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    Tytuł:
    Koniec zimnej wojny na południu Afryki. Sprawa Namibii podczas negocjacji między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Związkiem Sowieckim (1987–1988)
    The end of the cold war in Southern Africa. Question of Namibia during American-Soviet negotiations (1987–1988)
    Autorzy:
    Szczepańska, Anna
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/688354.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2018
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Tematy:
    Namibia
    niepodległość
    negocjacje
    konstruktywne porozumienie
    szczyt
    independence
    negotiations
    constructive engagement
    summit
    Opis:
    Among many conflicts between United States and Soviet Union during the cold war era, one of the longest were Namibia’s independence war and civil war in Angola. In the historiography, especially South Africa’s literature, both of them are linkaged and known as Border War. However, Namibians had begun their struggle in 1966, twenty years later there was no perspective to finisz the war. The major breakthrough appeared in 1987–1988 thanks to series of meetings between president of the US, Ronald Reagan and general secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. The key role played the year 1988. One year later United Nations has implemented Resolution 435 of Security Council from 1978. From that day, South Africa Defence Forces were beginning withdrawal from Namibia’s territory. This article refers about the most characteristic and important aspects of United States’ and Soviet Union’ negotiations in 1987–1988, especially before and during Moscow summit in May and June 1988.
    Spośród wielu sporów istniejących między Stanami Zjednoczonymi a Związkiem Sowieckim w czasie zimnej wojny jednymi z trwających najdłużej była wojna o niepodległość Namibii i wojna domowa w Angoli, w literaturze traktowane niekiedy jako jeden konflikt, nazywany południowoafrykańską wojną o granice. Walka Namibijczyków o wolność trwała od 1966 r., jednak 20 lat później wciąż nie było widać perspektyw szybkiego zakończenia konfliktu. Przełom nastąpił w latach 1987–1988 dzięki seriom spotkań i negocjacji, jakie odbyły się między administracją prezydenta USA Ronalda Reagana i sekretarza generalnego KPZS Michaiła Gorbaczowa. Dla rozwiązania kwestii Namibii kluczowym rokiem był 1988 dzięki podpisaniu w Nowym Jorku grudniowych porozumień między władzami Angoli, Kuby i RPA. Rok później rozpoczęto realizację Rezolucji Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nr 435, a wojska południowoafrykańskie zaczęły stopniowo opuszczać terytorium Namibii. Artykuł ma na celu wskazać najważniejsze aspekty negocjacji między USA i ZSRS w sprawie Namibii w latach 1987–1988, głównie przed szczytem i w czasie jego trwania (Moskwa, przełom maja i czerwca 1988 r.).
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica; 2018, 100; 171-184
    0208-6050
    2450-6990
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Niemiecko-sowieckie negocjacje w sprawie traktatu o nieagresji i neutralności z 24 kwietnia 1926 r.
    German-Soviet Negotiations concerning non-aggression and neutrality treaty 24th April, 1926
    Autorzy:
    Mikła, Łukasz
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/18104705.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2013
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Opis:
    Dating back to Rapallo treaty German-Soviet political-military cooperation was based on creating the permanent conflict between both countries and the Versailles system. It could have seemed that Locarno challenged the assumption because one of the consequences of the Rhine Pact and accompanying it agreements according to the western policy was the political isolation of the USSR as well as slackening the cooperation between Berlin and Moscow. But those predictions faced the obstacle as far as the German policy was concerned as they did not want to abandon the benefits of the alliance with Kremlin. The expression of this was the conclusion of the economic treaty between both countries on 12th October 1925 as well as the fight that was led by the German delegates in Locarno with their western partners concerning the interpretation of the article 16 Covenant of the League of Nations. However the essential and fundamental evidence to the willingness to continue the cooperation established in Rapallo was the non-aggression and neutrality treaty concluded on 24th April, 1926 also called the Treaty of Berlin. The treaty consisted of four points and two additional notes. It had been concluded for 5 years. It had guaranteed the neutrality of signatories in the case of attack of the third country on one of the sides. It had also obliged to the suppression of the aggression as well as it prohibited the participation in the enemy treaties. The essential in the note was the German obligation that its access to the League of Nations will not have a negative influence on the friendly relationships between Moscow as they will not lead to recognition the Soviet Union as an aggressor and in the event of such a possibility they will not take part in the imposed sanctions. The negations on the project lasted almost half a year and demanded many detailed findings. The main dispute concerned the entry number 2. The Soviets postulated the cancellation of the word “unprovoked” as a word formulation that is contradictory to the peace policy of both sides of the treaty. The German considered that the removal of the that formula would be received in a negative way by the western countries. They also paid attention that all the political treaties of this kind included them as well as that the crossing-out of it would mean the necessity of acknowledge the USSR as an attacked side. It was emphasized that if the word “unprovoked” remained it would not diminish the meaning of the treaty for the Soviet side. According to the content of the note, it was the German government to decide whether the Soviet Union is an aggressor in the conflict with other countries regardless of the interpretation of the League of Nations. As a solution to the dispute Gustaw Stresemann – the leader of Auswärtiges Amt – offered the introduction of the word formulation “despite the peaceful attitude”. That word formulation was accepted by Moscow and it led to the signing of the treaty together with the notes included.
