polish criminological thought
Opis:
Both the anthropological school of Lombroso, established in the late half of the 19th century, and the sociological school established by Ferri and other criminologists ( Liszt, Prins, van Hammel, Tarde) met with a keen interest in Poland. However, the anthropological school was criticized, as it was the case in other countries too, both by the classical school of penal law, and from the sociological point of view. A critical analysis of the views of Lombroso and his successors was made by the leading representative of the classical school of penal law in Poland in those days Krzymuski who  postulated that recognition of the individual’s free will to be condition of his penal liability, Krzymuski opposed free will to be conception of a born criminal propagated by Lombroso. Lombroso’s theory was also criticized by  Krzywicki, a sociologist and anthropologist who considered the former’s  approach towards the conditions of crime to be too narrow, leaving out of account those resulting from the social and economic conditions. On the other  hand, Polish criminologists considered it to be Lombroso’s unquestionable merit that he had called attention to the necessity of studying the offender's personality, and in this way initiated the modern criminology. Opinions of various sociological schools were discussed in the Polish literature and accepted by the majority of authors starting from the close of the 19th century. In particular, the most accepted one was the opinion that offence is a result of both individual and social factors, and the aim of punishment meted out by the court should be not only to deter. the perpetrator from committing offences, but also to reeducate him. Due to the fact that in the 19th-centuiy judicial practice the sentence depended on the extent of damage caused by the offender, it was emphasized in the Polish literature that punishment should take into consideration also the offender's individual features, as it is only then that it can fulfil its tasks (Stebelski). With the accepted division of offenders into professional and causal, the fact was stressed that - if the offender reveals a tendency to relapse into crime- the measures the society applies towards him should be more drastic since the society has to defend itself against incorrigible criminals in an effective way. Instead, more lenient measures should be applied towards causal offenders, such measures  being sufficient for their reeducation. In the period between the two world wars, criminology in Poland became a separate branch and extended its range; the establishment of the Polish Criminological Society in 1921 and of the Department of Criminology at the Free Polish University in 1922, later (I932) transformed into the Criminological Institute, contributed to this situation. The Polish criminology of that period faced the task of studying and defining in detail the basic factors of crime: individual (endogenous) and social (exogenous). This was related to the necessity to learn about the sources of crime with the aim of its effective control by means of preparing a Penal Code and properly shaping the criminal policy (Wróblewski). When studying the individual factors of crime, particular attention was paid to the psychopathic personality. Criminal psychopaths were believed to suffer from a pathological moral defect resulting from their underdevelopment in the sphere of emotions. It was stated that psychopaths who committed an offence should not be recognized as mentally irresponsible (Nelken). Psychopathy cannot be treated psychiatrically; on the other hand, intensified resocialization of the offender is necessary here, conditions for this treatment created during his prison term. At the same time, an adequate segregation of prisoners should be applied based on the psychopathological criterion (Łuniewski). The science of the offender's personality was called criminal biology; it dealt with the physical and mental structure of the offender. Criminal biology was to make use of the general anthropological, psychological and psychiatric data as well as those gathered by means of other clinical methods. Aimed at  gathering comprehensive data concerning the whole of the offender’s mental and physical properties, criminal biology should not confine itself to a mere specification of his various traits: it should also study their origin, methodically examining the development of these properties in the milieu in which the offender’s personality was formed. Thus the criminal-biological research must be made from the psychological and medical as well as sociological points of view. Particular importance was attached to detailed environmental research in the study of juvenile delinquents (Batawia). In the early Thirties, the Ministry of Justice initiated criminological- biological research in prisons. The research was carried out by special commissions with the use of a specially prepared comprehensive questionnaire . The greatest part was played by psychiatric and psychological examination. The  criminal-biological research in prisons was interrupted by the outbreak of the war. In connection with the criminogenic role of alcoholism, criminologists spoke for a considerable reduction of production and sale of spirits. Moreover, an opinion was expressed that a commission of an offence in the state of a normal (the so-called physiological) intoxication should not result in the recognition of the offender as mentally irresponsible. Only pathological intoxication may be considered from the point of view of irrespossibility. The offender should not avail himself of his intoxication as a mitigating circumstance (Nelken). The scientists opposed the introduction of compulsory sterilization which was to be applied toward persons whose children could inherit