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica; 2013, 90; 115-139
    0208-6050
    2450-6990
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Ceremoniał dyplomatyczny na dworze angielskim w negocjacjach z Rzecząpospolitą w XVII wieku
    The Diplomatic Ceremony at the English Court in the Negotiations with Polish Republic in the 17th Century
    Autorzy:
    Maciejewski, Piotr
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/18104503.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2005
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Opis:
    The article is an attempt to depict the ceremony which existed within the courtly-diplomatic relationships between Poland and England in the limes of Elisabeth I, James I and Charles I, and to show its role. The paper is based on such sources as the accounts of legations to England by Paweł Działyński (1597), Jerzy Ossoliński (1621) and Jan Zawadzki (1633). Some inside information was taken from the accounts or private travel of Jakub Sobieski (1609). The ceremony at the English court, similarly as in other capital cities visited by our diplomats, was not only essential for the international relationships and enabled contacts between countries in general, but it also ensured achieving the most important thing in politics — the compromise. Besides that, it served harmonious coexistence and secured comfort in any actions. I here was on condition for that of course: both sides should properly receive the signals given (e.g. gestures, greetings, speeches, toasting, feasts, gifts and tokens, etc.). The only visible difference between the two sides would be the outside difference e.g. in clothing. The above can be proved by the fact that Polish diplomats, equipped with instructions, letters from the country and the knowledge gained, could easily manage the relationships with the royalty and high range English diplomats. Polish diplomats didn’t find it difficult to adjust to the local customs (with the exception of the unprecedented case of Działyński).
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica; 2005, 79; 7-26
    0208-6050
    2450-6990
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Przesłanki, negocjacje i ogłoszenie brytyjsko-tureckiej deklaracji o wzajemnej pomocy z 12 maja 1939 r.
    Circumstances, Negotiations and Announcement of the British-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Aid on May 12th 1939
    Autorzy:
    Zdulski, Krzysztof
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/18104736.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2012
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Opis:
    German occupation of the Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939 and the simultaneous apparent threat to Rumania began the switch in British policy of appeasement to one of containment of the III Reich. However, it did not affect relations between Turkey and the Great Britain. The prime minister Arthur Neville Chamberlain did not want to include Ankara in plans of establishing a “peaceful front” against probable German aggression in Europe in order not to antagonize Italy, which played a crucial role in British efforts to maintain security in the Mediterranean area. Only after Italian aggression on Albania (April 7th 1939), when it became clear that understanding with Benito Mussolini is unfeasible, did British government take a firmer stand towards Rome. It was decided that Greece, which was thought to be the most threaten of Italian aggression, would be given guarantees in case of hostile attack. Firmer attitude was possible also due to the fact, that Mediterranean strategy of the Great Britain had became more aggressive, which resulted as much as from change in personnel at the Admiralty House in October 1938 as from sheer incapacity to send the fleet to the Far East should war with Japan occur concurrently with war in Europe. In these circumstances British Government decided to deepen rapprochement with Ankara. Turkey was seen as a vital ally in case of war with Italy. From a military perspective Turkish army could have attacked Dodecanese Islands. What was more important Turkey could close Dardanelles to Italian shipping, which could have been a severe blow for economy of Italy (10 per cent of Ital¬ian trade and 23 per cent of Italian oil passed through this strait). From political point of view the Foreign Office recognised Turkey as a “Small Great Power”. It was thought that Ankara could have benevolently influenced the Balkan countries and as a Moslem country, bolstered Britain’s influence in its numerous Muslim colonies. Initially the British tried to persuade Turks to join them in announcing guarantees to Greece. However when Ankara refuse to do so, explaining that it cannot extend her obligations at least, when better dispositions existed for their own security, British Government decided to limit its efforts to signing the treaty of mutual assistance. On April 15th 1939 Turkey accepted British offer, which initiated a long-lasting negotiations. They were not only limited to the issue of mutual obligations, but also include such problems as: security in Balkan area and relations with France and the Soviet Union. The first phase of negotiations ended on May 12th 1939, when the British-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Aid was announced. It was a first, but simultaneously a crucial step to British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was signed on October 17th 1939.
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica; 2012, 89; 121-150
    0208-6050
    2450-6990
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
    Tytuł:
    Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec przyszłości Fiume/Rijeki w negocjacjach Rady Najwyższej Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu w roku 1919
    British diplomacy and the future of Fiume/Rijeka in the negotiations of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
    Autorzy:
    Ławski, Dominik
    Powiązania:
    https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/2108999.pdf
    Data publikacji:
    2021-08-30
    Wydawca:
    Uniwersytet Łódzki. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego
    Tematy:
    Fiume
    Wielka Brytania
    David Lloyd George
    Konferencja Pokojowa w Paryżu
    kwestia adriatycka
    Bałkany
    United Kingdom
    Paris Peace Conference
    Adriatic question
    Balkans
    Opis:
    Celem artykułu jest zobrazowanie postawy brytyjskiej dyplomacji podczas negocjacji na temat kwestii Fiume w czasie obrad Rady Najwyższej Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu, na której zapadały najważniejsze decyzje dotyczące losów powojennej Europy. Analizie poddano zachowanie premiera Lloyda George’a wobec ogółu problemu kwestii adriatyckiej oraz sporu włosko-amerykańskiego. Zaprezentowano najważniejsze interesy Wielkiej Brytanii, które determinowały obrany kurs wobec tej sprawy. Zarysowano także stosunek szefów dyplomacji brytyjskiej do najważniejszych wydarzeń w Fiume w 1919 r.
    The aim of the article is to illustrate the attitude of British diplomacy during the negotiations on the Fiume issue during the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in Paris, where the most important decisions concerning the fate of post-war Europe were made. Prime Minister Lloyd George’s behavior towards the general problem of the Adriatic and the Italian-American dispute was analyzed. The most important interests of Great Britain, which determined the course taken in this matter, were presented. The attitude of the heads of British diplomacy towards the most important events in Fiume in 1919 was also outlined.
    Źródło:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica; 2021, 108; 165-192
    0208-6050
    2450-6990
    Pojawia się w:
    Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
    Dostawca treści:
    Biblioteka Nauki
    Artykuł
      Wyświetlanie 1-5 z 5

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