serious  pathological traits from them. The opposition had both scientific and humanistic grounds (Łuniewski, Nelken). Compulsory sterilization was not introduced. The main trend of the Polish criminology in the period between the wars corresponded with the sociological school which took into account the relationship between the endogenous (biological) and the exogenous (social) factors in the origins of crime. A vast majority of Polish criminologists opposed the conception of a “born criminal” put forward by Lombroso. Some of the Polish scholars of the period between the wars who used the term “criminal anthropology” (e.g. Rabinowicz), emphasized the evolution of this science which differed from the Lombroso’s doctrine, and postulated the social milieu as a factor be largely taken into consideration in the studies on the causes of crime. In the Polish criminology of those days, the stress was laid principally on criminal biology due to the fact that the internal factor is usually less  conspicuous and more difficult to prove than the external one in the etiology of crime. It was emphasized that not all of persons who  found themselves in unfavourable social conditions turned offenders (Neymark, Lemkin); therefore, the biological (somato psychological) factor determines the individual’s moral resistance to the unfavourable external conditions. On the other hand, also the social factor, in addition to the biological one, was included in the causes of crime, due to the considerable impact of living conditions on the human mind. The opinion was that - though the etiology of an offence is usually determined by a combination of the external and internal factors - in each case one should attempt to find out which of these factors prevailed in the origin of a given act; this should also be taken into account in the criminological prognosis. In general, the chance for correction is smaller in the case of an offender of the endogenous type who requires a more thorough and longer resocialization as compared with one of the exogenous type; this should be taken into account by the court when meting out punishment (Rabinowicz, Lemkin). The Polish  Penal Code of 1932 (in force till 1969) was an expression of the compromise between the classical school of penal law and the sociological school. In the code, many legal structures included in the General Part were formulated in accordance with the achievements of the science of penal law in its classical form; this concerns particularly the definition or the essence of crime and the principles of liability including that of subjectivism as responsibility for a culpable act. A compromising character was given in the code to meting out punishment which was conditioned not only  by the weight of the offence according to the classical principle of retribution and deterrence, but also by the offender's personality and the life he had led hitherto according to the instructions of the sociological school (Art. 54). The discussed code did not adopt from the Italian positivism the so-called ante-criminal prevention, i.e.. the application of sanctions towards an individual who has not committed any prohibited act yet. Also indeterminate sentences were not adopted in the Code in relation to penalties and not protective measures, as this would be contradictory to the principle of individualization of punishment. Under the influence of the sociological school the Code contained of a possibility of suspension of ęxceution of the penalty, and of its extraordinary rnitigation, as well as the release from prison before the expiration of term (separately regulated by the law of 1927-) and a possibility to mete out a more severe penalty in the case of recidivists. In addition to the medical security measures, which consisted in the commitment of the offender to a mental hospital and which the court could apply towards the persons guilty of acts committed in the state of mental irresponsibility or decreased responsibility, the code introduced - basing on the postulates of the sociological school-isolating security measures applied towards the offenders whose acts were connected with reluctance to work, and towards recidivists and professional as well as habitual criminals if their staying at liberty endangered the legal order. The isolating security measures were applied together with the penalty (not instead of it), the necessity of their application connected with the ‘’ state of danger", i.e. the perpetrator's probability of commission of further offences; in the criminological literature, subjective and state of objective criteria of the danger were distinguished (Strasman). According to Art. 84 of the  Penal Code, offenders of this type were  committed to a special institution  for at least 5 years, and the court decided after the termination of each such period whether it was necessary to prolong the commitment for the next five years. In the Penal Code of 1932, also the measures applied towards juvenile delinquents were divided into educational measures on the one hand, and commitment to a corrective institution on the other hand, depending  on the juvenile's age and of his possible discernment or lack there of when committing the forbiden act.
Źródło:
Archiwum Kryminologii; 1986, XIII; 223-260
0066-6890
2719-4280
Pojawia się w:
Archiwum Kryminologii
Dostawca treści:
Biblioteka Nauki
Artykuł
    Wyświetlanie 1-10 z 10

    Ta witryna wykorzystuje pliki cookies do przechowywania informacji na Twoim komputerze. Pliki cookies stosujemy w celu świadczenia usług na najwyższym poziomie, w tym w sposób dostosowany do indywidualnych potrzeb. Korzystanie z witryny bez zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies oznacza, że będą one zamieszczane w Twoim komputerze. W każdym momencie możesz dokonać zmiany ustawień dotyczących cookies